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Introduction
Reconstructing the Debate on Globalization: 
from Optimism to Doubt
Claudia Sunna
__________________________________
1. The Raising of the Globalization processes. The Optimistic Era
Starting from the mid-1990s, the globalization process was 
seen as a positive phenomenon which was leading economies toward 
a path of sustained growth. 
Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995) maintained that the 
globalization processes, measured by the market based international 
flows of goods and capitals, besides been responsible for the growth 
processes in developed countries, had the capacity to promote abso-
lute convergence in income levels between developed and poor 
countries. In other words, since the poor countries, thanks to globali-
zation processes, grow at higher rates than the developed countries,
this in the long term leads to homogeneity in income levels at the in-
ternational level. 
According to Sachs and Warner, since 1970 this process was 
driven by the “most remarkable institutional harmonization and eco-
nomic integration among nations in world history” (ibid., p. 1)1
                                                          
1 According to the authors this process was not completely new. A first 
wave of global economic integration was witnessed during the period that 
ran from 1870s to the first World War. In the period within the two world 
and 
Globalization and Economic Crisis
6
 
put forward by the newly established World Trade Organization and 
the International Monetary Fund. Economic integration means “not 
only increased market-based trade and financial flows, but also insti-
tutional harmonization with regard to trade policy, legal codes, tax 
systems, ownership patterns, and other regulatory arrangements” 
(ibid., p. 2). This process has the formidable capacity to explain the 
potential of growth of internationally integrated economies and “the 
onset or avoidance of economic crises” (ibid.). In conclusion the two 
main “promises” of globalization, which were of vital importance for 
many poor countries, were the reduction of poverty and the ensuring 
of economic stability. As we will see in section 2 these promises 
were systematically unfulfilled. 
This optimistic approach towards the globalization processes 
is emphasized, although not unanimously, by many authors. Jeffrey 
Frankel maintains that globalization processes have generated a posi-
tive impact in the social sphere and in particular on the distribution 
of income (since the expansion of trade increases aggregate income
and ultimately equality) and in protecting the environment (Frankel 
2000, p. 64). This latter case, as the distribution of income, would be 
described with an "environmental Kuznets curve". According to this 
curve a growing income increases the material chances to protect the 
environment against pollution caused by industrial production.
As it will be detailed below, in this literature, globalization is 
intended primarily as a phenomenon derived from economic pro-
cesses. This means mainly the reduction of transport costs, which
originate in the private sector, and trade liberalization, resulting from
decisions taken in the public sphere.
The process of integration of the world economies would
therefore also have positive effects in reducing poverty and this 
seems to be the orientation of the World Bank. In 2002 the Bank
                                                                                                                           
wars this process of integration was interrupted as countries started to erect 
trade barriers, Sachs, Warner, 1995, pp. 5-12. For a comparison between the 
two waves of globalization see Bordo, Eichengreen, Irving 1999. For a 
critical reconstruction of this vulgate see Chang 2003, pp. 13-19; Chang 
2008, pp. 26-31; Milanovic 2003. 
Globalization and Economic Crisis
 
7
published a report entitled Globalization, Growth and Poverty: 
Building an Inclusive World Economy, edited by Paul Collier and 
David Dollar.
From the report, albeit with due caution, it appears that in 
some countries globalization reduces poverty and inequality in in-
come distribution. In this study the definition of the components of 
the globalization process is further articulated. Among the factors re-
sponsible for globalization, in addition to reduced transport costs and
trade liberalization, the authors referred also to the spread of new 
media, namely the Internet, the increase in capital flows and the
boost to the international migration of labor (Collier, Dollar 2002, 
p.11).
The general scheme of the report is that well internationally 
integrated economies generally grow faster than the other economies. 
This growth in poor countries is responsible for the escaping from 
rural poverty, for the increase in labour productivity and, if the proc-
ess is well driven by national economies and international agencies, 
for the reduction of the income gap between rich and poor countries. 
The observed decrease in global poverty is the result mainly of 
the growth processes initiated in the two most populous countries of 
the world: India and China.
Furthermore the authors underline that globalization processes 
do not contribute to increase inequality in the distribution of income 
within countries (ibid., pp. 11-13). They also maintain that the glob-
alization debate, put forward by the so-called global civil society, has 
raised many question on the effects of globalization process regard-
ing the problems of poverty reduction, the shift of power among 
groups within the national economies, the cultural transformation of 
countries and the environmental issues. As far as the globalization 
processes, according to the authors, they can contribute to respond to 
these challenges in a positive way. 
For Collier and Dollar, in order to involve all the countries that
have not yet benefited by the globalization processes, there is the 
need of a new round of commercial agreements. National economies 
must intervene also by putting into action selected policies and insti-
tutions that, generally speaking, must create an appropriate environ-
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ment for local investments. In order to protect workers who do not 
benefit by the globalization processes some kind of one-off social 
policies must be put into operation (ibid., ch. 3).
This boundless confidence in the processes of globalization,
though not unanimous, endured as a dominant view until the finan-
cial and economic crisis started in 2007. As we will see in the next 
section among the first authoritative critics of globalization emerges,
with a great stir, an insider, Joseph Stiglitz.
2. The Criticism of Globalization 
The first well-known critic of the triumphant so-called neo-
classical globalization approach was Joseph Stiglitz. According to 
Stiglitz globalization is a process that potentially can generate a sig-
nificant increase in growth and well-being in many poor countries of 
the world. The point then is that the advocates of globalization, 
namely the international bureaucrats of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) and of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), system-
atically guided globalization for the sake of the economic interest of 
rich countries, and mainly for the economic interests of the United 
States (Stiglitz 2002, ch.1; 2003, ch.9). The charges of Stiglitz were 
of course well documented as he, during the 1990s, served as a 
member and then chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers of 
the President Bill Clinton and as senior vice president and chief 
economist at the World Bank. With his books on globalization 
Stiglitz explains to a wider audience the causes of the stream of pro-
test raised against WTO and IMF, starting from the events of Seattle 
in 1999. 
Stiglitz substantially demonstrated that the free trade liberali-
zation process, which was invoked as the fundamental prerequisite of 
triumphant globalization, was not effective for the growth of poor 
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countries, nor equitable2
International trade is a fundamental step toward self sustained 
progress and any country of the world cannot even imagine to de-
velop without increasing her capacity to produce and to export. This 
is probably an unquestioned aspect of the globalization process. The 
point is, as well explained by Ha-Joon Chang, that looking back at 
history of now developed countries it is possible to state that almost 
every country has used in the past protectionist policy measures in 
order to develop the national industrial sector (infant industry) and 
this applies to XVII century England, to France, Germany, United 
States, Sweden, Japan and, of course, to South Korea and China 
(Chang 2003, ch. 2). 
. This happened because the treaties imposed 
to developing and poor countries were studied in order to open those 
economies without reciprocity with developed countries and this 
process was related both to international trade and to the financial 
sector. 
According to Chang “infant industry promotion (…) has been 
the key to the development of most nations (…). Preventing the de-
veloping countries from adopting these policies constitutes a serious 
constraint on their capacity to generate economic development” 
(ibid., p. 10). Furthermore, developed countries, through their com-
mercial treaties or with conditional loans, impose to poor countries a 
set of rules and institutions, such as the protection of intellectual 
property rights, financial institutions, Central Bank, democracy, effi-
cient bureaucracy, corporate governance institutions that they did not 
have before becoming developed (ibid., ch. 3).
The conclusion of Chang is that the set of rules and institutions 
imposed to developing countries (and in the first place trade liberali-
zation) is a perverse system of obstacles brought forward in order to 
prevent them to raise and develop autonomously. The point really 
interesting for our purposes is that for Chang, given these premises, 
globalization, in the version exposed in the section above, simply 
                                                          
2 Stiglitz mainly referred to the Uruguay Round of 1987-1993 that leaded to 
the conversion of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) into the 
World trade Organization, Stiglitz 2002, pp. 7-9.
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does not exist. There are institutions and power relationships at the 
international level which historically determine phases of intensifica-
tion of international trade and phases of contractions. In essence,
globalization is not, as on the contrary is emphasized also by Stiglitz,
a phenomenon related to the possibility of economic and technologi-
cal expansion of trade.
For Chang the puzzling question about the globalization proc-
esses is that 
“as a result of neo-liberal policies, income inequality has 
increased in most countries (…) but growth has actually slowed 
down significantly. (…). Neo-liberal globalization has failed to de-
liver on all fronts of economic life – growth, equality and stability. 
Despite this we are constantly told how neo-liberal globalization 
has brought unprecedented benefits” (Chang 2008, p. 28).
The crucial aspect of this criticism regards the dynamic of in-
come inequality and growth at the international level. Many authors, 
in recent years, dealt with this subject in order to explain why the 
progressive integration of economies at international level produce 
many “negative externalities”, such as the increase in income ine-
quality and the ecological stress on the environment3
As far as the study on global income inequality, the most sys-
tematic analysis of this issue is the one of Branko Milanovic (2005, 
2011). Contrary to the wisdom of the optimists, Milanovic shows 
that over the past twenty-five years, global inequality, measured both
as internal inequality and as inequality between countries, has in-
creased significantly. With regard to the first type of inequality, that
is the one currently not yet well explained, the crucial point is why
inequality in the advanced countries, especially the United States and 
Europe, after a long period of decline, has started to increase. In oth-
er words, the growth of inequality in income distribution, which is 
realized during the phases of industrialization, is explained by the 
fact that it is a physiological process that the transformation of poor 
economies produces a sudden social and economic stratification. 
.
                                                          
3 For an analysis on China and India, see Bhaduri (2008).
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This has happened in the past to the present advanced economies and 
more recently to the so-called emerging economies: China, India and
Russia.
The question, however, is that the processes of globalization, 
at the opposite to what had been expected, did not favor the reduc-
tion of inequality and, at the same time, there has been a deteriora-
tion in the economic conditions of the poorest sections of societies, 
and this is true for both the developed and the developing countries.
The promises of globalization have not been fulfilled because
with the expansion of the integration processes among countries,
even if the income produced is increased, no process of convergence 
between countries has been achieved (Milanovic 2011, pp. 115-118).
According to Milanovic, the most obvious economic conse-
quences for the process of growing inequality in the advanced coun-
tries affect the current economic and financial crisis. Deregulation of 
financial markets has not been the main cause of the crisis. It has 
helped to increase the effect of the crisis. The origin of the crisis lies 
in the progressive increase in inequality recorded in all countries in 
the last thirty years, and especially in the United States. A growing 
inequality means that the income of a small minority of the popula-
tion increases dramatically. This income, in the case of the United 
States, has been poured into the financial market in search of invest-
ment opportunities and has substantially contributed to sustain the 
consumption levels of the American middle class which, as a result, 
is heavily indebted (ibid., pp. 211-214). The consequences of this 
process are known and will be further developed in this volume (see 
ch. 1).
In conclusion, on the one hand the neoclassical theory of glob-
alization seems to be unsatisfactory because it does not explain the 
rise of the crisis and the persistency of poverty in many countries. 
The alleged convergence process was absolutely not operative. From 
another point of view this theory failed to see that global inequality 
was growing and that this process was among the causes that con-
tributed to the financial and economic crisis of the present days.
Globalization and Economic Crisis
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3. A New World Bank? The Age of Doubt 
The World Bank Commission on Growth and Development, in 
the words of the final report editors Michael Spence and Danny 
Leipziger, started its work in 2006 because “while we felt that the 
benefits of growth were not fully appreciated, we recognized that the 
causes of growth were not fully understood” (Spence, Leipziger 
2010, p. xi). Furthermore “our understanding of economic growth is 
less definitive than commonly thought   	
  	 e-
times has been given to developing countries with greater confidence 
than perhaps the state of our knowledge would justify” (ibid.). These 
statements are in sharp contrast with the optimistic and bold attitude 
of few years earlier. This much more cautious approach, as it is sim-
ple to guess, is due to the fact that the activities of the Commission 
where in few years overlapping with new unexpected events, namely 
the recent financial and economic crisis. Furthermore the editors of 
the report, on the one hand, testify that the contemporary theoretical 
framework regarding the processes of economic growth is much 
more full of unresolved questions compared with few years earlier 
and, at the same time, that the toolbox of the economists is almost 
empty. 
For this last aspect, as it was remarked before the Commis-
sion, firstly by Easterly (2001) and then by Lindauer and Pritchett 
(2002), there was at a theoretical level the awareness of a general 
lack in the literature regarding the analytical explanation of devel-
opment and growth processes. After the decline of the so-called sea-
son of “high development theory” of the 1950s-1960s (Krugman 
1992; Hirschman 1981) there was not any “big” and consistent the-
ory that was able to explain the development processes and the ways 
to guide the development policies. Eventually, if development eco-
nomics was abandoned, the so-called globalization neoclassical ap-
proach did not triumph. 
Then the question is: are we in the Age of Doubt?
For many economists who in the recent past were pretty confi-
dent of the power of the neoclassical globalization theory, the re-
sponse to the question is affirmative. Anyway there is not at the mo-
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ment any convergence in the economic theory regarding the explana-
tion of the causes of the crisis. While Milanovic raises the problem 
of income inequality as the fundamental cause of the present crisis, 
in the 2010 report of the World Bank it is clearly stated that “the 
Commission believes that the crisis was a failure of the financial sys-
tem” (Spence, Leipziger 2010, p. xii). Different causes require dis-
similar cures so we still need to investigate which is the best way to 
handle the present economic situation. 
There are many aspects related to the processes of globaliza-
tion that need to broaden the scope of the issues under investigation
and to help to understand in detail the effects of globalization on dif-
ferent national contexts. This volume then responds to the need to 
understand and deepen the study of the processes of international 
economic integration seen in the light of the recent economic crisis. 
The crisis certainly provides a strong incentive for research but, as 
has become clear from the review of positions analyzed above, there 
is not only one path of research that is able to contain all the econom-
ic and social issues raised by globalization. 
An effective approach of investigation would be to look at
globalization, and to the contemporary economic crisis, from a long-
er term perspective. This would allow researchers to interpret this 
phenomenon as a particular stage in the evolution of capitalism. In 
essence it is not possible to understand the characteristic phenomena
of globalization without analyzing the historical processes that pro-
duced them. This means, above all, to investigate the role played by
social, economic, and institutional aspects taken into consideration in 
a broad sense.
As suggested by Robert Heilbroner (1992), a broader vision on
the evolution of capitalism allows us to see that the process of capital 
accumulation involves both aspects, success and failure. The success 
is measured by the improvement in the material well-being, while
failure is manifested by the adverse social consequences and by the 
instability of the system. These processes are intertwined with each 
other and are essentially inseparable. In other terms, as long as there 
is capital accumulation, there will be also side effects (ibid. pp. 50-
52). 
Globalization and Economic Crisis
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This does not mean that the State can’t intervene through poli-
cies designed to alleviate the adverse social consequences. With re-
gards to the instability of the system, this problem is more difficult to 
solve because the processes of globalization have a geographical 
scope much larger than the field of action of national policies. Fur-
thermore, international institutions, designed at least to watch over
global processes, as we have seen above, are too oriented to the eco-
nomic interests of the developed countries and, overall, are basically 
undemocratic.
Finally, a point on which it is useful to reflect refers to the fact
that the problems of instability and the failures of the capitalist ac-
cumulation process derived from the operation of the private sector,
not from the public one. For this reason, the results of the future sce-
narios will depend increasingly on the ability of the public sector to 
correct the failures and to govern international processes.
4. Content of the book
This book derives from a fortunate series of research seminars 
held at the University of Salento during 2011. They were devoted to 
the theme “Globalization and Economic Crisis”. The seminars were 
organized by the two editors and by the Centre for Economic Stud-
ies, for the Degree Course of Political Sciences, where Claudia 
Sunna teaches Political Economy.
Those meetings provided a world survey of general processes 
of globalization together with specific analysis of regional contexts. 
The latter approach allowed us to see the effects of these processes in
very different national contexts. The collection of all these written 
texts will be certainly useful to people interested in this topic.
Given these purposes the book is divided into two Sections. 
The first, Facts and Theories, is devoted to the analysis of some gen-
eral concepts and processes, for which it is necessary to look at the 
global level of economic international relations. Chapter 1, by Toshi-
aki Hirai, addresses the key issue of financial globalization in order 
to explain how the process of integration of capital markets tends to 
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intensify the instability of the system. In Chapter 2, Sunanda Sen 
looks at the controversial relation between globalization and eco-
nomic development, and provides an overview of the theoretical ap-
proaches and of the effects of certain policies of globalization on de-
veloping countries. In Chapter 3, George Bitros discusses the posi-
tive effects of globalization on economic growth and underlines the 
importance of international trade in this process.
The second section of the book, Case Studies, is devoted to 
highlight how globalization affects the economic development in 
some national contexts. Toshiaki Hirai examines the case of Japan, 
Sunanda Sen analizes the situation in India, and María Eugenia Ro-
mero Sotelo and Juan Pablo Arroyo Ortiz study the case of Mexico.
Globalization and Economic Crisis
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SECTION I  
Theories and Facts
___________________________
 
 
 
Chapter 1
Financial Globalization and Instability of the 
World Economy
Toshiaki Hirai
_______________________________________
1. Introduction Globalization
Since the mid-1980s the world has seen the development of 
globalization under the leadership of the US and the UK. Globaliza-
tion can be summarized as “the tendency toward the market economy 
on the global scale”. It has turned out to transform the political econ-
omy of the world dramatically, to an extent such as nobody could 
have expected, and it has defined the future course along which the 
world should proceed. 
We might divide globalization into two types: “financial glob-
alization” (FG), on the one hand, and “market system (or capitalistic) 
globalization” (MG) on the other. FG is the global unification or lib-
eralization of the financial market, while MG is the multiplication of
nations, on the global level, which would adopt the market system as 
the fundamental economic mechanism. 
We may identify three upheavals which globalization has 
brought about to the world system over the last three decades: (i) re-
capture of leadership of the world economy through finance by the 
US and UK; (ii) collapse of the Cold War system and convergence 
toward the capitalistic system; (iii) rise of the emerging nations.
The first of these was caused by FG, the second and the third 
by MG. It was “Neo-Liberalism” (Thatcherism and Reaganomics) as 
a social philosophy that drew the world economy powerfully in that 
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direction – ‘leave all to the markets; government intervention in the 
economy will hamper its efficiency and development; the structure 
should be reformed in such a way that regulation be abolished as 
much as possible’. Promoted, backed and promulgated by the Neo-
Liberalists, liberalization in the field of finance, labor and capital has 
been extended literally on the global scale – above all, the liberaliza-
tion of finance (or FG).
In this paper, we will focus mainly on how FG has in the 
course of time been making the world economy increasingly unstable 
and volatile. In Section 2 we will explain how financial liberalization 
has proceeded in the US, while in Section 3 we will see how the 
world financial system has become unstable and vulnerable, leading 
up to a world economy characterized by instability. In Section 4 we 
will reflect upon what financial liberalization has implied in relation 
to the world economy. Finally, in Section 5 we will explain how the 
US administration has grappled with the meltdown caused by the 
Lehman Shock and barely managed to enact the Financial Regulato-
ry Reform Act in July 2010.
2. U.S. Financial Liberalization ?Attenuation of the Glass-Steagall 
Act and Enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
2.1 The Outline
The Glass-Steagall Act (the GS Act hereafter) enacted in 1933 
had long been a dominant instrument for regulating and overseeing 
the US financial system. In the 1920s the USA saw financial fraudu-
lence rampant, to the extent that President Roosevelt ascribed the 
Great Depression to it4
                                                          
4 The Pecora Commission made a great contribution to revealing this fact.
. So it was that the GS Act was passed with 
the aim of imposing strict regulations on the financial institutions. It 
was composed of three pillars: (i) regulation of interest rates (“Regu-
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lation Q”); (ii) separation of commercial banking from investment 
banking; (iii) regulation of interstate banking.
In the 1960s a movement calling for softer regulation was 
launched through  the lobbying activities of banks eager to enter the 
municipal bond market. But the GS Act had worked well enough up 
until the 1970s, when the situation eventually changed.
In the 1970s the investment banks tried to edge into the sphere 
of commercial banking, providing customers with money accounts 
(with interest paid), including check and credit services. The role 
which the DTCC (Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation) 
played here was significant. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s com-
puterization went ahead only in the mega investment banks, where 
individuals came to make transactions by means of the so-called 
“street names”, which worked as a sort of reserve ratio in the case of 
the commercial banks. The investment banks were able to get new 
funds by exploiting them, which aggravated the commercial banks’ 
growing impatience.
In the 1980s bills aiming at relaxing the GS Act had often 
been submitted to the Congress. Abolition of Regulation Q came first
in 1986, followed by that of interstate banking regulation in 1995
(the Rigle-Neil Act). Lastly, the separation of commercial banking 
from investment banking was unlocked by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (the GLB Act hereafter) in 1999.
2.2 Relaxing Separation between Commercial Banking and Invest-
ment Banking
Here we will see how the GS Act came to be alleviated and fi-
nally abolished, focusing on the separation of commercial banking 
from investment banking.
The movement toward relaxation might be said to have pro-
ceeded through a sequence of extended interpretations by the Federal 
Reserve Bank (FRB) of Section 20 of the GS Act. In December 1986 
the FRB interpreted a clause in the Section which prohibits “in prin-
ciple” a commercial bank from dealing in investment banking in 
such a way that it is allowed to do so for up to 5 percent of the total 
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revenue, followed by the FRB’s decision (spring of 1987) that a 
commercial bank can underwrite some securities.
Since A. Greenspan, a former executive of J.P. Morgan, was 
appointed Chairman of the FRB in 1987, relaxation of the GS Act 
was expedited through the following stages:
(i) In 1989 the FRB permitted commercial banks to engage in un-
derwriting securities for up to 10 percent of the total revenue 
(the first bank thus allowed was J.P. Morgan); 
(ii) In December 1996 the FRB authorized bank holding companies 
to have investment banks as subsidiaries for up to 25 percent of 
the total revenue;
(iii) In February 1998 there emerged a merger deal between the 
Travelers Insurance Company (the CEO was S. Weil) and Cit-
icorp (the president was J. Lead). This should have been impos-
sible under the GS Act, but vigorous lobbying activities devel-
oped targeting top figures such as Clinton, Greenspan and Ru-
bin, resulting in the FRB approval of the merger in September;
(iv) The final blow came with heated agitation calling for abolition 
of the GS Act, resulting in enactment of the GLB Act in No-
vember 1999.
2.3 Promulgators for the GLB Act
It was financiers such as Wile and Lead, and politicians and/or 
academics such as R. Rubin, L. Summers (whose protégé was Ru-
bin), Greenspan and Phil Gramm (Republican Senator) who worked 
as the promulgators for the GLB Act.
Summers and Greenspan were responsible for drawing up the 
GLB Act, alias “the Citi-Group Approval Act”. Rubin, who resigned 
as Secretary of the Treasury in July 2000, was welcomed as CEO of 
the Citi-Group. While he was there, he induced the Citi-Group to 
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embark on risky investments such as the CDO (Collateralized Debt 
Obligation)5
Gramm was also involved with enactment of the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (the CFM Act hereafter), which 
gave momentum to moves to legalize the future trade of energy and 
the credit default swaps (CDS hereafter).
.
Prior to this, B. Born, chairperson of the Commodity Futures 
Trading Committee (the CFTC), who was worried that the OTC 
(Over-The-Counter) Derivatives (esp. the CDS) had been transacted 
on an ever larger scale, evading supervision of the financial authori-
ties, insisted on the need for supervision. Her move, however, came 
up against harsh opposition from Greenspan, Rubin (the then Secre-
tary of the Treasury) and Summers, who had promoted relaxation of 
the GS Act. It was they who reversed the direction and succeeded in 
enacting the
CFM Act. Wendy, Gramm’s wife and chairperson of the 
CFTC under the Reagan and the G.H. Bush Administrations, also 
worked hard for the CMF Act, thanks to which she was to be wel-
comed by Enron.
The salient feature of the CFM Act, known as the so-called 
“Enron Loophole” (the future trade’s exemption from supervision), 
lies in “the single stock future” being allowed. This was to enable 
higher leverage and more speculative activities (the Act is held re-
sponsible for the California Electricity Crisis in 2000-2001).
Enron had been very much involved in derivative dealings in 
the 1990s. In 1999 it set up “Enron Online” and greatly extended de-
rivative dealings. It was subsequently to be exposed for continued 
fraudulent accounting and was forced into bankruptcy, setting the 
scene for the so-called “Dotcom Bubble” to burst.
                                                          
5 Incidentally, Geithner, the Secretary of the Treasury (Summers was a pro-
tégé), was president of the FRB of New York. In September 2008 he forced 
the Lehman Brothers to go into bankruptcy, and yet bailed out the Citi-
Group with the TARP fund. 
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Phil Gramm6 was thereafter welcomed as executive by UBS7,
where he is reputed to have played a central role in its extensive in-
volvement with the CDS.
3. The Instability of the World Financial System
How are we to evaluate the influences on the world economy 
resulting from financial liberalization or globalization? They can be 
approached from both affirmative and problematic viewpoints.
Enabling capital to move to the regions where it can obtain 
higher rates of profit, FG has contributed to generating vigorous eco-
nomic growth such as would otherwise have been impossible in these 
areas.
Leaving further considerations from this affirmative viewpoint 
to a later date, we will focus here on the problematic aspect – the in-
stability of the world financial system as cause of the collapse of the
world economy. Firstly we will take the rise of the Shadow Banking 
System, followed by two examples of turbulence.
3.1 The Rise of the Shadow Banking System
Gaining momentum in the 1980s, FG ingenerated the “Shad-
ow Banking System” (SBS hereafter). The US financial system, 
which had so far been supervised by the FRB under the GS Act of 
1933 with the purpose of keeping the speculative activities of bank-
ing business under control, began to enjoy more relaxed conditions 
subsequent to the above-mentioned financial liberalization, spawn-
                                                          
6 Gramm ran for Republican nomination in the 1966 presidential election. In 
the 2008 campaign for the Presidency he was among McCain’s principal 
supporters. According to a certain source, he would have been the Secretary 
of the Treasury if McCain had been elected as President.
7 In October 2008 the UBS, which suffered a huge loss, not only received 
public money (to the tune of 6 billion Swiss francs) from the Swiss 
government, but also handed over the bad assets (amounting to 72 billion 
Swiss francs) to it.
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ing a whole series of new financial institutions such as hedge funds 
and private equity funds, which lend themselves freely to speculative 
dealings without supervision by the financial authorities. Working 
out various kinds of securitized papers such as the MBS, the CDO 
and the CDS and using leverage, these institutions came to be in-
volved in risky speculative dealings in the global financial markets. 
Having witnessed their surprisingly high rates of return, the com-
mercial banks, which had been kept under control by the FRB, found 
their way into the SBS by means of an off-balance technique, the 
product being “Special Investment Vehicles” (or SIV). 
Thus, as the years went by the SBS grew bigger and bigger, to 
such a degree that the share of conventional banking shrank ever 
smaller, making the world financial system increasingly unstable and 
volatile.
Excessive FG had often precipitated the world economy into 
critical conditions, and yet the world had managed to avoid any great 
catastrophe. Eventually, however, FG led to the Lehman-shock in 
September 2008, which set the world financial system as well as the 
world economy plunging precipitously.
The resulting situation prompts the following questions: could 
the rise of the SBS really have been desirable, and indeed indispen-
sable to the development of the world economy? What justification 
can there be for the layered securitized papers (see below) and the 
financial institutions’ speculative activities free from any supervi-
sion? To what extent can the financial engineering be justified in 
terms of improvement and/or growth of the capitalistic system? 
Leaving these questions to Section 4.2 below, here we will 
take two examples of economic instability as caused by excessive 
FG: the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 and the subprime loan 
crisis of 2008, which see the US, the EU and Japan still in search of 
the way out8
                                                          
8 As examples of serious financial crises which occurred in the US (albeit 
having no influence abroad), we may mention the S&L crisis (around 
1990?and the burst of the Dotcom Bubble (around 2001; Enron is 
emblematic there).
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3.2 Two Examples
.
The Asian Financial Crisis  The crisis of 1997, which start-
ed in Thailand, was caused by speculative activities in hedge funds. 
Thailand, which adopted the dollar-pegged system, began to suffer 
from a sharp drop in exports because of the appreciation of the dollar 
(and thus of the baht). Hedge funds, seeing the opportunity for 
speculation, continued to sell off the baht, which finally forced the 
Thai Government to devalue it. The Thai economy, which had so far 
gone on achieving a high rate of economic growth thanks to dollars 
borrowed in the short term, plunged into a serious depression which 
abruptly increased the debt in terms of the dollar. The depression 
rapidly propagated to Malaysia, Indonesia and so forth.
The hedge funds’ speculative activities then turned to target 
Russia in 1998. In 1991 the Soviet Union had disintegrated into sev-
eral nations, the largest being Russia. President Yeltsin went ahead 
with transformation of the Russian economy into a capitalistic sys-
tem at a breakneck pace – the so-called “shock-therapy method”. The 
result turned out to be devastating, causing high inflation and severe
unemployment, as well as fiscal crisis in 1997. The Russian govern-
ment was forced to collect the necessary revenues through the issue 
of national bonds. Thus it was Russia, sunk in a very fragile and cha-
otic situation, that the hedge funds targeted. Russia failed to maintain 
the ruble, and was forced to declare default for the national bonds.
Now came the turn of a hedge fund named “Long Term Capi-
tal Management” (LTCM hereafter), which continued to buy the 
Russian bonds. It gloried in its two Nobel Laureates for Economics 
(for the “Black-Scholes Equation” determining option prices) as co-
founders. Although it had only 150 employees, it gained such a high 
reputation due to its initial startling success that major banks from all 
over the world were willing to hand out blank checks. Around 1998 
LTCM, a neutral-type hedge fund, came to manipulate 100 billion 
dollars and to take a position of 1000 billion dollars.
Due to the Russian bond default, however, LTCM suffered 
heavy loss. Suddenly there emerged a very real possibility that, if the 
LTCM were left as it was, the world would plunge into a formidable 
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financial crisis. It was in September 1998 that the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York (the then president was T. Geithner) asked the 
Wall Street megabanks to bail out LTCM. Thanks to this prompt ac-
tion the world economy managed to avoid an impending crisis.
The Subprime Loan Crisis? This crisis erupted in September 
2008. Since 2005 high interest rate mortgage loans had been made, 
targeting the low income earners (the so-called “subprime loans”). 
The financial institutions bought them up, and issued MBSs (Mort-
gage-Backed Securities) with them as collateral. Then new types of 
securities were issued one after another, mingling other loans such as 
car loans, credit card loans and so forth as collateral. Thus the US 
economy came to be filled with multi-layered securities (“securitized 
papers”), which were duly certified by rating agencies, such as 
Moody’s, as definitely safe securities (80 percent of the securitized 
papers based on the subprime mortgage loans were ranked as AAA), 
and sold all over the world. The financial institutions eventually went 
as far as issuing subprime mortgage loans without any assessment 
(the so-called “Ninja Loans”), and, based on them, set about structur-
ing layered securitized papers. Thus the negative concatenation went 
on. It was on the occasion of the Lehman Shock that this fragile 
monetary and credit structure collapsed, plunging the world economy 
into deep depression.
4. “Financial Liberalization” Considered
As explained above, financial liberalization proceeded with 
the impulsion of financial capital toward liberalization as catalyst. It 
was a movement led by: (i) the US commercial banks, eager to break 
out of the conditions imposed by the GS Act; (ii) the competition of 
the above banks with the US investment banks which, free from reg-
ulation, saw rapid development; (iii) the US government, which 
again wanted to hold the world financial market as well as the world 
economy in the palm of its hands. 
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Motivated with this impulsion, the leading actors such as Ru-
bin, Greenspan, Summers and politicians like Gramm made great ef-
forts to attenuate the GS through extended interpretations of Section 
20 and finally succeeded in getting through the GLB Act as well as 
the CMF Act.
4.1 The Geopolitical Significance
Financial liberalization accorded well with the US govern-
ment’s desire to regain world hegemony in the economic scene. The 
US Administrations which had suffered miserable economic perfor-
mance throughout the 1980s came to think that finance could be a 
key to regain and extend US influence over the world economy. The 
“Washington Consensus”, adopted by the IMF and the World Bank, 
as well as the “Shock Therapy” method, adopted by the former 
members of the Soviet Bloc, with US economists as advisers9
These movements, moreover, derived strong support and cred-
ibility from the intellectual authority related to Neo-Liberalism, fi-
nancial engineering, and the New Classical School as well as ideolo-
gies such as Neo-Conservatism and the Christian Fundamentalism. 
To say nothing of these ideologies, Neo-Liberalism also took on a 
very authoritarian stance, quite different from its ostensible one. As 
the progenitor of “freedom”, the Neo-Liberalists did not hesitate to 
interfere with foreign countries where freedom, as they conceived it, 
was judged to be lacking, through either the “structural adjustment 
program” or military operations. In this sense, Neo-Liberalism con-
tains a sort of “Power-ism”.
, also 
accorded with the financial liberalization movement. 
In terms of political dynamics, furthermore, these movements 
can be said to have proceeded hand in hand with Cleptocracy – the 
“quid pro quo” ties between financiers and the financial authorities.
                                                          
9 The most famous, and indeed, notorious was A. Schleifer, Professor at 
Harvard University (his protégé is L. Summers), in the case of Russia. 
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4.2 The Economic Significance
What kind of economic significance will financial liberaliza-
tion be seen to have?
It constitutes an extension of the markets in which the finan-
cial institutions can raise funds to have at their own disposal (where 
securitized papers are structured, accompanying leverage), always 
pursuing speculative profits by means of the funds thus obtained. In-
deed, in some cases the pursuit of profit has been practiced to such a 
degree as to incur moral hazard.
Hedge funds have targeted weak and fragile countries, mount-
ing speculative attacks to make huge gains with no concern for the 
considerable damage to the countries concerned, ascribing the de-
fects and failures to their economic systems. In recent years these at-
titudes have become blatantly evident. “Finance for finance’s sake”, 
or speculative activities without any regard for the real economy, can 
be characterized as “autotelism” on the part of financial capital, far 
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 	   	
    	 	
providing the financial activities required to make the real economy 
grow, and making the market economy run smoothly. Thus we see 
the phenomenon of real economy caught up in speculative waves.
The enlargement of the SBS was also a product of the activi-
ties of governments under the leadership of the US administration, 
which means some divergence from the original role which each 
government should play ? the pursuit of its own economic growth. 
Any government should be independent of the financial community, 
implementing its own policies and placing top priority on the well-
being of its people. In the movement aiming at financial liberaliza-
tion, in fact, various governments including the US government have 
gone hand in glove with the financial community at the cost of a 
stampede of hedge funds, the emergence of multi-layered securitized 
papers and a catastrophic meltdown.
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5. The Financial Regulatory Reform Act
The instability of the world economy recently witnessed ap-
pears to be attributable to the enlargement of the SBS: if we are to 
stabilize the world economy, therefore, we need to bring it under the 
control of the financial authorities. This is a point recognized by the 
Obama Administration.
5.1 How the Story Went in the US
Obama’s Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals 
June 2009 when President Obama made public the outline of his fi-
nancial regulatory reform proposals, aiming at repeal of the GLB Act 
and modern-day resurrection of the GS Act.
The central pillars are: (i) enlargement of the FRB, which is to 
work not only as a central bank but also as an institution to oversee
systemic risk; (ii) creation of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency (CFPA), to guard consumers from financial abuse and 
fraudulence. 
Through these institutions dealings in securitized papers, fi-
nancial derivatives, futures and so forth were to be on open and clear 
markets, while the activities of hedge funds, investment banks, rat-
ing agencies and so forth could be overseen. Thus the proposal aims 
at scaling down, if not abolishing, the SBS.
The Bailout and Early Recovery of the Megabanks First and 
foremost, the Wall Street megabanks were rescued through bailout 
with huge sums of public money10
The story does not end here. They were soon able to make 
immense profits by investing gigantic volumes of money obtainable 
with both the FRB’s zero interest rate and quantitative easing (QE) 
policy, in the emerging nations (such as China, Brazil and India)
.
                                                          
10 Funded by the TARP (the Troubled Asset Relief Program), which was 
hastily proposed, and was to be used in a very ambiguous way by the Bush 
Administration. 
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through the so-called “zero carry trade”. Having repaid the public 
money to the government, the megabanks were to start a fierce battle 
aiming at blocking Obama’s financial regulatory reform11.
The Growing Perception of Unfairness? Contrastingly, in 
spite of the FRB’s easy-money policy, the US real economy cannot 
be said to have made much progress towards recovery. Major wor-
ries for the American people include, among other things, the contin-
ued high unemployment rate, the rapid increase in arrears and fore-
closure due to the bust of the housing market, which has also driven 
many local banks into bankruptcy (the number reaching a record 
high since the S&L crisis in 1992). The credit crunch by the local 
banks, in turn, has aggravated the real economy. 
The perception of unfairness has grown among the public, for 
the Wall Street was instantaneously bailed out (by the Bush Admin-
istration) while the Main Street has remained stagnant (in spite of the 
Obama Administration’s strenuous efforts).
5.2 The Dodd-Frank Act
The Process? After public announcement of Obama’s finan-
cial regulatory reform proposals in June 2009, deliberations in the 
two houses proceeded very slowly.
On December 11, 2009 the financial regulatory reform act (the 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) got through in the 
House of Representatives. However, the Senate version, which was 
first laid out as a discussion draft in November 2009, was to proceed 
along a very difficult road thereafter. Leaving the details to my other 
paper12, let us here summarize the process in the Senate:
                                                          
11 As representative of the lobbyists criticizing financial regulation, we may 
mention the American Bankers Association, while in support of it we have 
an example in the U.S. Public Interest Research Group.
12 See Hirai (2010).
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(i) In May 2010 the Dodd Act (the Restoring American Financial 
Stability Act) was deliberated.
(ii) The deliberations continued for three weeks. On May 21 at long 
last the Dodd Act was passed with some slight modifications. 
(iii) The Conference Committee was then set up to unify the House 
and Senate versions. After a few weeks’ deliberations, the 
committee report was adopted.
(iv) On June 30 the Dodd-Frank Act was passed in the House, while 
on July 15 it finally got through in the Senate.
(v) On July 21 the Act was ratified with President Obama’s signa-
ture.
The Gist of the Act??The Dodd-Frank Act covers the following.
(1) The Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA).
This is to be set up within the FRB, but should remain independent. 
The director is to be nominated by the President (this reflects some 
compromise between the House version and the President’s view?.
During the subprime boom many financial institutions made 
mortgage loans to people on low incomes without any serious 
screening. In consequence, when the bubble burst a great many peo-
ple were rapidly driven into default and foreclosure. It is in order to 
prevent this state of affairs from recurring (that is, to prevent con-
sumers from being cheated and forced to conclude unfair contracts) 
that the CFPA is to be set up.
(2) Volcker Rule
This was first advocated by P. Volcker in January 2010 and support-
ed by Obama, and was incorporated into the Act. The rule aims at 
prohibiting commercial banks from dealing in so-called “proprietary 
trading”, for it would expose the depositors’ money to risk through 
speculative activities by the banks13.
                                                          
13 This September JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs decided to close the 
proprietary trading section, heeding the Volcker Rule.
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(3) Lincoln Provision
This provision was first adopted by the Senate Agriculture Commit-
tee chaired by B. Lincoln in April 2010 and was incorporated into 
the Act. It aims at making derivative transactions fair and transparent 
by abolishing Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives and creating an 
open market14.
(4) Establishment of a committee to prevent possible systemic risk
The committee is to be composed of nine members headed by the 
Secretary of the Treasury.
(5) The president of the FRB of New York is to be appointed by the 
US President.
The aim here is to block influences from the Wall Street.
(6) In the case of megabanks running into bankruptcy, clearing and 
dissolution should be carried out smoothly with the fund collected 
from the financial industry.
In short, the “TBTF” (Too Big To Fail) idea should be swept away. 
The megabanks have got used to assuming that because they are 
huge the government will never fail to rescue them in the event of 
their failure. Otherwise the economy as a whole, they think, would 
be exposed to serious crisis. Thus they are likely to venture upon im-
possible speculative activities – and all this adds up to serious moral 
hazard.
Challenging the TBTF, the provision aims at clearing financial 
institutions on the brink of failure through the self-responsibility of 
the financial industry rather than with taxes.
It is estimated that it will take a year and half for the Dodd-
Frank Act to be implemented. Each section needs interpretation, so 
                                                          
14 Recently the yields gained by hedge funds have shown some decline. 
Wary of risks, investors are now tending to concentrate their resources in 
large funds rather than small ones.
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there will be confrontation on it. Lobbying activities are very influ-
ential and might change the nature and the course of direction.
Moreover, should other countries – including the EU (with the 
UK) – fail to follow suit, the aim of the Dodd-Frank Act will be 
thwarted. For finance has been developed on the global scale, so any 
loopholes will remain gaping. If the US intensified regulation but 
other countries did not follow suit, the financial institutions would 
continue risky speculative activities, shifting their headquarters to the 
more easy-going countries. 
And yet the Dodd-Frank Act should be welcomed, for this will 
be the only feasible and effective path which could lead to financial 
regulation on the global level.
Worrisome Present Situation  As of today we need to bear in mind 
the following facts of the US economy.
Although the need to keep the activities of the financial institutions 
under the control of the financial authorities has been repeatedly 
urged since the Lehman Shock, it was not until July 21, 2010 that the 
Dodd-Frank Act was at long last enacted – just a few months ago. It 
will take another year and a half, moreover, for the Act to be effec-
tively implemented. This means that so far virtually no regulation 
has been imposed on the SBS system.
The Wall Street megabanks were rescued by the government 
and made huge profits through the dollar carry trade: scandalously 
enough, these profits were then distributed among the executives 
who, by contrast, have shown no interest in helping get the Main 
Street back on its feet. 
These states of affairs have infuriated the common people with 
the impression that all that the Administration and the FRB have 
done so far has been to rescue the Wall Street, while leaving them in 
the lurch. Such anger might appear all the more justifiable on re-
calling the barefaced personnel adhesion among the FRB, the Treas-
ury and the megabanks.
The US society faces the potential risk of serious conflict be-
tween the two groups ? the mega financial community and the 
masses. 
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In spite of the serious difficulties President Obama came up 
against, he finally succeeded in putting through the Dodd-Frank Act. 
This is a great achievement, although it amounts to only one step 
forward. The real test of its success hinges on the implementation 
from now on. 
In this regard what is worrying is the fact that the approval rate 
for the Obama Administration has been sharply falling, mainly be-
cause it has not succeeded in reducing the high rate of unemploy-
ment. So at present the Republican Party is expected to win the mid-
term election in November. If so, the implementation of the Dodd-
Frank Act will entail great difficulties. Even today the Administra-
tion has some difficulty in deciding the top-ranking posts of the new 
institutions to be set up by the Act. The difficulty will be much 
greater after the election.
6. Conclusion
We have examined financial liberalization or globalization, 
and the increased instability of the capitalistic system brought about 
by it, focusing on the USA as a center of the world economic system. 
We cannot imagine continuance of the capitalistic system without 
finance. And yet there is a danger that serious meltdowns will be re-
peated if the financial system is left as it is. The future of capitalism 
will hinge upon how the “right capitalism” can be maintained and 
developed, harnessing this restive horse. 
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Chapter 2
Globalization and Development
Sunanda Sen
_______________________________________
1. Introduction: Do we view Globalization as old or new?
Globalization can be traced back to its old incarnation in terms 
of an imperial order, when colonies were linked to the ruling nations 
both politically and along economic channels. However, the new pat-
tern of globalization which has evolved over the post Second World 
War period has been integrating countries with globalised markets 
and fast communication channels which operate beyond the authority 
of sovereign nations. Markets in different parts of the world have 
opened up steadily in response to the mainstream doctrines which 
has been influencing policies in most countries. Simultaneously, 
technology has minimized the barriers across nations with speedy 
communications as well as blending of cultures. Globalization today 
is a far more sweeping force to connect nations as compared to the 
earlier pattern of linking countries via trade, financial flows and po-
litical subjugation. While political domination was a major aspect in 
the earlier pattern, globalization today has brought in greater socio-
economic disparity which, in the countries with a representative gov-
ernments, has led to open discontent in society.1
In today’s globalization the geo-political significance of select 
advanced countries has been crucial in determining the pattern of in-
ternational interactions, which include trade, finance and even strate-
                                                          
1 Sen, 2007; McGrew and Held (2007).
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gic concerns. Influence of the powerful advanced economies on mul-
tilateral institutions has played a part in determining policies which 
favor the more powerful nations in the advanced region.
We can identify the following four aspects as the prominent 
features of today’s globalization.
 Market driven policies with faster pace of capital and skill inten-
sive innovations.
 Global integration of markets for goods, services, technology and 
finance.
 Dominance of finance in global and national policies. 
 Staggering inequality within and across nations.
2. Unfulfilled promises of Mainstream Economics with the over-
powering market 
Let us here deal with the market-driven policies which drives 
globalization today. In terms of the logic postulated in free market 
theories, voluntary exchange by rational actors in the market 
achieves ‘efficiency’, providing mutual gains in trade and exchange. 
With market access production achieves economies of scale and 
competitive edge vis a vis other producers.
One can, however, detect the limiting assumptions behind the-
se theories. Those include, among others, perfect competition; the 
full utilization of resources including labor; complete information to 
all in the market; the distribution of product according to the contri-
bution to output in terms of marginal product of factors deployed in 
production. None of these assumptions remain valid in the context of 
the actual functioning of markets.
It is thus not a surprise to witness the failure of free markets to 
end unemployment, poverty and excess capacity. With inequity and 
instability one also notices large-scale displacement of labor, espe-
cially with technological advances. Investment today is often guided 
by financial gain (most often on financial assets) rather than  by 
physical productivity in the real sector.
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3. Markets in economic theory: Three Variants
To deal with markets in theory, it is useful to distinguish the 
following three variants:
The neo-classical theory bases itself on methodological indi-
vidualism, which assumes the capacity of rational individuals to ful-
fill the maximum benefits by operating in self-interest, which in turn 
ensures common good for all who are operating similarly. Main-
stream theory provides an uncritical acceptance of the ability of mar-
kets to attain growth with efficiency which achieves optimum pro-
duction, consumption and distribution, in terms of what is defined as 
the Pareto optimum. Accordingly expansion of markets can also be a 
cure-all for slow growth or lack of development.2
Alternately, markets can be viewed as an institution under cap-
italist systems, which is both dispensable and at best subject to regu-
lation by authorities. In terms of orthodox Marxist positions, the 
market is necessary but not sufficient to ensure capitalist production. 
This is because a capitalist system is considered to based on wage 
labor, exchange economy and a process of accumulation. 
In other versions of Marxist analysis, markets, providing 
channels of exchange, have viewed as sufficient for capitalism. A 
view as above dominates the World System theories offered by 
Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein,3
The Marxist theory of markets under capitalism also include 
the Dobb-Sweezy mode of production debates on transition from 
feudalism to capitalism. In this context some have drawn attention 
semi-feudal or semi-capitalist modes of production in the context of 
the developing countries, thus extending the analysis to cover the re-
gion which has encountered the rapid advances of markets under 
globalization. The above extends to other versions of Marxist read-
ings, notably that of Samir Amin
both of whom trace the 
beginning of capitalism to the earlier centuries of mercantile trade.
4
                                                          
2 See for a critique, Sen, 2005.
, on markets under globalization. 
3 Frank, 1976; Wallerstein 1980.
4Amin, 1977.
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This includes the notions of “Peripheral capitalism” in developing 
countries, one where the co-exists with non-market activities.
We now have a look at notion of markets when viewed beyond 
standard tools of economic theory, as in Karl Polanyi. Polanyi’s
Great Transformation spells out the “double movement” under capi-
talism. It relates to the expansion of market relations and the ensuing 
reactions of society to protect itself from the consequences of the 
very operation of the market; as an allegedly self-regulating mecha-
nism. This ensures the dominance of global markets’ culture on so-
cial relations  or the fabric at large. The latter pervades family, com-
munity and all social relations. In effect expansion of markets pro-
ceeds with dispossession, displacements and degradation of people. 
As a consequence the  market and even the state are both 
disembedded from society. As put by Polanyi5
Despite its relevance in understanding the social processes un-
der globalization, Polanyi’s theorization on markets has been ignored 
by Marxists as well by mainstream theorists.
, “Yet simultaneously 
a countermovement was on foot. This was more than the usual de-
fensive behaviour of society faced with change; it was a reaction 
against a dislocation which attacked the fabric of society, and which 
would have destroyed the very organization of production that the 
market had called into being” .
4. Free Markets in operation: liberalized trade in goods and ser-
vices6
Trade liberalization in developing countries, was initiated by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in terms of the Structural Ad-
justment Programs (SAP). In 1980s these programs were considera-
bly intensified with the tariff cutting rounds (meetings) of GATT 
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and later of the WTO 
(World Trade Organization), especially in terms of the provisions 
                                                          
5 Polanyi, 1957.
6 Sen, 2005
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under the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and 
Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). In general the devel-
oping countries have been grossly disillusioned with the functioning 
of these multilateral tariff-cutting institutions, especially on issues of 
trade restrictions on textiles and agricultural subsidies in advanced 
economies. Moreover, the end of national patent regime which start-
ed with product patenting has considerably dampened the national 
R&D (Research and Development) activities in the developing na-
tions. The new trade regime under WTO has also pushed up prices of 
pharmaceuticals while encouraging Genetically Modified food in 
these areas.
In a similar tone, smaller countries in advanced areas also 
were faced with lesser advantages during the new regime, a culmina-
tion of which, along with other factors, has been the current EU cri-
sis. 
5. Free trade in technology and services7
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under 
the WTO is considered to provide level playing field to service pro-
viders from abroad, a move which, as claimed by WTO, is in the 
name of competition policy and efficiency.
While the measures under the GATS were responsible for 
wide-ranging innovations in Information and Communication Tech-
nologies (ICT), micro-biology, communications, power and con-
struction, there has been an asymmetric impact vis a vis the develop-
ing and advanced nations. Thus as it has been pointed out, technolo-
gy is not a “free public good’ and “world is not flat”. One does not 
observe a process of ‘learning by doing’, especially for late-comers 
in the industrialization process, unlike what is claimed in endogenous 
growth theory.
Services which are under the scanner of liberalization include 
wide-ranging spheres which include banking, insurance, transports, 
                                                          
7 See Sen, 2007
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railways, electricity, gas, telecommunications, health and education. 
Many of these are in the nature of public goods, which demand state 
intervention, especially in the developing economies. Liberalization 
and privatization, as in the new trade regime, hamper the process.
Issues of further liberalization of services are in the agenda, in 
terms of Non Agricultural Market Access( NAMA), Singapore Is-
sues8 and the Doha declaration9 of the WTO regime . 
6. Financial Liberalization
Finally, we look at the new regime of financialisation in de-
regulated financial markets. Initiated by IMF and World Bank 
through loan conditionalities, liberalization of financial markets to-
day has a wider appeal to policy makers in different parts of the 
world economy in terms of the Washington Consensus.10
Implementation of these policies first of all has churned the 
realm of speculation-led activities in financial markets with shadow 
banking, generating myriads of derivative instruments. Besides, these 
policies also have led to concentration of wealth within as well as 
across countries. It may be recalled here that Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI) flows from advanced countries today are more than five 
times those originating from the developing countries. Half of those 
                                                          
8 Four issues introduced to the WTO agenda at the December 1996, 
Ministerial Conference in Singapore: trade and investment, trade and 
competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade 
facilitation.
9 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/singapore_issues_e.htm
10 The term Washington Consensus was coined in 1989 by the economist 
John Williamson to describe a set of ten relatively specific economic policy 
prescriptions that he considered constituted the "standard" reform package 
promoted for crisis-wracked developing countries by Washington, D.C.-
based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World 
Bank, and the US Treasury Department. See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Consensus
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FDI flows from advanced economies comprises Mergers and Acqui-
sitions (M&A) which further adds to concentration.
Opening up of financial sectors by developing countries also 
tends to affect their national autonomy in the management of fiscal, 
monetary and exchange rate policies. Often such policies are guided 
by the immediate concerns relating to the external sector rather than 
to the need of the domestic economy in terms of growth and em-
ployment.
In conclusion, opening of markets and the integration of coun-
tries in terms of globalization has more to do with problems created 
to countries, especially in the developing region, rather than provid-
ing a panacea for rapid and efficient growth.
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Chapter 3
In defense of Globalization
George Bitros
_______________________________________
1. Introduction
In this short paper I pursue three tasks. First I explain why so 
many economists, in my view the overwhelming majority of them, 
support the general proposition that trade is beneficial to all countries 
involved in bilateral and/or multilateral exchanges. This I think is a 
very important point because, of those who are against globalization, 
the non-economists do not know that ultimately it is driven by the 
benefits that it brings, particularly to those that lag behind in the 
scale of economic development, whereas the economists invoke con-
siderations that are contradicted by facts. My second task is to high-
light the forces that have been unleashed by globalization and ex-
plain why globalization is unstoppable. In this regard, what I claim is 
that, as long as the worldwide diffusion of information cannot be 
controlled by any single country, no matter how powerful, globaliza-
tion will proceed at an accelerating pace. Finally, my third task is to 
look into the logic of the criticisms that have been raised against 
globalization and try to make sense of their consistency or lack of it. 
2. The benefits from international trade
To understand the source of the benefits from international 
trade, I will employ an example of extreme simplicity. In particular, I 
will strip it from all complexity by appeal to three assumptions. The 
first of them is that there are two countries, say, 1 and 2, which are 
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alike in all respects except one. This implies that, whereas the coun-
tries have the same institutions, the same technology for producing, 
say, goods X and Y, and the same tastes, their endowments in terms 
of natural resources differ. The second assumption has to do with the 
so called transformation curve, which defines how many units of 
good Y must country 1 (2) give up in order to free up enough re-
sources to produce one unit of good X. Lastly, the third assumption 
is that the two countries live isolated from each other. 
In light of the first assumption regarding the difference of the 
two countries in natural resources, I will assume for the moment that 
their transformation curves are linear with different slopes and depict 
all the above in Figure 1. Line gives the transformation curve 
of country 1, line gives the transformation curve of country 
2, and UU is the preference ordering of the two goods in the two 
countries.
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At this point remember the assumption that the two countries
live in isolation. If so, countries 1 and 2 will reach equilibrium in the 
demand and the supply of goods X and Y at points D and F, respec-
tively. At these points they will enjoy the utility indexed by the indif-
ference curve UU Next, let us assume that all barriers to trade are 
eliminated and the countries start to rethink their opportunities. Be-
fore very long they will discover that they can increase their material 
welfare by concentrating in the production of the good in which they 
are most efficient and then trading it for the quantities they desire to 
have from the other good. In particular, they will discover that the 
technologies at their disposal, as reflected in their transformation 
curves, permit them to proceed to a state of complete specialization, 
in which country 1 produces only good Y in the quantity Y1 whereas 
country B produces only good X in the quantity X2 in line with the 
theorem below. Moreover, the countries will discover that it is to 
their great benefit to trade because they can increase their material 
welfare by moving to the utility indifference curve Uat point G. 
This proves the basic proposition that the driving force behind inter-
national trade is the benefits that accrue from allowing each country 
to specialize in those goods they can produce most efficiently and 
trade them in some quantities in international markets to acquire the 
goods they wish to have.
The validity of this proposition has been investigated in the 
relevant literature under a variety of different assumptions and in 
general it has been found to be quite robust. To give you an ex-
ample, consider the case in Figure 2, in which the two countries 
have different tastes as well as transformation curves. Soon after 
they realize that they coexist, the citizens in the two countries will 
discover that the prices of the two goods are different in the two 
countries.
Theorem I: If the transformation curves are linear with different slopes, 
the countries specialize completely in the production of that good in which 
they are most efficient.
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This realization will occur to them because of the difference 
in the slopes of curves C1YE in country 1 and E in country 2. So 
they will start trading with the cheaper goods flowing to the coun-
tries where they are more expensive. In particular, country 1 will 
start importing good Y and exporting good X, with country 2 doing 
the opposite, until equilibrium is established at point A in Figure 1a 
and 1b. At those points the prices of the two goods in the two coun-
tries will have become equal and there will be no more advantage in 
changing the quantities of goods consumed, produced, and traded. 
Observe though that equilibrium is established at a level of material 
welfare that the two countries could not reach without international 
trade. This proves again the claim that international trade is benefi-
cial to the participating countries.
Finally, to corroborate further the benefits from trade, let me 
refer to a few powerful theorems which are scarcely, if at all known, 
to critics of globalization. The first is the one immediately below.
Theorem II: If: 1) countries A and B have the same technological know-
how; 2) their production technologies are characterized by constant re-
turns to scale; 3) country A is abundant in one input and country B is 
abundant in another input; 4) full competition reigns in all markets, and 
5) each country produces both goods (i.e. there is no complete speciali-
zation), then through international trade the prices of production fac-
tors in terms of purchasing power become equal in both countries.
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It is known as the theorem of factor price equalization and it is mag-
nificent because it suggests that if the five assumptions hold, immi-
gration of workers and the transfer of capital from one country to an-
other are unnecessary. That is, by itself the movement of goods 
through international trade equates the value of marginal product of 
each productive factor in all its international uses. Two more theo-
rems are:
Needless to say, these theorems constitute only a small sample of the 
propositions that have been worked out to highlight the benefits of
and the implications for the countries involved in international 
trade.1
At this point one may ask: if the case is as predicted, say, by 
Theorem II, why do we observe so significant flows of labor and 
capital moving from one country to another? Or, expressed in anoth-
er way, if international trade does have the suggested benefits, why 
                                                          
1For more details, see, for example, Brems (1968). 
Theorem III: Assuming that the five assumptions in Theorem II hold, in 
the presence of  international trade, the country which is abundant in 
one productive factor produces relatively more of the good which is 
intensive in that factor, and vice versa.
Theorem IV: If the five assumptions in Theorem II hold and at the same 
time preferences in both countries are similar and homothetic, the 
country which is abundant in one productive factor exports that good 
which is intensive in that factor.
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do we need globalization in the form of movement of labor and capi-
tal from one country to another? 
The answer is that globalization is a process that retains for the 
countries the benefits of international trade in an environment where 
some or all of the five assumptions mentioned above are violated.
For an example consider the assumption that all countries have 
the same technological know-how. We know that this is not true and 
that is why capital leaves from developed and goes to developing 
countries. By moving there it brings new technology where it is 
needed and maintains the process of diffusing benefits on a world 
wide scale. 
If after the above explanations one is unwilling to concede that 
international trade and globalization hold significant economic bene-
fits that could not be had by the countries involved if they lived in 
isolation, that one is like the agnostic in the novel Brothers Karama-
zov. In that novel Feodor Dostoyevsky writes that there are people 
who may climb seven heavens, see the god and yet upon returning to 
the earth they testify that they did not see him. 
3. Why globalization is unstoppable
Even a cursory scanning of the relevant literature would suf-
fice to reveal that globalization is driven by the processes that are 
depicted in Figure 3.2
                                                          
2 See, for example, Cullen, Parboteeah (2008).
So let me explain how they work and why it is 
practically impossible for any country, no matter how powerful it 
may be, to stop their diffusion.  
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Figure 3
4. Disintegrating borders
National borders have been always a significant impediment to 
the open economy. The reason is that they translate into trading costs 
in the form of differences in the export-import institutions, tax re-
gimes, currencies, etc. However, more precipitously than in any pre-
vious period, nowadays countries adopt initiatives to integrate into 
the world economic community by reducing willfully economic bar-
riers. That they do so is corroborated by many indices. One such in-
dex is the number of countries that participate in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). In this regard it may be noted that membership 
in this organization has come to be considered a sine qua non for any 
country that aspires to rapid economic development. Another index 
is the explosive increase in the regional trade agreements. For exam-
ple, whereas in the early 1990s there were around 70such agree-
ments, by 2000 their number had increase to 200. Lastly, since we 
live in Europe, we must not forget its remarkable evolution from a 
customs union in the 1960 to a monetary union more recently. 
THE
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The last example gives me the opportunity to add a further 
remark. This has to do with the nature of the particular borders that 
disintegrate. Many who object to globalization are afraid that it 
erodes the very foundations of the nation-state as a distinct institution 
of the prevailing world order. Their view is correct in the context of 
the European Union, where the participating nations willfully shed 
national powers on the prospect of taking part eventually to a United 
Federation of Europe. But this is not the case in general, because the 
borders that disintegrate are the economic ones, not the political, and 
there is no obvious reason why there cannot emerge in the long run 
an integrated world economy with distinct and totally sovereign na-
tion-countries. 
5. Growing cross-border trade and investment
Figure 4 shows two time series. The thick red line gives the per-
centage annual change in the international trade flows, whereas the thin 
black line gives the annual growth rates. From them we observe that the 
former series moves around an upward trend, whereas the trend of the 
later series is horizontal. 
Figure 4
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By implication, the volume of the international trade increases in the 
long-run at an average annual rate of around 6% and indeed quite inde-
pendently from economic growth. This difference is interpreted to imply 
that countries attempt to maintain their economic growth by resorting 
increasingly to international trade. However, at the same time, it should 
be noted that almost 50% of the international trade is taking place 
among EU, USA, and Japan, i.e. the so called TRIAD. 
Source: UNCTAD database
On the other hand, Figure 5 depicts the amounts of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in billion dollars that went into developed and devel-
oping areas of the world. Even through after 2000 there took place a 
significant deceleration, in the last two decades the trend in the flows 
and stocks of such investments is positive and more so in the developed 
areas. 
Based on the above it is reasonable to surmise that, as more 
and more countries come to appreciate the benefits that accompany 
Figure 5
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international trade and foreign direct investment, globalization will 
accelerate. 
6. The rise of global products and global customers
As the ever spreading use of internet, tourism, and other trade 
relations bring people nearer together, consumer tastes, consumption 
habits, and product preferences become more and more homogene-
ous across countries. On the other hand, the capabilities associated 
with the technologies of just-in-time production, and not only, enable 
companies to locate and produce anywhere and then ship their prod-
ucts to any location. As a result, in recent decades reaching global 
customers with the production and marketing of global products has 
transcended the narrow confines of big multinational companies and 
spread into medium and smaller size enterprises. This explains why 
we find now the same products in the stores of nearly every country 
we visit.
7. Privatization
Privatization is a policy under which governments particularly 
in developing nations sell or transfer the management of public as-
sets to private concerns for the purpose of accomplishing various ob-
jectives. This policy was applied widely from 1970 to 1990 all over 
the world, then in the 1990s it lost some of its traction, but more re-
cently it seems that it is accelerating again as many countries attempt 
to become more competitive in the light of the economic crisis. Fig-
ure 6, which is based on data from the World Bank, indicates how 
the index of proceeds from privatizations evolved over the period 
1990-2003 in three regions, namely Europe (ECA), Latin America 
(LAC) and all others. From this we observe that privatization activity 
in all three regions decelerated significantly after the crises that oc-
curred in the late 1990s and early 2000. But from then on it has 
picked some speed again. 
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Figure 6
Clearly, this policy fosters globalization in at least two ways. 
First, by providing opportunities for Foreign Direct Investments, as 
buying and operating high value public assets in many countries can-
not be effected by local investors, and, secondly, because by contrib-
uting to competiveness countries are enabled to integrate easier into 
world markets.  
8. New Competitors in world markets
Not long ago the only multinational companies that roamed in 
the world originated in the developed capitalist countries. Oil, auto-
mobile, electronics, chemicals, shipping, food, and other giant corpo-
rations were predominantly American or European. However, start-
ing from the 1960, companies based in Japan and the newly emerging 
countries started to challenge their dominance. Now there is no need for 
me to mention what happened in most of these industries. With a few 
exceptions the industrial basis of the world has moved eastwards and 
now multinational companies like Toyota, Mitsubishi, Toshiba, Sam-
sung Electronics, Taiwan Semiconductor, etc., are leaders in their sec-
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tors. This was made possible because globalization allows fierce compe-
tition among the best of the best companies and opens new opportunities 
for companies that we do not know of today, but which will lead in the 
future. In other words, globalization goes hand in hand with entrepre-
neurship and the systematic pursue of excellence through Research & 
Development (R&D) and keeping world markets open to newcomers. 
This is a most dynamic process which cannot be controlled by any sin-
gle company or government.
9. The rise of global standards of quality and production
Multinational companies follow a great assortment of strate-
gies to strengthen their position in world markets. Some produce one 
or a few versions of a given product with specific country differen-
tiations. Others adopt more regional strategies by differentiating their 
products to better suit the desires of local customers. And still others 
allow wide limits of adaptation to their local affiliates.  In each case 
the best strategy is selected on a cost–benefit basis because, as it is 
easy to understand, more varieties of a given product cost more to 
produce and market. However, the tremendous expansion of such ac-
tivities was significantly propagated by the establishment of interna-
tional organizations that imposed standards in the quality of prod-
ucts. Such quality assurance organizations have proliferated in all ac-
tivities and in all regions. For example, in Europe we have the Inter-
national Organization for Standardization (ISO) in Geneva, Switzer-
land - ISO 9000:2000. 
10. The internet and information technology
Lastly, I can hardly stress the power with which the diffusion 
of information through internet and other means of electronic com-
munication have accelerated the speed of globalization. In our days 
all aspects of control and management of a multinational company 
are done mostly from the headquarters. Just in time production and 
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delivery, logistics, and the ability to fine tune operations are a few 
examples of activities that would be utterly impossible to conduct 
without internet. Moreover, medium and small companies which op-
erate in world markets would be unable to compete with the giant 
and well–capitalized enterprises.
In summary, owing to these seven forces, globalization may go 
through phases of acceleration and deceleration, adjusting in accord with 
the cyclical movements of the world economy, but its trend will contin-
ue to point upwards. The fundamental reason for this is the benefits that 
nations reap by integrating their economies into world markets.
11. An assessment of the criticisms against globalization3
The process of globalization did not start either yesterday or a 
decade ago. It started since unmemorable times when people in one 
country sent their goods by land or sea to other countries to exchange 
them with other products they did not produce but wished to have. In 
other words, globalization started ever since people discovered the 
truth of the theorem that through voluntary exchange of goods and 
services material prosperity and quality of life may increase for the 
average citizens in those countries that take part. Therefore, as I ar-
gued already, the forces that promote the opening of economies and 
societies to international trade and other exchanges are so powerful 
that no country is strong enough to stop globalization.
However, at the same time there is a growing group of well-
respected people, including some prominent figures from universi-
                                                          
3The literature which examines the effects of globalization is enormous. For 
the readers who are interested to find where the discussions stand at the 
present on the various issues, a representative sample of solid sources, to 
begin with, would include: Milanovic (2005, 2012) and Hurrel, Woods 
(2000), on Globalization and Inequality; Goldsmith (1996) and Najam, 
Runnalls, Halle (2007), on Globalization and the Environment; Tomlinson 
(1999), on Globalization and Culture; Singer (2004), on Globalization and 
Ethics; and Giddens (2000), on how globalization reshapes working and 
living conditions everywhere in the world. 
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ties, politics, religion and culture, who raise various strong objec-
tions. This means that, while initially the criticism originated with 
people who oppose the system of open economy and society, today 
the situation is different and we must see whether their criticisms 
point to problems that need to be addressed. So what I intend to do 
next is to assess the main arguments they have put forward.
12. Globalization increases inequality and poverty
One of the main arguments used by protesters against globali-
zation is that it increases inequality and poverty, both between coun-
tries and within them. Usually in support of their arguments they rely 
on the calculations that Milanovic (2005) has made using data col-
lected on behalf of the World Bank, covering the period 1988-1993. 
His calculations showed that the Gini coefficient of income inequali-
ty rose from 63.1 in 1988 to 66.9 in 1993, recording a percentage in-
crease of 6%. But can one conclude from this evidence that globali-
zation contributes to inequality in the income distribution, and hence 
to a worsening of poverty in the world? My view is that such a con-
clusion is not warranted for the following reasons.
To be sure the data on which the above calculations are based 
are much more detailed and more reliable than any previous study of 
the likely forces that may contribute to inequality and poverty. How-
ever, the period they cover is very small and we cannot know if these 
findings traced a temporary trend, which reversed in the years that 
followed, or if it constitutes part of a more permanent trend. Obvi-
ously, those who draw on this evidence to claim that globalization is 
responsible make a jump of logic by assuming that the rise in the 
Gini coefficient captured a well-established long-term trend. 
However, suppose for the moment that they are right and that 
this finding revealed the existence of a permanent trend. Then the 
following question comes to mind naturally: Is globalization the sole 
cause for increasing poverty or are there also other forces, and per-
haps more important ones, that feed on this trend? To this question 
the critics of globalization respond by saying that there are certainly 
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other factors at work. In particular, most commonly they mention 
that: a) economic growth in rich countries is faster than in poor; b) 
the population is growing faster in poor countries than in rich; c) for 
many decades in Africa and in rural areas of China and India there 
has been economic stagnation, and d) in China and India, the ine-
quality between rural and urban areas is widening. In this light, seri-
ous researchers would have thought that there is an identification 
problem in the sense that one cannot tell how much each of the nu-
merous factors contributes to inequality and poverty. Yet, ignoring 
this major issue, they go on to claim that for the increasing inequality 
and poverty the main cause is that: "information technology and lib-
eralization of financial markets is causing a disproportionately rapid 
increase in the number of very wealthy households without at the 
same time reducing the number of very poor ones.” Therefore, the 
question transforms into the following: Why might these two forces 
of globalization work against the poor peoples of the world? 
To answer it a straightforward approach is to direct attention 
to those places where inequality and poverty have increased the 
most. Apparently, this has happened in Africa and in the rural areas 
of China and India. Can we consider these regions as victims of in-
formation technology and liberalization of financial markets? Since 
these areas are geographically and economically extremely isolated, 
the answer is certainly that their poverty has nothing to do with these 
factors. Hence, the most logical thought is that these areas are vic-
tims of their lack of internationalization and the problem they face is 
how to stop them from being isolated.
How valid is this view is also corroborated by the realization 
that every poor country that found its way to a more or less decent 
standard of living in the past century has succeeded thanks to global-
ization. That is, by producing goods and services for global markets 
rather than trying to achieve economic self-sufficiency. No one de-
nies that in the process of economic growth in many export indus-
tries workers are paid much lower wages than the wages prevailing 
in developed countries. But to put the blame on globalization for this, 
one must close his mind to two indisputable facts. First, that these 
workers were impoverished before the jobs were created by Foreign 
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Direct Investment and exports, and, second, that poverty in regions 
geographically and economically isolated is far worse than in those 
regions which have reached some degree of integration into world 
markets through globalization. 
In short, all available data indicate that economic growth reduc-
es poverty. Also, in many poor countries that have managed to find a 
path towards economic development, the historical records show that 
their income per capita showed discernible signs of convergence to 
that of the rich countries. But many other countries and regions within 
countries have not been able to take off in economic development. No 
matter how awful this realization is, the way forward is clear. In par-
ticular, the challenge for them is not how to protect from globalization, 
but how to engage through it in the process of economic development 
and technological progress.
13. Globalization reduces national sovereignty
The financial crises in some countries of Southeast Asia in 
1997-1999, in Turkey more recently, and Greece currently have pro-
vided the critics of globalization with opportunities to claim that it 
allows managers of short-term funds the ability to blackmail the gov-
ernments of weak countries by inducing the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to impose stiff austerity measures against their people. The 
reality is that poor countries cannot on the one hand do everything in 
their power to attract Foreign Direct Investment and on the other to seek 
protection from the mobility of capital. Nor is it possible for IMF to in-
tervene to save from bankruptcy countries with profligate and wasteful 
governments, because not only the IMF does not have the required vast 
resources, but also there a serious moral hazard problem arises. Hence, 
if some countries lose sovereignty, the blame should not be put on glob-
alization but in the first place on their governments that misused the
loans they obtained from abroad, and ultimately on their citizens who 
voted repeatedly for such governments over the course of many years. 
Moreover, contrary to the predictions of the critics that those 
financial crises would deepen and spread globally, nothing of this 
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sort happened. The crisis in Southeast Asia soon stopped. Turkey re-
turned to very robust economic growth and was able to repay all IMF 
loans, and my expectation is that a solution will be found in the case 
of Greece in the context of the European Union.
14. Globalization promotes consumerism
The protesters have a lot of ingenuity. Among those that went 
to Seattle, for example, to demonstrate against world leaders, we saw 
people displaying photos of a crossroads in total confusion due to 
traffic congestion. Others held signs of a national road filled with 
kilometers of cars waiting patiently to pass through a bridge. Some 
others mocked the aesthetics of a building with satellite television 
antennas in every balcony, etc. Obviously the message they wished 
to send is that these phenomena are indicative of a decaying material 
culture that has no other goal than to increase consumption. 
Now it is true that most people bear with the hassle of traffic 
congestion for the freedom and pleasures that are associated with the 
ownership of a car or motorcycle, they prefer work in the office in-
stead of the hard work in the fields, and despite the annoying image 
of satellite antennas, they are happy to hang them in their balconies. 
But why are these consumption patterns bad if they are formed in the 
context of spending their disposable incomes as they chose? The crit-
ics of globalization allege that they are bad because they are promot-
ed to poor countries and as a result the latter get stuck in impover-
ishment and underdevelopment. The linkage they imply is that over-
consumption in these countries defeats their need for investment and 
to some extent the critics have a point. However, I think their analy-
sis is faulty because they fail to allow for the fact that: a) the diffu-
sion of consumption patterns would take place even in the absence of 
globalization through other contacts among peoples, and b) thanks to 
the rapid growth in per capita consumption, the average lifespan has 
increased, the mortality of infants and mothers has decreased, litera-
cy has spread like never before, etc. Therefore, even though consum-
erism may be accompanied by certain drawbacks in poor countries, it 
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is the key feature of an open economy and society and one should 
not judge its merits without allowing for all its pros and cons. 
15. Globalization leads to depletion of natural resources
Another criticism is based on the view that, as per capita con-
sumption increases with the spread of globalization, the available 
natural resources will run out soon, so future generations will be 
condemned to a state of irreversible poverty. Initially this assertion 
was raised by the Club of Rome and since then many more have re-
peated it by focusing on particular resources like oil, wood, many 
foodstuffs, and other commodities.4However, their predictions so far 
have not materialized. Nor is it expected that there will be shortages 
of natural resources in the future for three reasons. First, because the 
quantity of resources depends on the inventiveness of human ingenu-
ity and entrepreneurship, which for all conceivable purposes are infi-
nite. Second, because - as we know from the experience in the last 
200 years - in the market system inventiveness is endogenously di-
rected to those resources that become relatively scarce and need to be 
substituted by other resources in relatively abundant supply. And 
third, the resource content of goods and services moves along a long-
run declining trend thanks to technological innovations that are bent 
on economizing resources by all means. In the light of these process-
es, one may concede that from time to time there may emerge short-
ages of certain resources, but the claim that globalizations drives the 
world to a state of general scarcity of resources is unjustified and un-
dermines the hopes and expectations of poor and developing coun-
tries.
                                                          
4 See Meadows, Randers, Meadows (2004).
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16. Globalization harms the environment
In recent decades technological progress has restricted signifi-
cantly the adverse effects of production technologies on the envi-
ronment. But so far there exist no environment neutral technologies 
for the production of goods and services. In turn this implies that, as 
globalization spreads and per capita incomes increase, more and 
more pollutants are emitted in the environment. Hence, the assertion 
that globalization harms the environment has a basis in facts that are 
difficult to deny. That is why this argument against globalization has 
won many supporters. It is simple, it is based on plausible facts, and 
by raising doubts about the sustainability of human race in this planet 
it seems logical. But three reasons make it quite contestable. The first 
of them is that pollution is worst not in the rich but in the poor coun-
tries. In other words, pollution in these countries has been the result 
of the reckless environmental policies of their governments and not 
of multinational companies that located there, even though some 
multinationals have behaved badly. The second reason is that by in-
tegrating into world markets the governments of globalized countries 
are subject to the continued supervision of international organiza-
tions and as a result they are obliged to follow good environmental 
policies. Finally, the third reason is that world markets provide coun-
tries with considerable flexibility in dealing with the problem of pol-
lution. For example, a country may trade for rights to pollute, which 
leads to pollution levels considerably lower than those that would re-
sult under existing technologies and per capita consumption, if coun-
tries operated in complete isolation. 
17. Globalization hurts the diversity and cultural heritage of peoples
The protesters argue that in a globalized environment, which 
will be dominated by international markets, there will be no room for 
the cultivation and development of those characteristics that make 
each country unique. Therefore, they conclude, globalization threat-
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ens the language, the religion, the traditions, and the culture of vari-
ous countries with extinction. Is this possible and if so under what 
conditions?
As I mentioned above, even though the pace of globalization 
has increased in recent decades, the process has been recorded since 
immemorial times. In the course of history we know that through it 
some cultures thrived whereas others disappeared. For example, the 
Babylonians, the Assyrians and the Phoenicians disappeared along 
with their cultures. But the Greek, the Roman and many other cul-
tures continue to survive and evolve. Based on this realization the 
view that globalization threatens the characteristics that give peoples 
their uniqueness is a speculation of incalculable order. Someone may 
legitimately argue that because through globalization cultural goods 
will be opened to international competition, those of a country may 
"lose market share" even in the preferences of its citizens. This pos-
sibility does exist. But what will happen eventually no one can tell 
because the result depends on the incentives of peoples to support 
their cultural heritage and promote it as their trade mark in the inter-
national community. Personally I think that Greek cultural goods in 
Europe are of excellent quality and that they enjoy great competitive 
advantage. Thus, the probability is that globalization will help us 
"gain share" internationally. But if we doubt about their strength, 
then we run the risk to fall into the trap of the mechanism that econ-
omists call self-fulfilling prophecy. Therefore, the burden of proof 
that our cultural goods may succumb to globalization lies with all 
those who support this claim.
18. Conclusions
From the above it turns out that on careful examination all 
main arguments against globalization vanish. However, this does not 
mean that the criticisms are completely devoid of benefits. Thanks to 
the criticisms, we have come to realize that there are side effects that 
need attention. For example, one is that capital and jobs move from 
countries with high to countries with low labor costs. This obviously 
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creates unemployment and job insecurity in wealthy countries from 
where the funds move. So it is reasonable for workers who lose their 
positions to react. We know also that, while initially globalization 
caused immigration of unskilled workers, more recently globaliza-
tion has affected workers with advanced skills.
A second side effect arises from the fact that wages and sala-
ries in the sectors that move abroad are pushed down. This happens 
for two reasons. First, because workers are forced to seek employ-
ment in other sectors with lower wages, and second, because busi-
nesses indirectly use the threat of moving to other countries, thus 
pushing their employees to reduce their wage demands. Thus, in the 
sectors which are affected unemployment increases and wages de-
cline, thereby worsening inequality.
Finally, a third important side effect is that in the countries 
where capital and jobs move labor conditions are less than satisfacto-
ry. In particular, the hours of work are too long and the conditions of 
occupational safety and comfort below par. Therefore, despite the 
improvement that globalization brings to their lives, workers in these 
countries have many reasons to complain.  Although there are effec-
tive ways of intervention in the decision making of foreign investors, 
the protests against globalization have already begun to attract the 
attention of both governments and international organizations. Early 
retirement schemes, retraining of workers who lose their jobs, and 
prolonging unemployment benefits, are some of the initiatives gov-
ernments adopt and they are in the right direction. But the implied 
advice of those who object to globalization to return to the era of 
closed borders and economies is neither reasonable nor justified. The 
reason is that it will harm the best interests of those poor countries 
that the objectors purport to shield from the effects of globalization.
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Chapter 4
The Self-Trapped Japanese Economy –
An Overview
Toshiaki Hirai
_______________________________________
1. Introduction
In the 1990s Japan, as the most successful nation for economic 
performance, was struck with awe and consternation. While through-
out the 1980s the US, UK and the European countries suffered from 
stagflation, Japan maintained high economic performance. Thus 
much attention was paid to the clue to the success of the Japanese 
economy, and the “Industrial Policy” by the MITI (Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry) and the “Japanese Way of Doing Busi-
ness” were lionized.
In the late 80s there emerged great cracks in the Socialist Bloc 
which played its part in the Cold War System. In Eastern Europe the 
civil rights movement became increasingly active, in its efforts to 
shake off the yoke of the Soviet Union and introduce some sort of 
capitalistic system, Poland taking the leading role. The Soviet Union, 
no longer having the power to crush the movement, finally fell in 
1991.
Since then twenty years have passed, and here we are in 2011. 
During this period the world has gone through great transformation 
and turbulence. The US achieved some economic growth thanks to 
the information technology revolution and financial globalization, 
while the UK enjoyed some growth due to financial globalization. 
More strikingly, what came as truly unexpected and surprising was 
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the miraculous economic growth of China, India and Brazil, which 
have come to exert some influence over the world economy. 
Japan, on the other hand, was left out in the cold: it tumbled by 
itself and remained stagnant – hence the so-called “Lost Decade” (or 
the “Lost Two Decades”). 
It became a constant refrain to speak of Japan as the country 
which could still find no way out of the stagnation, or the one that 
held a lesson for all. Emblematic was Obama’s statement in the Pres-
idential Inaugural Speech two years ago that he would implement 
any resolute policy for recovery of the US economy from the crisis, 
referring to the Lost Decade. 
The present paper will look into the realities of the Lost Dec-
ade, examining the path along which the Japanese economy proceed-
ed over the three decades.
2. The Misstep from the Supreme Reign
2.1. The Plaza Accord (1985)
In the 1970s the world economy saw the collapse of the Bret-
ton Woods System and the advent of the flexible exchange rate sys-
tem as a new currency system. 
After the yen was fixed at 1 dollar = 308 yen at the Smithson-
ian Agreement (December 1971), Japan eventually came to adopt a 
flexible exchange rate system in February 1973. Immediately after 
that, the yen appreciated to 1 dollar = 260 yen, but remained stable at 
around 300 yen thereafter. Then a rapid appreciation of the yen  oc-
curred as from October 1977, arriving at 175 yen in October 1979.
Besides the change in the monetary system, the world econo-
my also saw US-Japan trade conflict.
The Japanese firms, producing high-quality goods thanks to 
sophisticated technology, had rapidly expanded sales abroad and 
come to dominate the world market. In consequence Japan’s balance 
of trade continued to show a surplus, and so it was that trade conflict 
arose with the US. As huge exports to the US drove American firms 
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to bankruptcy, the US began to criticize Japan in terms of unfair 
trade. This US-Japan trade conflict was to continue over the long pe-
riod, starting with synthetic fiber, followed by steel products, color 
TV and cars. Japan usually responded to the US with self-imposed 
restraint. Its balance of trade surplus, however, rapidly increased 
from 1983 on, and US grievance waxed ever stronger. 
At that time the US economy was suffering from stagflation. 
Volcker, who became the Fed chairperson in August 1979, imple-
mented tight monetary policy (“New Adjustment Finance Method”), 
causing the FF rate to rise to 20 % (“Volcker Shock”). In conse-
quence, although the price level rapidly stabilized, the unemploy-
ment rate rose further, reaching 11%. Due to the high rate of interest, 
huge amounts of dollars poured into the US, which caused consider-
able appreciation of the dollar (from 200 yen in October 1981 to 275 
yen in October 1983). The exchange rate then settled at around 250 
yen, which meant some depreciation of the yen, resulting in a rapid 
increase in the balance of trade surplus. The balance of trade in rela-
tion to the US also showed a huge surplus, which heightened the 
trade conflict.
It was in these circumstances that the “Plaza Accord” (Sep-
tember 1985) was concluded with strong initiative on the part of the 
US Administration. This was a pact among the G5 for cooperative 
intervention in the foreign exchange market. Its aim was, in essence, 
to appreciate the yen (depreciate the dollar) by selling dollars and 
buying yen.
In consequence, the exchange rate rose from 1 dollar=255 yen 
in October 1985 to 150 yen in October 1987. Thereafter the yen went 
on appreciating until it reached 125 yen in October 1988. Then it 
went on to depreciate for a while, and again appreciated until it 
reached 79 yen in April 1995.
In spite of this appreciation, Japan’s balance of trade saw a 
large surplus persisting throughout the 90s.
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2.2. The Bubble Period
Speaking of the recent bubble economy we may mention the 
real estate bubbles of the US, Ireland and Spain in the early 2000s. 
We can also mention the real estate bubble in Japan, which anticipat-
ed them. It continued from December 1986 to February 1991, and its 
collapse continued from the spring of 1991 to that of 1993.
2.2.1. The Upward Phase (December 1986 - February 1991)
Worries about Depression Induced by Yen Appreciation – As Japan’s 
economic growth had been led by exports, worries spread that the 
steep yen appreciation due to the Plaza Accord might cause serious 
depression if the government did nothing. The surplus, in fact, con-
tinued to decrease in the balance of trade from 1987 to 1990.
The Nakasone Cabinet then implemented fiscal and monetary 
policies aiming at stimulating domestic demand. For fiscal policy it 
put forward the “Emergency Economic Measures” (May 1987) while 
for monetary policy it lowered the official discount rate to 2.5 % 
(February 1987 - May 1989). In consequence, public investment as 
well as private investment increased tremendously. Besides, the na-
tion-wide project to develop the resort area was devised as a means 
to stimulate domestic demand (“The Resort Act”, 1987).
The Japanese exporting firms adopted two methods to tackle 
the yen appreciation. One was to reduce production cost through a 
rise in labor productivity. The use of robots in the production process 
was emblematic of this approach, which amazed the world.
Another method was to transfer production bases abroad for 
cheaper labor cost. This was extensively carried out, to such a degree 
that it might have induced) de-industrialization. The ratio of produc-
tion abroad to total production in the manufacturing sector, in fact, 
soared from 3.0 % in 1985 to 6.4 % in 1990 (the main location was 
South Eastern Asia1
                                                          
1 This was a key factor for Southeastern Asia’s dramatic economic 
development thereafter.
).
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And yet Japan’s balance of trade showed a healthy surplus, al-
beit continuously decreasing until 1991. Japan did not see worrisome 
depression, but maintained the boom thanks to the fiscal and mone-
tary policies. 
The Abode of Demons: The Change in the Financial Structure – Un-
der these circumstances, the scene was set for major policy failures –
a shift from indirect finance to direct finance (or self-finance) in the 
Japanese financial structure. As a result of a steep increase in ex-
ports, many firms emerged in possession of huge sums of money (the 
phrase, “Toyota Bank” was emblematic), and felt less need to depend 
on the banking institution for procurement of capital.
On top of that, the stock market was gaining in popularity, giv-
ing rise to a situation that made it easy for firms to procure capital 
through it. The stock price continued to go up, with the Nikkei Aver-
age Stock Price rising from 1,300 yen in 1986 to 38,900 yen in 1989. 
Around that time a social atmosphere emerged in which more and 
more housewives caught the bug of investing their money in equities 
and other financial assets (the so-called “Zai-Tech Boom”).
This state of affairs had serious implication for the banks. So 
far the Japanese economy had continued along a high economic 
growth rate, and firms were eager to procure a vast amount of capi-
tal. As long as the stock market was underdeveloped2
Then, due to a large-scale shift to direct finance and self-
finance, this traditional method no longer served the purpose. In ad-
dition, due to the huge surplus in the balance of trade the foreign ex-
change reserves rose abruptly, which brought the money supply rap-
, firms had no 
means of procuring capital other than borrowing it from the banks. 
People deposited a large proportion of their increased incomes in the 
banks (or post-offices), and yet this was not sufficient to meet the 
demand of the firms. As, moreover, the loan rate was fixed above the 
deposit rate, the banks were able to finance capital safely by means 
of rationing.
                                                          
2 It should be noted that this was not the case in the prewar period.
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idly flowing into the banks. Thus the banks found themselves in a 
new situation, forced to look for new customers.
Thus the banks came to expand their business, including mort-
gage loans, stock loans, and free loans (usable for any purpose). In-
dividuals and firms able to obtain loans purchased immobile proper-
ties, stocks and other financial assets.
As the property prices and stock prices started to soar, more 
and more people were eager to get loans, believing that the prices 
would rise instantaneously. When the prices promptly rose, the de-
mand for loans increased yet further, which in turn drove property 
prices and stock prices up still further.  
Gradually the people making transactions for the sake of pure 
speculation, carried away by get-rich-quick dreams, came to account 
for a large weight in the markets. In consequence, eventually the land 
value within the Yamanote Line reportedly came equal to the land 
value of the whole of the USA. The objects of the speculatively bor-
rowed money were not confined to properties and stocks, but extend-
ed to golf club membership cards, valuable paintings, and even fancy 
foreign cars. And in fact the prices of these items continued to rock-
et.
These speculative activities seriously affected the manufactur-
ing industry. Many manufacturing firms came to be devoted to spec-
ulation to such a degree that they almost forgot their primary busi-
ness. There were firms which even boasted larger profits in “Zai-
Tech” than profits in the primary business.
The speculative activities extended beyond the domestic to the 
world market. Speculative investment in properties, stocks, other fi-
nancial assets, and artworks3 increased at a faster pace. The purchase 
of the Rockefeller Center by the Mitsubishi Estate in 1989 was an 
emblematic case of such dealing.
                                                          
3 Successful bidding by Japanese in auctions such as Sotheby’s became all 
the news.
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2.2.2. The Burst (February 1991- March 1993)
As the price of immobile property went up, the unlawful activ-
ity in connection with it (i.e. “Jiage”) became a major social prob-
lem. On top of it, unlawful loans by financial institutions (e.g., coun-
terfeiting of the deposit account by bankers) came to light. Scathing 
criticisms was then voiced by the mass media and the public on 
property speculation and the loan stance adopted by the banks.
In response, the Treasury embarked on “the Regulation of the 
Total Sum concerning the Property Loan” (March 1990). This was 
an administrative directive designed to hold the rate of growth of the 
property loan below that of the total loan. In practice it acted as a 
tremendous pinprick, bursting the bubble.
It was, rather, the stock market which was initially affected. 
The Nikkei Average Stock Price, which was record-high at 38,000 
yen in December 1989, plunged to 15,000 yen in 1992. Then the 
price of property, which had only seen a decline in the rate of in-
crease even in 1991, dropped sharply. Many firms and individuals 
engaging in speculative activities were suddenly refused loans by the 
banks. They were forced to rush to sell their properties and equities, 
which caused further decline in the price of the stock and the proper-
ties. And the bubble burst there. 
This, in turn, worsened the balance sheets of the banks and se-
curity companies which had made loans to these firms and individu-
als. It turned out to be difficult to retrieve loaned money, for more 
and more firms and individuals were pushed into default, and the 
value of the collateral possessed by the financial institutions plunged. 
In a word, the loaned money turned into bad debts. 
The banks, which initially held the optimistic view that prop-
erty value as well as the stock price would soon rise, tried to prevent 
the bad assets from coming to the surface. This they were able to do 
under the system of acquisition cost basis accounting, unless the bad 
assets were disposed of. However, this behavior was soon to be de-
nounced by the mass media as “bad asset concealment”.   
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3. Recovery, Stagnation, and Recovery
When the bubble economy turned into depression, what kind 
of economic measures would the government implement? The 
phrase, “the Lost Decade” is quite often used to characterize the Jap-
anese economy in this period. However, it is not true to say that all 
were doomed to failure from the start, for there was a period in 
which policy was seen to have some effect. It is premature to label it 
with the blanket term “the Lost Decade”. Let us take the period in 
order.  
3.1. Economic Stimulus Measures and Economic Recovery (1993-
1996)
While property value and stock price were abruptly deteriorat-
ing, the government implemented the following economic stimulus 
measures, which had fiscal policy to boost effective demand as top 
priority.
(1) “The Overall Economic Measures” (August 1992. 10.7 trillion 
yen) by the Miyazawa Cabinet (November 1991 – August 1993).
(2) “On the Promotion of the Overall Economic Measures” (April 
1993. 13.2 trillion yen) by the Miyazawa Cabinet.
(3) “Emergent Economic Measures” (September 1993. 6 trillion yen) 
by the Hosokawa Cabinet (August 1993 – April 1994). 
(4) “The Overall Economic Measures” (February 1994. 15.25 trillion 
yen) by the Hosokawa Cabinet.
(5) “Economic Measures” (September 1995. 14.22 trillion yen) by 
the Murayama Cabinet (June 1994 – August 1995) together with 
a lowering of the official discount rate to 0.5 %.
Thanks to these measures, personal consumption and capital 
investment increased. The Japanese economy was able to accomplish 
an economic growth rate of 3.1 % in 1995 (as compared with the 
previous year), and 4.7% in 1996, and fear over the bad debt de-
creased. Fiscal policy was clearly having effect around this period.
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3.2. Fiscal Structural Reform and the Financial Crisis (1996-1998)
Seeing the economically favorable situation, the Hashimoto 
Cabinet (January 1996 - July 1998) set its primary policy objective 
on fiscal structural reform. The cabinet raised the consumption tax 
by 2%, abolished the special tax break (2 trillion yen), and increased 
the burden on the public through health service reform (2 trillion 
yen), expecting to increase tax revenue by the total sum of 9 trillion 
yen.
Contrary to the expectation, however, the economy, which had 
been showing an upward trend, was to plunge again with this policy. 
In 1997 the stock price sharply dropped and the bad debt problem 
came to the surface. At the G10 summit in July 1998, moreover, it 
was decided that an international bank should maintain 8 % plus as 
the capital-to-asset ratio (the BIS regulation). The banks concerned 
carried out extensive credit crunch and credit withdrawal.
Thus the Japanese economy again deteriorated and, additional-
ly, fell prey to financial crisis (the following bankruptcies occurred 
in succession: the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and the Yamaichi Se-
curity Company [November 1997]; the Long-Term Credit Bank of 
Japan [October 1998]; the Nippon Credit Bank [December 1998]4.
Asset prices slumped while the number of bankrupt firms and indi-
viduals soared, which, in turn, worsened the balance sheet of the fi-
nancial institutions.5
                                                          
4 Ironically, it was in November that the “Fiscal Structural Reform Act” was 
enacted.
The value of the bad debts possessed by the 
5 The Housing Loan Companies (“Jusen”) Problem became a hot issue in 
relation to property. They were subsidiaries for making loans to the property 
set up by the financial institutions. Even when “the Regulation of the Total 
Sum concerning the Property Loan” was implemented, money flew, through 
a loophole, into the Jusen from the financial institutions managed by the 
Agricultural Cooperation. The Jusen continued to make loans for property. 
However, this came to aggravate further the balance sheets of these finan-
cial institutions under the overall asset deflation. 
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banks, which amounted to 40 trillion yen in August 1995, jumped to 
79 trillion yen in December 1997.
The Hashimoto Cabinet, which faced a serious depression, 
suspended the fiscal structural reform and implemented the “Overall 
Economic Measures” (16.7 trillion yen) in April 1998. However, the 
effect was not favorable. This should not be attributed to the fiscal 
policy, but rather to the fiscal structural reform, which is, by its very 
nature, a deflationary policy. The rate of economic growth in 1997 
was 0.2 %, and -0.6 % in 1998.
The megabanks, which suffered from a steady decline in asset 
prices, finally appealed to the government for public funding. In con-
sequence, the following bailouts were made: (i) (February 1998) 18 
trillion yen for the 21 large banks including the Long-Term Credit 
Bank of Japan and the Nippon Credit Bank; (ii) (March 1999) 7.5 
trillion yen for the 15 large banks6
Through the 90s, spending went to the tune of 18.6 trillion yen 
for the bankrupt financial institutions, 9.6 trillion yen to buy up the 
assets from the financial institutions, and 12.3 trillion yen for capital 
infusion into the almost bankrupt financial institutions
The mass media and public opin-
ion denounced this as a continuation of the so-called “Convoy Sys-
tem”.
7.
The Line of Financial Liberalization - The collapse of the financial 
system in the latter half of the 90s constituted for the government a 
considerable inducement to leave the traditional “Convoy 
tem”8
The plan was composed of two pillars. One pillar was the lib-
eralization of securities, finance, and insurance.
and promote financial liberalization (the “Japan-Version of the 
Big Bang”). This was carried out mainly by the Hashimoto Cabinet.
                                                          
6 The road to public funding for banks was paved by the “Early Promotion 
of the Financial Function Act” (October 1998).
7 It is a historical irony that similar things were to be carried out on a larger 
scale throughout the world after the Lehman Shock.
8 Another factor is pressure exerted by the US.
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In November 1996 the Hashimoto Cabinet put forward an idea 
for the financial system reform, advocating “the three principles” 
(Freedom, Fairness and Globalization). The idea was implemented as 
the “Financial System Reform Act” (June 1998), which advocated: 
(i) deregulation of brokerage commissions; (ii) promotion of new en-
try into the banking sector, the security sector, and the insurance sec-
tor; (iii) shakedown of the investment trust; (iv) complete lifting of 
the ban on OTC (Over-the-Counter) derivatives; (v) enhancement of 
disclosure; (vi) upgrading of the rule of transaction. 
This movement was closely tied to the financial liberalization 
carried out in the US, where the Glass-Steagall Act (1933) was muti-
lated and eventually taken over by the Gramm-Leach-Briley Act 
(1999). The US strongly urged Japan to adopt the same approach.
Another pillar was overhaul of the bureaucratic machinery. In 
June 1998 the Hashimoto Cabinet separated the Bureau of Check and 
Oversight from the Treasury in accordance with the “policy of sepa-
rating fiscal matter from monetary matter”, and set up the “Financial 
Supervisory Agency”. In July 2000, moreover, the Mori Cabinet 
founded the “Financial Services Agency”, integrating the Financial 
Supervisory Agency with the Financial Planning Bureau of the 
Treasury. It is worth stressing that this reorganization brought about 
a weakening of the Treasury, which had so far flaunted absolute 
powers.
3.3. Economic Measures and the Economic Recovery (1998 –2000)
The Obuchi Cabinet (1998–2000), which was established in 
July 1998, when the Japanese economy spiraled downward and the 
financial system was in crisis, advocated recovery of the economy as 
top priority: (i) for fiscal policy, the “Emergent Economic Measures” 
(November 1998. 23.9 trillion yen) and the “Economic Renovation 
Measures” (November 1999); (ii) for monetary policy, the zero inter-
est rate policy (February 1999). Thanks to these policies the Japanese 
economy clearly showed some recovery (November 2000).
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Then the Bank of Japan lifted the zero interest rate policy 
(August 2000) although the Obuchi Cabinet opposed it. At that point 
the so-called “Dot Com Bubble” burst in the US, and the Japanese 
economy again showed a downward turn due to the decline in ex-
ports. The Bank of Japan again implemented the zero interest  rate 
policy (together with the Quantitative Easing policy, March 2001. 
This was maintained until July 2006).
As compared with the fiscal policy, however, just how much 
the monetary policy helped in alleviating the economy is doubtful 
(see Table 3).
According to this table, the monetary base (the account current 
balance of the banks on the BOJ) showed a big increase in 2001 and 
2002, while the rate of increase in money supply (the deposit balance 
of individuals and firms on the banks) was incredibly low. At that 
time the credit crunch held sway and the financial institutions were 
not inclined to make loans to the real economy. Rather, their usual 
practice was to purchase the national debt with the money obtaina-
ble.
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(Table 1?Monetary Base and Money Supply (% compared with the Aver-
age Balance of the previous year?
Monetary Base Money Supply
97 8.2 3.5
98 7.4 3.7
99 9.8 3.2
00 3.8 2.2
01 14.7 3.1
02 21.8 3.2
(Source) BOJ Data 
3.4?The Structural Reform and the “Izanami” Boom
It is the Structural Reform and the “Izanami Boom” (February 
2002–October 2007) that characterized the Koizumi Cabinet era.
The Structural Reform was an inheritance of the Hashimoto 
Cabinet as well as representing explicit approval of “Market Funda-
mentalism” (or the Washington Consensus). The Koizumu Cabinet, 
which advocated small government and a balanced budget, persisted 
in a deflationary policy.
The zero interest rate policy by the BOJ attracted US investors 
who borrowed yen and exchanged them for dollars, which were car-
ried over to the US and used for consumption and investment (the 
“Yen Carry Trade”). This in turn further boosted the US economy, 
which had already shown an upward trend. The Yen Carry Trade 
brought about a depreciation in yen, which induced a rapid increase 
in exports, due to which the Japanese economy was able to get on a 
modestly upward curve.
This situation continued from February 2002 to October 2007. 
Due to its considerable duration it was dubbed the “Izanami Boom”, 
contrasting it with the “Izanagi Boom” (November 1965 – July 
1970). However, this boom’s beneficiaries were confined to the ex-
porting firms and the financial institutions. At the same time restruc-
turing proceeded in the whole industry; a great deal of labor em-
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ployment was shifted onto a temporary basis; the level of income 
remained stagnant, and income disparity widened. Thus the general 
public had limited awareness of the actuality and benefits of the 
boom. And economic growth in this period was, in fact, very modest. 
No wonder it is also dubbed the “Kagerou (or Air Turbulence) 
Boom”. 
3.4.1. The Structural Reform
The Koizumi Cabinet took a critical stance on the counter-
cyclical measures and placed major emphasis on the structural re-
form, for which the Cabinet put forward the following: (i) privatiza-
tion of the Postal Services, which was the main point of dispute in 
the general election in September 2005; (ii) privatization of the 
Highway Public Corporation; (iii) the Structural Special Zone; (iii) 
the Divine Trinity Reform; (iv) reorganization of the bureaucratic 
machinery.
It is doubtful, however, to what degree these reforms (some of 
which were not implemented) effectively contributed to revitalizing 
the Japanese economy. Many reforms were watered down and privat-
ization was no more than a nominal change. Albeit the bureaucratic 
machinery was vertiginously overhauled, restructuring of public offi-
cials was not touched on at all. Although the Koizumi Cabinet em-
phasized the private economy (the market economy) and the reduc-
tion of activities by the state, the administrative reform dwindled into 
all bark and no bite.
The structural reform by Mr. Koizumi was carried out with the 
support of the general public. Although he was a maverick, he had a 
flair for populism which was unique in the Japanese political scene. 
When the mass media failed to show interest in a given reform, that 
structural reform plan came to an end without any substantial change 
as a result of power struggles behind the scenes. Then another plan 
for structural reform was put forward to attract the general public.
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3.4.2. The “Izanami Boom” (February 2002 – October 2007)
Cavalcade of Deflationary Policy ? To repeat, the Koizumi 
Cabinet took a critical stance on the counter-cyclical measures. It 
implemented, in fact, a series of deflationary policies as follows: (i) a 
hike in the consumption tax rate; (ii) the abolition of income tax 
credit; (iii) an increase in health insurance premium; (iv) extension of 
retirement age.
They were founded on a microscopic (or microeconomic) idea 
of normalization (or equilibrium) of each account: (i) in order to 
solve the budget deficit, a hike in the consumption tax rate, and the 
abolition of income tax credit were advocated; (ii) in order to deal 
with the medical insurance fund deficit, an increase in the health in-
surance premium was advocated; (iii) to tackle the national pension 
fund deficit, extension of retirement age was advocated.
Of these, the medical insurance issue and the national pension 
problems are closely related to the aging problem facing Japan, so 
this is a very serious problem to tackle by any means. However, the 
reforms were implemented with bad timing. In a situation that saw 
no improvement for the general public, these measures aggravated 
their uneasiness about the future, which led to a fall in consumption 
(rise in the propensity to save).
What was really problematic was the stance the Koizumi Cab-
inet took on the budget deficit. A rise in the consumption tax rate, the 
abolition of income tax credit and a reduction of budget expenditure 
put heavy deflationary pressure on the Japanese economy.9
The Izanami Boom ?The above account, however, hardly 
does justice to the effects on the Japanese economy sufficiently in 
the Koizumi Cabinet period, for the boom dubbed the Izanami con-
tinued.
The Izanami Boom was brought about mainly as a side effect 
of the zero interest rate policy implemented in March 2001 (which 
                                                          
9 The Structural Reformers have an allergic antagonism to fiscal policy, but 
they do not perceive that this can put deflationary pressure on the economy. 
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was maintained until July 2006). This policy gave rise to Yen Carry 
Trade on a huge scale. The US economy was beginning to recover, 
mainly in the housing market, from the 9.11 shock. It was American 
investors who showed an interest in the yen with zero interest rate. 
Borrowing yen and changing them into dollars in Japan, they used 
them to buy properties and financial assets in the US.
The Yen Carry Trade led to yen depreciation, so the Japanese 
exporting firms were able to make huge profits. The contribution ra-
tio of the exports to the economic growth in this period, in fact, 
reached almost 60%. Due to increased exports, capital investment 
rapidly increased as well.
And yet, the annual rate of economic growth in terms of GDP 
was relatively low (2%). This was greatly affected by stagnation in 
consumption due to a deterioration in labor conditions (including a 
large-scale shift from normal employment to temporary employment 
and little or no increase in wages) and widening income disparity. 
The general public chose a life style to save (not to consume). The 
sales of the retail trade including the department stores and the su-
permarkets continued their prolonged decline.
The Izanami Boom was largely dependent on exports, lacking 
in domestic effective demand. Although the exporting firms and the 
financial institutions made huge profits, a sort of social uneasiness 
spread again due to the restructuring, the predominance of temporary 
employment10 and little or no rise in wages. To the eyes of the gen-
eral public who could not enjoyed no benefits, the Izanami Boom 
was the Kagerou (Air Turbulence) Boom.
3.5. After the Lehman Shock
The Lehman Shock, which broke out in September 2008, 
caused the collapse of not only the US economy but also the rest of 
the world economy. Far from being an exception, Japan suffered se-
rious damage.
                                                          
10 The phrase “Working Poor” was coined.
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Japan, as already noted, experienced the financial system crisis 
in the latter half of the 90s. During the Izanami Boom, however, the 
bad debt problem could finally be settled, and the financial institu-
tions made unprecedentedly huge profits. Unlike the US and Europe-
an financial institutions, the Japanese financial institutes were not in-
volved in the financial bubble associated with securitized papers, for 
they were preoccupied with the bad debt problem. 
The root cause of the deterioration of the Japanese economy 
was a sharp drop in exports, which was caused by the crisis of the 
US real economy. Almost all the exporting firms (including the car 
industry and the electronic industry) racked up huge losses, followed 
by massive restructuring and stoppage of investment. Consumption, 
which had long remained stagnant, showed further decline. Thus the 
Japanese economy abruptly spiraled downward. The stock price 
sharply dropped as well. Then there broke out speculative buying of 
yen. As the Japanese government did not intervene in the foreign ex-
change market, the yen peaked (76 yen) in March 2011.
Facing these critical conditions, however, the Japanese gov-
ernment was too worried about the huge budget deficit to implement 
counter-cyclical economic measures. Far from it, the bashing of 
“public investment” became a motto. The main policy of the Demo-
cratic Party included Child Benefits, Agricultural Individual Income 
Compensation, and Free Senior High School Tuition, none of which 
had anything to do with counter-cyclical measures. The government 
did not intervene in the foreign exchange market, fearing internation-
al reaction. The only counter-cyclical measures implemented were 
the zero interest rate policy by the BOJ (October 2010; this was the 
third time) and the Quantity Easing policy. However, even if money 
finds its way to the financial institutions through the QE (by buying 
the national debt), the project cannot work well, because of the credit 
crunch and credit withdrawal by the financial institutions on the one 
hand, and the feeble credit demand by the firms on the other.
During this period consumption has remained stagnant. Due to 
a sharp increase in unemployment the general public is uneasy about 
the cost of living and trying to limit consumption and save money, so 
we have the saving paradox. In the case of the firms, they are en-
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deavoring to move their factories abroad because of yen apprecia-
tion, with the result that de-industrialization is under way. Thus in-
vestment remains low as well. Taking the stagnation in exports into 
account, all in all the aggregate effective demand is very low. Then 
Japan with its persisting deflationary situation has encountered the 
apocalypse of March 11, 2011 – the colossal Tsunami and the col-
lapse of the atomic power plants in Fukushima. 
4. Looking Back Over the Two Decades
4.1. Japan on the International Scene
Throughout the 80s the US economy suffered from serious 
stagflation. It was Japan and the West Germany that economically
led the world, and Japan was coming into incessant trade conflict 
with the US. Albeit militarily and politically weak, Japan was out-
standing in creating the highest quality manufactured goods through 
the endeavor of the firms (such as the Quality Control [QC) move-
ment, and innovative technology). Economically speaking, Japan 
was distinctly top-drawer.
With abundant money supply at its zenith, however, the Japa-
nese economy ran into the bubble, and property prices, stock prices 
and other asset prices shot up. Failure to tackle the bubble, the Japa-
nese economy was to experience the Lost Decade. Then, helped by 
the Yen Carry Trade, it was able to maintain the “Izanami (or 
Kagerou) Boom”. Hit by the Lehman Shock, however, it again 
plunged into bottomless depression. Now severe instability descend-
ed both on the firms enjoying high reputation for “Japanese-style 
Management”, and on the laborers and salaried men who were re-
garded with awe as the “corporate warriors”. 
The US saw liberalization (above all, financial liberalization) 
proceed on a large scale in the 80s. In this process the Shadow Bank-
ing System (SBS) was enlarged, and the US came to lead the world 
financially. This, together with the innovative IT industry, boosted 
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the US economy in the 90s. The people went in for consumption 
while the firms regained self-confidence.
Excessive financial liberalization was, however, to put a great 
strain on the US economy. The USA had reacted smugly to Japan’s 
Lost Decade, but ironically was now following the same path, to 
even worse effect, influencing the world economy.
In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed, and a political situation 
emerged in which the US took on, also in military terms, overwhelm-
ing stature in the world. This, however, did not last long. The US 
was to be deeply involved in endless conflict in its “War on Terror-
ism”.
In the same period, a phenomenon arose which was to trans-
form both economy and politics in the world. China, Brazil and In-
dia, which had long been underdeveloped countries, continued to 
achieve surprisingly high economic growth. China, for instance, 
went on growing at an average of 8 % plus over the three decades, as 
a result of which it became No. 2 in terms of GDP, and No. 1 in 
terms of foreign currency reserves (2 trillion dollars). 
Thus the economic and political structure of the world dramat-
ically changed to such a degree that nobody had been able to foresee 
twenty years before. Today the presence of the Japanese economy in 
the world economy is manifestly in decline. While the Japanese 
economy remained stagnant, the US and the UK led the world in the 
financial area, and the BRICS and the Southeastern Asian countries 
raised their position in the area of the real economy.
Twenty years ago it was said that Tokyo was soon to become 
the world financial center together with New York and London. Now 
it’s a dim memory. Then the Japanese manufacturing industry was 
proud of its overwhelming productive efficiency, thanks to the intro-
duction of robots. Now it is lagging behind US industry in the IT ar-
ea. It is, moreover, feeling Korean and Chinese firms at its heels. On 
top of this, while Korea and China built up a strong backup system 
through their governments, the Japanese firms evidently lack such 
support.
The deterioration of the Japanese political system in recent 
years, and its weak position in the world politics are all too evident. 
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We can say, ironically enough, that there is no country like Japan for 
respect of the principle of laissez-faire. While the US, the UK, China 
and Russia move on the basis of their “national interests”, only Japan 
seems to leave everything to market fundamentalism. Restructuring 
of the Japanese political system is indispensable for the resurgence of 
Japan’s position in the world economy.
4.2. The Main Cause of the Lost Decade
There is an argument that the root cause of the Lost Decade 
should be seen in the line of cooperation with the US, starting with 
the Plaza Accord. The real responsibility, however, should be sought 
in the government’s failure to adjust policies to the changed condi-
tions.
The appreciation of the yen rapidly ran its course in accord-
ance with the Plaza Accord. Soon worries were spreading about the 
onset of depression. Then the government implemented an easy 
money policy (the low interest rate policy) and fiscal policy which 
included public works. Thanks to these measures, the Japanese econ-
omy, far from falling into depression, was able to maintain an up-
ward trend. So far, so good.
During the same period there was a great shift in the financial 
structure, from indirect to direct finance (and self-finance). Due to 
failure to adjust to this change, the Japanese economy boiled up to 
the bubble phase. Above all, without implementing tight monetary 
policy the government allowed the bubble to run its course.
A series of drastic decisions was then implemented tightening 
monetary policy, such as “the Regulation of the Total Sum concern-
ing the Property Loan”, in order to arrest this process. But the gov-
ernment allowed the deflationary process to proceed so long that the 
economy plunged into depression (The government should have lift-
ed its tight money policy earlier). Thus a series of asset deflation 
processes followed, starting with a sharp decline in the price of prop-
erty and stock prices. Then the Japanese economy saw the collapse 
of the financial system. It seemed self-trapped through the inappro-
priate timing of economic policy.
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These policy failures were further aggravated by the Structural 
Reformers’ inconsistent policy. They argued that the economy 
should be left to the workings of the market as much as possible, and 
should be made efficient through de-regulation. So far, so good. 
However, they had lost sight of macroeconomic policy so there was 
no scope for a rational economic policy11. The refusal to apply fiscal 
policy (abnormal reaction to public works) and the implementation 
of de facto of deflationary policies in the deflationary phase are em-
blematic examples .
4.3. Chaos and Lost Confidence
Turning to the domestic side, the Japanese people as a whole 
seemed to shift from impatience into loss of confidence. 
In the 90s Japan saw political whirlwinds. In addition, in re-
cent years governments changed within a short period. The Demo-
cratic Party, which assembled the cabinet in October 2009, did not 
implement any policy measures to tackle the economic crisis that hit 
Japan immediately after the Lehman Shock. The main measures (the 
above-mentioned Child Benefit, Agricultural Individual Income 
Compensation, and Free Tuition for Senior High School) did not aim 
at tackling the economic crisis. The Democratic Party’s governments 
have had no definite policy vision of how to manage the economy, 
consequently leaving it to the working of the market economy. Fiscal 
policy is regarded as a sort of taboo, while monetary policy (zero in-
terest rate) has no effect in terms of recovery of the stagnant econo-
my. The government seldom intervenes in the foreign exchange mar-
ket, allowing the yen to appreciate abruptly (to dollar). In these re-
spects the Japanese government is in sharp contrast with foreign 
governments (such as those of China, the US, Russia, and the EU) 
which set out to defend their national interests.
Consequently, even in the international economy theater Ja-
pan’s presence has dwindled. The State of the Union Address by 
President Obama in February 2011 was emblematic, for he very of-
ten referred to Korea and China without mentioning Japan. In the 
sphere of foreign policy, the presence of Japan was meaningless. In 
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the redeployment problem of the US military base in Okinawa, and 
the conflict of the Senkaku Islands, the government voluntarily 
abandoned responsibility, almost losing its raison d’être.
The firms – the driving forces of the Japanese economy - need 
to survive on their own in the world market, given the incompetence 
of the government. Japanese firms continue to be exposed to severe 
competition from the Korean and Chinese firms. Given the persistent 
shrinkage of the domestic market, they are forced to resort desperate-
ly to some global strategy. What is worrisome, as a consequence of 
many firms in the industries shifting their factories overseas, is the 
acceleration in de-industrialization.
The Japanese people seem to be losing self-confidence. Hav-
ing suffered from restructuring and a rapid increase in temporary 
employment during the long depression, they are, psychologically 
and economically, in the throes of unstable conditions. Thus even if 
the income from savings is almost nil, they have got accustomed to 
abstaining from consumption.
Reflecting this social atmosphere, the young tend to be intro-
versive. They like a quiet life, avoiding competition and showing in-
terest no in foreign countries. Yet there is no room for this introver-
sive attitude in today’s world. Even the Japanese firms which are try-
ing to achieve survival through global operations have a tendency not 
to employ more young Japanese.
Thus the Japanese economy is in a state of self-trap, finding no 
exit. 
5. Conclusion – New Social Philosophy Required
The Japanese economy is a market economy. Yet market (or 
private) economy at present lacks the ability to pull itself up by the 
bootstraps. Even if there are innovative entrepreneurs, the present fi-
nancial institutions lack the ability and will to provide themselves 
with the required capital. In Japan, unlike the US, venture capital 
market has not successfully arisen.
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Moreover, the direct finance of enterprises is completely 
blocked because of the stagnant stock market. The key to boost the 
market economy should be to form a government capable of imple-
menting shrewd and bold policies. After the private economy had 
been allowed to bubble, we saw it remaining stagnant. And then the 
government failed to come up with the necessary macroeconomic 
measures11
“The power of the private sector, the self-adjusting mechanism 
of the market, economic behavior based on self-responsibility” etc.: 
these mottos seem to lose color in the present Japanese economy. 
Entrepreneurs are not necessarily beings that can be completely en-
trusted with the future of the Japanese economy. What they are do-
ing at present is to reduce costs through restructuring. Although the 
firms might, by this means, improve the financial conditions to some 
degree, mass unemployment is emerging in return. It has become 
common practice for firms to reduce bonuses and lower wages, 
bringing further deflationary pressure to bear on the economy.
. This should not be repeated.
We suggest that both efficiency, by means of the market, and 
security, guaranteed by the government, should be required for the 
smooth working of the market economy. It is important for the eco-
nomic agents to feel some degree of stability. It is an obligation for 
the government to work out the institutional framework, because on-
ly within a stable framework can the people engage in competition
with self-confidence. Contrastingly, a society in which people are 
subject to uneasiness, seeing no future prospects, and dropping out as 
a result of competition, is not a good society. “Self-responsibility” 
has no meaning unless some degree of stability and safety is guaran-
teed. A jungle of business competition à la Hobbes is to be avoided. 
                                                          
11 This is a responsibility of macroeconomics as well. 
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Chapter 5
Indian Economy and Society: Globalization and 
Economic Reforms1
Sunanda Sen
_______________________________________
1. Markets in Economic Theory and Policy
Markets today remain integral to the politics and economics of 
mainstream neo-liberal doctrines. Policy prescriptions as follow from 
dominant official circles often share an uncritical acceptance of such 
positions, thus attaching a great deal of importance to the expansive 
path of the market. Views as above treat the market as a major 
institution which holds the key to a path of maximum growth with 
efficiency, by enabling producers, consumers as well as the labourers 
to operate and exercise options according to their rational choice. 
Based on the foundations of methodological individualism, an 
exercise of free will as above is also consistent with the much 
celebrated optimality principle formulated by Wilfred Pareto back in 
the 1920s. The doctrine is considered to provide a unifying link 
between the markets for final output and those for labour and capital, 
the latter with inputs rewarded according to their individual 
contribution in the production process.
                                                          
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Plenary Session of the 
Italian Association of Political Economy, Rome 2008.
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A free market as viewed above in neo-liberal economic 
doctrines is supposed to provide opportunities for an economy to 
maximise, at a point of time, potential output and its utility from 
consumption, while providing the best possible returns to capital 
along with the best available wages for labour. 
With disproportionate power as is usually enjoyed by the 
advanced nations in material terms and with their geo-political 
significance, advocacy for the opening and liberalisation of markets 
has continued to prevail, both on the official view of the advanced 
nations and on positions taken by the international financial and 
trading institutions, dominated by the same set of countries. As for 
other nations, which include the developing, the least developed and 
the transition economies, these have been at the receiving end, with 
their policy makers either too ready or obliged to adopt and put to 
practice the market-oriented policy prescriptions. Moves to launch 
market-oriented reforms reflect the desire to remedy what is seen as 
the so-called inadequacies/imperfections of markets in these 
economies, which are also held as responsible for their lack of 
development! 
Viewed from an orthodox Marxist perspective, the market as 
an institution can be seen as necessary to promote the expansion of 
capitalist production processes. Thus capitalism accumulation is 
made possible as the free market enables production to be based on 
wage labour, commodity production and exchange2
Some debates within the Marxist circle, on the historic and in-
stitutional specificities of capitalism (as a form of production, ex-
change and distribution), also connect the role of markets to capital-
ism. For the school led by Immanuel Wallerstein and Gunder Frank, 
. From this angle 
advances of the market are treated as a necessary pre-requisite of a 
capitalist expansionary process. It provides a run up to 
transformations by compulsions, on the part of capital, to improve
productivity and to extract surplus (labour) value by employing 
labour who works at low wages (equivalent to necessary labour) for 
survival.
                                                          
2 Dobb (1946).
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markets have remained central in bringing about a world system of 
trade and exchange, as happened since a period as early as the 16th 
century. The process, according to them, also heralded the advent of 
capitalism3
For other scholars, like Maurice Dobb, trade, exchange and 
markets, while necessary, are not sufficient to warrant a path of capi-
talist expansion. Thus trade can be there even with serfdom or its 
variations, which limit accumulation and the expansionary effects of 
the market. As pointed out, in absence of wage labour, commodity 
production for exchange and the ability of capitalists to accumulate 
by using surpluses from wage labour, it is not possible to have an ex-
panded reproduction which makes for capitalism
.
4
However, positions as above, while relevant in the context of 
the accumulation process under advanced capitalism, cannot be ap-
plied to the developing or the least developed countries, where pro-
duction and exchange have continued to dwell on several non-market 
relations. For mainstream economists markets here are other than 
perfect or fully functioning, a factor responsible for their backward-
ness. The call for liberalisation and opening of markets thus follows 
as a logical cure-all for low growth and underdevelopment
.
5
It may be relevant here to point out that, to understand the dy-
namics of capitalist accumulation in market economies, one has to go
beyond the standard tools of economics. As it can be found in the 
classic work of Karl Polanyi, there exist, in all societies, a set of pro-
tective as well as countervailing forces which regenerate and sustain 
the ‘mutually supportive relations’ in society. As capitalist expansion 
enlarges the sphere of the market, the latter tends to subordinate the 
society and to destroy the social fabric through the imports of stand-
ardized capitalist values, body and soul as embedded in the culture of 
the global market. This is done by the violation of both the basic hu-
man nature as well as such requirements of indigenous people as are 
.
                                                          
3 Wallerstein 1974, see also Sweezy 1950 pp. 134-57.
4 Dobb, 1946, in Jomo and Reinhart 2005.
5 See, for a short account, Sen 2007. 
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fundamental and intertwined with family, community and social rela-
tions. In terms of this position, unlimited expansions of the capitalist 
system along with the market, while generating fast growth of output 
and accumulation, are capable of causing “dispossession, displace-
ment and human degradation”6
Markets (with their adjunct, which is capitalism), in the 
alternate view as above, are sustainable only when “embedded” in 
society. This is partially achievable with attempts on part of 
institutions, including the state, to act in a manner which conforms to 
the preferences of the society. It is usually done by regulating and 
stabilising the market economy to achieve some degree of political 
legitimisation. 
.
Markets, as described above, have come up in a large number 
of countries today, often carrying the label of “Emerging 
economies”. For the majority of these countries, and in particular for 
the developing countries, the expanding market most often remain 
“dis-embedded” from society. Often the process generates reactions 
from what is known as civil society, which also can take the form of 
political struggles/resistances. This has the general pattern which 
takes the form of social and political protest movements. Reactions 
as above, while impairing the pace of market orientation of the 
society, also help the market itself by bringing up to the surface what 
all are acceptable to members of the society. Described by Polanyi as 
a “double movement”7
There remain, however, considerable discrepancies between 
what all are sought after in terms of the social and political 
movements within a country and the realm of what are achievable. 
The mediating role provided by the state here assumes a great degree 
of significance in these liberal market economies, where the state is 
subject to an “existentialist contradiction” between unfettered 
competition and expansion of capitalism on the one hand and the 
political necessity of sustaining a minimal façade of a mutually 
, the process is one which is but expected in a 
functioning democracy.
                                                          
6 Levitt in Jomo 2005
7 Ibid. see also Polyani 1944.
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supportive and self-reinforcing society on the other. Rejecting this 
position, the neo-liberal mainstream view continues to treat the 
market as the sole arbiter, using the narrow economism of supply and 
demand. It thus ignores the role of social institutions which shape up 
the civil society, the social and political movements in such societies 
and the responses which the latter is capable of eliciting, from the 
state, the community and other voluntary groups.
2. Markets, State and Society in India
India, since her independence from the British rule in 1947, 
has witnessed, between 1950s and 1990s, a rapid transformation of 
the economy from state-led industrialisation to laissez faire. Follow-
ing the theoretical frame of Karl Polanyi in his classic book titled 
“The Great Transformation”, one observes the following four se-
quences of what Polanyi described as the ‘double movement’ in 
market economies:
1. economic reforms and liberalization;
2. impact on economy with regressive consequences;
3. resistance from people-centred organisation, the society;
4. redressals from state with limited measures.
We would touch upon the above four issues in our analysis of 
the Indian economy in the subsequent part of this paper.
3. The Transformation
Problems as arise with steady expansions of the market are 
amply demonstrated in the rapid transformations of the economy and 
society which India has gone through, especially, in moving away 
from state-initiated partial planning and industrialisation during the 
first two to three decades of the country’s independence to full scale 
economic reforms in 1991. To dwell on these changes, we need to 
pay attention to the early pattern in India of a developmental state 
and its transformation with the market at the centre-stage.
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We document, in the following pages, the four elements of the 
‘double movement’ in India, as spelt out above. These deal with state 
policies (intervention/liberalisation), the related state of the economy 
and society, movements from civil society and political groups and 
finally, the responses from the state as arise in way of remedial 
measures.
Early years of industrialisation followed by gradual erosion of 
state authority and steady advances of the market.
Policy makers in independent India led by the Congress party 
initially stood for a path of industrialisation in terms of a closed 
economy model. Following the pattern of Soviet industrialisation it 
relied on an import-substituting industrialisation strategy, using 
heavy industries, large public sector, licensing and controls over 
trade, industry as well as external payments and an emphasis on de-
velopment of science and technology. By the mid-sixties the initial 
growth spurts were followed by economic stagnation. Faced by a 
balance of payments crisis , external pressures, especially from the 
World Bank and the United States, led the country go through a steep 
currency depreciation and deflation with cuts in capital expenditure. 
Fuelled by cuts in private investment, there resulted an industrial 
stagnation, intermittent agrarian crisis, rising food prices, agrarian 
protests, intensified labour unrest and mass movements, all at an un-
precedented level in independent India.
Resentments and protests were voiced by opposition political 
parties as well as by the general public, and matched by armed re-
sistance movements in the countryside of Eastern India (Naxalbari) 
demanding land reform. Largely in response to above, the state 
launched a 10-point programme of regulation which included nation-
alisation of banks and the insurance sector, state trading, controls 
over monopolistic practices, abolitions of the managing agency sys-
tem and privy purses in princely states, introduction of public distri-
bution in food grains and some measures of land redistribution. In 
the coming years exchange control in the external sector was consol-
idated with the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) to prevent 
leakages of foreign exchange and money laundering. A brief period 
of a regime with alternate policies followed, with a populist pro-poor 
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agenda to help small industry, decentralised administration, food 
subsidy and employment schemes which provided options for ‘Food 
For Work’. However, the trend was to be reversed soon as authorities 
who came back to power shared an agenda endorsed by the condi-
tional loan package from the IMF in 1981, directing a right-ward 
shift in official policies. Strict limits were imposed on fiscal deficits 
as a proportion of the GDP and within a few years several de-
regulatory measures followed, relating to trade, technology and fi-
nance.
Some limited employment programme and some measures to 
improve health, education and the status of women in the economy 
also followed. However, policies towards liberalisation continued in 
full steam with the successive regimes which came to power subse-
quently, each bent on following a market-oriented neo-liberal policy.
India formally launches economic reforms in 1991.
Economic reform was the main agenda of the Congress party 
which again came to power in 1991. Depleted official reserves, large 
deficits in balance of payments, and sharp declines in GDP growth 
(which was reflected in similar declines in almost all sectors of the 
economy), demanded urgent attention. For those in power, economic 
reforms were considered as the panacea and a cure-all to combat the 
economic crisis as had engulfed the country. Those changes in eco-
nomic policies targeted the prevailing controls and regulations as still 
existed in the economy, relating to trade, technology, finance and 
even labour.
Looking back, the year 1991 can be treated as the turning 
point in economic policies, with the launch of wide-ranging 
measures to de-regulate the economy. Those were to continue and 
gain momentum in the coming years, despite short-lived changes in 
regimes.
By mid 1990s there was an implicit consensus or unanimity 
among political parties in India regarding the need to continue with 
the reform process as an irreversible path or TINA (There is No Al-
ternative) syndrome. The deviations, at level of state governments 
run by left-wing parties, were no exceptions when it concerned the 
major decisions. As mentioned above, these policies were backed by 
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the neo-liberal doctrines of growth via efficient market which by this 
time was already an accepted mainstream position.
We deal in the next few pages with the major changes in poli-
cy as have taken place since the onset of the major reform drive in 
1991, in specific areas of trade, technology, finance and labour.
4. Liberalised trade and technology
The steady opening up of the domestic market with liberalisa-
tion of trade which started in mid eighties geared up its momentum 
in the following years. This came with the scrapping of quota licens-
ing and with steep reductions in import duties both of which were in 
compliance to the WTO norms. This led to subsequent increases in 
import intensity of output. As it can be expected the measures also 
led to changes in the composition of output and the pattern of tech-
nology as used in industry. With new products catering to the domes-
tic market with demand by the middle class and the rich, the upgrad-
ed technology, now availed of by industry from the global market to 
gain a competitive edge, production required less labour and more 
capital and skill.
As one can expect, proportion of imports to GDP at current 
prices had moved up significantly, from 8.3% in 1990-91 to 22.06% 
in 20011-12. It is worth recalling here that a rise in imports as a pro-
portion of output, while providing requisite inputs to investment as 
well as consumption with the new import-intensive technology, 
dampens simultaneously the demand for domestic output by an 
equivalent amount. Moreover the displacing of the import-
substituting industries by those which are import intensive can, in ex-
treme cases, be a cause for what we have labelled elsewhere as an 
‘import-led GDP compression’8
                                                          
8 Sunanda Sen, “Import Liberalisation as a Tool of Economic Policy since 
mid-Eighties”, Economic and Political Weekly, 27(12), 1992 (also in Idem, 
Trade and Dependence. Essays on the Indian Economy, Delhi: Sage India, 
2000).
.
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The above process of import liberalisation, which started off 
with the conditional loan package from the IMF in early 1980s gath-
ered momentum, with compulsions, in terms of the WTO negotia-
tions, to abide by the tariff cuts and the scrapping of quantitative im-
port controls. This had several implications, with some having seri-
ous consequences for agriculture; especially with the entry of subsi-
dised agricultural products from the advanced countries. The latter 
made it difficult for local production units to compete in the domes-
tic market. For industry the shift in the pattern and technology of 
output has made it difficult for local units to access the newly opened 
up opportunities of import-intensive and high-tech pattern of produc-
tion in the arena of global markets. In the process some of the major 
industries including cotton and jute textiles, light engineering indus-
try went through a process of decay, and to that extent a process of 
de-industrialisation.
Import liberalisation also had an impact on technology inflows 
to the country which were linked with the WTO initiative for Trade 
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). In India advances in 
R&D for science and technology as had taken place over the earlier 
decades can be viewed as a fall out of the national patent regime, 
granting patent rights only to process technology which ruled in In-
dia and other developing countries for in-house innovations with in-
digenous technology by local producers. As it is held by the neo-
liberal school, technology is a free public good which, if markets are 
free, would be accessible to all countries and all individuals within, 
thus conforming to the notion that the world is flat9
In India the software industry of the Information Technology 
(IT) sector has witnessed a phenomenal expansion in recent years, 
which is largely a fall-out of both the initial advantage in terms of 
skill-formation (which started during the early years of industrialisa-
tion) and the man-power to access advanced technology. Both have 
provided incentives to foreign capital in the IT sector. However, de-
. Policies as logi-
cally follow are for opening up the technology frontier, and to build 
and expand the ‘knowledge economy’, across and within nations.
                                                          
9 Friedman, 2005.
Globalization and Economic Crisis
108
 
spite the success of the IT industries to compete in the world market 
and to create a hub for jobs as well as to provide newer facilities for 
communication in the country, and an ability to provide additional 
sources of exchange earnings, the functioning of the market has 
failed to narrow down the gap between those who can access the 
new-found prosperity and benefits and those who cannot. In effect 
the expanding market for software revolution in India has created a 
‘Digital Divide’, with a large number of the poor in the wrong side of 
it. Furthermore, the future prospects of the IT sector entirely depend 
on the global economic conditions. This is reflected in the recent 
sub-prime crisis and recession in USA which led many global and 
local IT companies shred off their strength.
Advances in technology and facilities for its open access have 
encouraged capital from overseas to enter India. Thus FDI (Foreign 
Direct Investment) inflows have shot up from $113mn in 1990-91 to 
$37.74bn in 2009-10. While the current inflows of FDI do not com-
pare with the spectacular inflows to China, India still stands out as a 
major destination among the Emerging Economies10. Relaxation 
of the prevailing controls on flows of external finance as well as fis-
cal incentives along with labour market reforms provided further in-
centives for foreign capital, which was keen to enter and make use of 
the expanding domestic market in India.
                                                          
10 However, there are some anomalies between FDI definitions as used in 
China and India. Attempt was made in 2002 to correct these anomalies by 
changing the FDI definition in India as per IMF norms to include re-
invested earning and inter-corporate borrowings. As a result the gap 
between FDI inflows in India and China was little narrowed down since 
then. However, still some gap exists in accounting practices as imports of 
capital goods used in Foreign Enterprises are treated as FDI in China which 
is not the case in India.
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5. Financial Reforms
Reforms in India encompassed several aspects of the economy 
in the realm of finance. Initiated in 1981 as a part of the IMF-
package of financial liberalisation, official policies in India have con-
tinued to follow policies with a drive to lower fiscal deficits, mone-
tarist measures to combat inflation with occasional tightening of 
credit, banking reforms in the interest of financial stability (thus lim-
iting access to credit for the productive segments as well as the poor) 
and finally, a steady pace of liberalisation of the external financial 
sector.
Fiscal discipline, initiated in the country during the early 
1980s, has gathered momentum over years. Following the Fund-
Bank position relating to the stabilisation package, a ceiling now is 
binding on fiscal deficit in terms of the Fiscal Reforms and Budget 
Management Act (FRBMA) of 2003. Successive cuts in fiscal deficit 
as a proportion to GDP has reduced it from 6.2% in 2001-02 to 4.8% 
in 2010-11 (and dipping even lower during the next year according 
to budget estimates). Cuts in the primary deficit have continued to be 
even lower, at -0.9% in 2007-08 and 1.8% in 2010-11. In terms of 
budgetary classification the primary deficit equals the fiscal deficit 
less interest payments. Thus it covers the gap between expenditure 
on defence, capital expenditure and subsidies over tax and non-tax 
revenue. With expenditure on defence remaining steady at around 
1.2% or 1.3% as a proportion of GDP, the axe naturally comes on 
major subsidies (for food, fertilizers and petroleum) as well as capital 
expenditure by the government, with the two actually dropping re-
spectively from 1.7% in 2002-03 and 3.0% in 2003-04 to 1.6% and 
2.2% of GDP in 2010-11. The gap between the fiscal deficit and the 
primary deficit as proportion to GDP kept widening over time, re-
flecting the rising interest payments on the marketised borrowings by 
the state, an item which was an inflexible component of the budget. 
As already mentioned above, fiscal discipline has made it obligatory 
on the part of the government to meet the expenditure (as remained 
uncovered from other sources) by borrowing from the market instead 
of from the Central Bank (Reserve Bank of India) as had been the 
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practice earlier. These marketised borrowings against government 
guaranteed securities turned out as lucrative for risk-averse investors 
which included financial institutions who readily purchased those 
government bonds.
One can here mention other measures to reform the financial 
sector. Those included the strict credit-risk norms to conform with 
the Bank of Settlement (BIS) norms of the Capital Adequacy Ratio 
(CAR) and the Credit Risk Adjusted Ratio (CRAR). While measures 
as above improved the quality of bank portfolio by reducing the ratio 
of their Non-performing Assets (NPAs) to total assets , the new rules 
created hurdles for the poor borrowers as well as the small and medi-
um industry who became the victims of financial exclusion. One no-
tices a sharp decline in the flow of credit to poor and the SMEs 
whose share of credit from Public Sector Banks and private banks 
respectively fell from 17% to 10% and from 20.6% to 7.1% between 
1999-2000 and 2003-0411
The steady process of capital account opening in the country 
includes the free entry of Foreign Institutional Investors(FIIs) to the 
country’s stock markets and large number of concessions offered to 
FDIs. These facts have created profit opportunities, both for foreign 
direct investments and for portfolio capital through speculation and 
. Reforms in the area of finance has also 
de-regulated the interest structure and banks today can fix interest 
rates on both deposits and advances according to what they consider 
as profitable in terms of the state of the capital market. While norms 
for priority sector lending by the Scheduled Commercial Banks has 
remained at 40% of net bank credit since banks were nationalised in 
1979, the practice is now subject to the anomaly that no targets are 
set for lending to the small sector industry (SSI). With advances to 
agriculture and to weaker sections within the priority sector set re-
spectively at 18% and 10% of NBC, SSIs are effectively left with no 
more than 12% of NBC as a residual. In addition one can observe 
tendencies, even in terms of priority credit, to introduce new items as 
priority credit, as consumer loans, housing credit etc., which openly 
flout the social norms of the credit policy, as it used to be earlier.
                                                          
11 Sunanda Sen and Soumya Kanti Ghosh, 2005.
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arbitrage. The late inflows of portfolio capital have far exceeded 
those of FDIs , creating an atmosphere of speculation-led high fi-
nance in the economy. Thus net inflows of FDI were at $ 9.3bn as 
compared to net inflows of portfolio at $30.2bn in 2010-11. Unlike 
what could be achieved in the real economy by Initial Primary Offers 
(IPOs) of equities with FDI inflows in the primary market of stocks, 
short-term portfolio investments, which cater to the secondary mar-
kets of stocks, are incapable of generating fresh investment demand, 
at least in the first round. Instead these flows create fresh opportuni-
ties for profits on speculation by generating uncertainty and volatility 
in the stock markets and push up the returns on financial assets to 
levels much higher than those on industrial securities. Higher returns 
on financial securities as compared to those on securities held with 
the industrial sector have prompted corporates and banks to hold a 
large part of their assets as financial securities. One can confirm the 
current tendencies in the corporate sector of India to switch their 
portfolio in favour of financial assets. Investment of these firms in 
industrial securities has actually fallen from 43% to 34% of their to-
tal investments between 2002-03 and 2004-0512
                                                          
12 Source: Prowess India on line data. Cited in my article “De-regulated 
Finance: Some Concerns for India’s Industry and Labour”, in Philip Arestis 
and Luiz de Paula (ed) Global Finance and Emerging Economies, London, 
Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008.
. The pattern tallies 
with the asset-liability structure of these units, with “quick assets” 
covering more than half of total liabilities for the large firms having a 
sales value over Rs (rupias) 1000 crores (equivalent to Rs 10 billion) 
during 2004-05. The pattern was roughly of the same order for firms 
with lower sales values. Financial liberalisation has thus opened up 
profit opportunities in the financial sector, which in effect is mop-
ping up a considerable part of the re-investible surpluses in the in-
dustrial sector. Interest shown by corporates and banks to invest in 
the high yield financial assets are found to have an added impetus 
with the on-going employees’ stock option (ESOP) system. It en-
courages the company managers to invest more in financial assets, 
not only in the interest of the corporate they are engaged in but also 
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from the pure self-interest of an enhancement in their personal 
wealth. Use of ESOPs in the IT companies in US has been followed 
by the use of the device in the Indian IT subsidiaries and elsewhere, 
as a device to attract and retain the skilled employees. In effect little 
of those short term investments as well as the re-investible earnings 
on such assets with finance companies can be directed to pockets of 
real growth in the economy, since major parts of such assets are de-
ployed to fetch higher returns on speculative finance. It is much easi-
er to speculate in the stock market today with trade in derivatives 
having a major role. According to the latest estimates, derivative 
trade has been several times the value of spot transactions, during re-
cent years. As for the average size of the deals, those in derivatives 
have been more than 25 times an average deal in the spot market13
As for the impact of FII inflows to the market, in 2006 the FIIs 
transacted business amounting Rs 2855 thousand crores which is as 
much as 37% of the country’s GDP! FII transactions (mostly in de-
rivative markets which are for speculation) are 6.5 times the primary 
market transactions (which create equivalent physical assets). It is 
not difficult to draw the conclusion that financial reforms in India 
have neither been for growth in terms of the creation of physical as-
sets nor for a fair distribution of the financial flows which are not on-
ly equitable but also productive. Instead the country has provided 
opportunities for speculation in financial assets in a manner as had 
never been witnessed before. This has considerably been facilitated 
by the new communication technology, with investors having the fa-
cilities to manage their portfolios at the press of a button!
.
Much of the zeal in the derivative trading is due to the uncertainty 
relating to stock prices which in India are connected to similar forces 
in both the domestic and the international market.
Financial liberalisation, with uncontrolled flows of short term 
finance from overseas and the rising levels of FDI inflows, have im-
pacted the autonomy of monetary policy on the part of the authori-
ties. As pointed out in the literature, an open capital account (which 
in India is nearly complete but for resident outflows) and a managed 
                                                          
13 Government of India, Economic Survey 2010-11, New Delhi 2011.
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exchange rate leaves little leeway for autonomy in monetary policy. 
Pressures to manage the exchange rate within an acceptable band, to 
ensure both external competitiveness for goods produced within the 
country and to sustain the net flow of foreign investment from 
abroad, often give a dual signal to policy makers. Thus an appreciat-
ed local currency while continuing to attract foreign investors, may 
be a disaster for local exporters making it obligatory for the central 
bank to mediate and tone down the currency appreciation by buying 
up foreign currency from the market. Additions to official reserve of 
foreign currency, contributing to high powered money, can, in ab-
sence of sterilising actions by the monetary authorities, push up the 
supply of money. It thus becomes one more responsibility for the 
central bank to control money supply, by raising the domestic rate of 
interest and or, as the RBI( Reserve Bank of India) had been doing, 
by selling bonds to the public as well as by raising the CRR ( cash 
reserve ratio) ratios. Monetary policy, no longer determined by the 
domestic requirements thus ceases to be autonomous. This reflects 
the trilemma faced with open capital markets, managed exchange 
rates and achieving autonomy in monetary policy. We have men-
tioned earlier the further problems in terms of the fiscal burden of the 
interest cost on the state.
6. Reforms relating to labour
Economic liberalisation in India has also impacted the status 
of labour in the economy, especially with the introduction of ‘flexi-
bility’ in terms of labour market reforms for achieving competitive-
ness and efficiency. By freeing labour from formal employment un-
der the prevailing labour legislations, labor flexibility was supposed 
to provide incentives to capital inflows from overseas, with assured 
labour market flexibility within the country. It has often been 
claimed that labour in the process can not only be more productive 
but also would get back the much needed freedom (option) over 
her/his own “time”. The approach, originating from methodological 
individualism which provides the theoretical background for achiev-
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ing complete laissez-faire, has been used in mainstream economics to 
justify unemployment in advanced countries with notions such as the 
Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU).
The scrapping of labour laws in terms of labour market flexi-
bility in India permits “hire and fire” policies, not only for the units 
in the private sector but also in the EPZ (export processing zones) 
units in different parts of the country which were privileged to oper-
ate without following the laws of the land. Pressures to dismantle the 
existing labour laws, even for the organised sector where they were 
relatively protected, often were devised to encourage larger inflows 
of FDI and to meet the compulsions for cost-cutting faced by indus-
try, both local and foreign controlled. The need for the latter was for 
achieving global competitiveness by using cuts in the wage bill. The 
official position on the matter was made explicit in the National 
Commission on Labour Report which came out in 2002. It recom-
mended , in no uncertain terms, the use of contract labour in view of 
the uncertain demand from global markets. Also, the move for pri-
vatisation of industries, which was often used by the government to 
raise resources in the name of gaining efficiency in those units, has 
given a push to labour flexibility. Use of casual labour today has 
been common in units as are owned by foreign as well as local capi-
tal14.
7. The failed performance of reforms and remedial gestures by the 
state
Economic reforms, operational in full swing since 1991, has 
not achieved the goal of efficient growth as is usually claimed on its 
behalf. It is only the service sector which has seen a remarkable up-
surge, much to its leanings on the IT sector, the latter with an annual 
growth of 11% during 2006-07 and contributing more than half 
(54%) of the annual GDP with an export growth rate of software at 
75% . However, the prosperity in the services sector, as mentioned 
                                                          
14 See, for details, Sunanda Sen and Byasdeb Dasgupta, 2009.
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above, was mostly confined to IT and finance, with Business Pro-
cessing Organisations (BPOs) in the IT sector responsible for out-
sourcing of services for overseas companies. As mentioned above, 
these services were made possible with the country’s track record of 
skill formation during the earlier years along with the newly accessed 
technology.
The service sector in areas of finance could take off as a result 
of financial liberalization which allows the free entry and exit of for-
eign capital and their deployment along different channels. A major 
consequence of the latter has been the sharp volatility in stock prices 
and even in exchange rate, volatility of which has been a common 
feature. Short term flows of capital have been responsible for an add-
ed degrees of uncertainty in the financial market which, paradoxical-
ly, provides further incentives for short term inflows in a booming 
market. The pattern with a boom has been in the reverse gear when 
stock prices moved in the downward direction, reinforcing flows of 
capital in the outward direction. The unprecedented accumulation of 
exchange reserves by the country, which is currently around $300bn 
often generates a sense of complacency for monetary authorities, 
calling for a move to full capital account convertibility of the Indian 
rupee and even investments in the equity-linked Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (SWF). Pressures from the WTO in terms of the GATS to 
open up the services sector including banks and the insurance sector 
has provided a major incentive to foreign finance. 
However, in terms of employment potential, the contribution 
of services had been abysmally low, providing not more than 1% of 
jobs in the organized sector
The structural shifts in the economy, away from brick and 
mortar industries and from agriculture, in the direction of the sun-rise 
services sector, while generating high growth rates of GDP, proved a 
failure in terms of employment growth. One thus observes a scenario 
of ‘job-less growth’, with employment in organized industry and ser-
vices growing at around 1% per annum. The pattern even prevails in 
the high growth industries with annual average output growth at 20% 
and above and employment growth falling far behind. The arithmetic 
behind it is the rise in labour productivity which was made possible 
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by raising capital-intensity per unit of labour15
It thus remains for agriculture and the informal sector in both 
industry and services to fill in the vacuum in the job-less market lad-
en with the so-called flexible norms for the labour market. These are 
the sectors which continue to support at least 75% or more of India’s 
working population who live in the countryside. But the slow or even 
negative growth of agricultural output in recent years, along with the 
use of new technology in terms of fertilizers etc. as are needed for 
the new crops, have made agriculture less dependent on labour as an 
input, especially in North India. But that does not reduce the depend-
ence, of large numbers of people in the countryside, on avenues of 
subsistence around this sector. Annual growth rates of agricultural 
output reflected a dismal picture in recent years, with low growth in 
several years of the new millennium. Facts as above along with job-
less industry explain poverty, with one third of population living on 
$1 to $2 dollars per day and with their well being as indicated by the 
rank of India in global human development index as low as 123 in 
recent times.
. In absence of offset-
ting factors which included expansions in the scale of production of 
these units, employment growth in industry failed to keep pace with 
output growth, even in units where these were robust. The core dy-
namic sector of the Indian economy today consists of IT and finance 
in the services sector, which so far has a limited capacity to absorb 
greater numbers, especially from the majority in the country who 
possess neither the requisite skill nor the resources to access skill-
formation.
8. Public Protests, Responses from the State
Unemployment, poverty, malnutrition, rising food prices and 
shortages, agrarian distress and farmer suicides, widening disparities 
and aspiration gaps prepare the grounds for protest movements 
which have been widespread in recent years. Contrasts between the 
                                                          
15 Ibid.
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high-income consumptions in pockets of the economy and abject 
poverty as well as acute distress for the majority created an atmos-
phere of growing discontent and anger at a scale which was not wit-
nessed before. Mention can be made of various organizations from 
the civil society, with demands which range from employment, food 
under public distribution, primary and other education, abolition of 
child labour, displacements by big dams, industrialization by the set-
ting up of Special Economic Zones, rights of women, trade unions 
rights for casual labour and similar issues which are important. 
Sometimes these demands are also voiced by political parties in the 
opposition, attacking the policies of the party in power but co-opted 
by mainstream thinking when they come to power in individual 
states.
Demands as above unfold a story which speaks of a total deni-
al of developmental needs and equity in the country. However, to 
continue with the minimal façade of democracy by an elected gov-
ernment, the ‘double movement’ of Polanyi under capitalist expan-
sion keeps repeating, despite the innate apathy on part of the authori-
ty in power, which introduced reforms in a remedial mode. Of late 
these include in India the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(NREGA), the Right to Information Act (RTI), Farm loan waiver 
scheme, Anti-hoarding drive to combat food prices and the frequent 
announcements by those in power to endorse an ‘inclusive develop-
ment’. The changed mood also reflects itself in the moves on the part 
of the private sector to shoulder a minimal corporate social responsi-
bility. While none of these are supposed to halt the steady advances 
of the market or to attack the roots of poverty in the country, the 
moves continue to remain as symbolic gestures which help to bring 
back some minimal semblance between growth and equity or devel-
opment.
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Chapter 6
The Origins of Economic Orthodoxy in Mexico1
María Eugenia Romero Sotelo
_______________________________________
1. Introduction
This article supports the hypothesis that the formation of an an 
economically orthodox current in Mexico was a conscious act by a 
sector of Mexico’s élite, intended to create an alternative to what has 
been called economic nationalism, which emerged with the Mexican 
Revolution of 1910 and was consolidated by the economic and social 
reforms promoted by President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940)2
                                                          
1 A Spanish version of this article has been published in the Journal 
Economía UNAM, vol. 8. No.24, 2011.
. In the 
2 This article is the result of my research visit to the Instituto de Estudios 
Latinoamericanos (IELAT) at the Universidad de Alcalá, as part of the 
Short-Stay Post-Doctoral Research Programme organised by Fundación 
Carolina and the Department of Academic Staff at the Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México (UNAM). My gratitude to all three institutions. I 
would like to extend particular thanks to: Pedro Pérez Herrero, Director of 
IELAT, for his commitment to my research programme; to my colleagues 
and friends Leonor Ludlow, Carlos Tello, Enrique Rajchenberg, Juan Pablo 
Arroyo, Emilio Caballero and Rogelio Huerta, for the time and effort they 
were willing to put in to reading this article, and for their intelligent and 
thought-provoking comments; and to Samuel Luna Millán, for his support 
in carrying out this research. Finally, I would like to mention that this work 
is part of a line of research developed by the project PAPIIT IN307408 
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word of the researchers: the Revolutionary movement set Mexico on 
the road toward the economic doctrine that would prevail in Western 
economies in the post-War period, and it was during Cárdenas’s ad-
ministration that the biggest steps were taken3
In December of 1934, General Lázaro Cárdenas was sworn in 
as President of the Republic, and he undertook a series of wide-
ranging structural reforms intended to resolve social problems and
encourage growth and economic development in Mexico. Within this 
programme, the State played the pivotal role as promoter of devel-
opment. The plan was a turning point in Mexican economic thought, 
as it broke with the liberal-style economic policy that had been dom-
inant in Mexico since the Revolution in 1910, even during periods 
such as the crisis of 1929. From that moment on, two different ways 
of approaching and resolving the problems of the Mexican economy 
would remain in tension with one another for the rest of the twentieth 
century.
.
The Cardenist economic policy of growth with distribution of 
wealth was not looked favourably upon by a particular class of busi-
ness owners. The State played a very active role in the economy in 
its quest for independent, nationalistic economic development, and 
all of this implied: a renewed impetus for agrarian reform (a wide-
reaching redistribution of land), and consequently the redistribution 
of the nation’s wealth; and support for workers’ interests through the 
formation of trade unions and respect for the right to strike. The poli-
cy encouraged economic activity via a broad programme of public 
investment, which in turn was responsible for the construction of 
large public infrastructure projects. To this end, a group of public in-
stitutions was created to manage and guide the economy, including 
the development bank Nacional Financiera and the agricultural lend-
ing institution Banco de Crédito Ejidal. In 1938, Cárdenas national-
                                                                                                                           
“Philosophy, Figures and Institutions in Mexican Economic Policy, 1880-
2005”. 
3 See Loyola & Martínez, 2010, p. 27.
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ised the oil industry and created the state-owned oil company 
Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex)4
The economic philosophy that emerged from this era consti-
tutes the basis of Mexican “developmentalism”, characterised by 
State intervention to ensure high growth rates, the distribution of 
revenues and job creation
.
5
This policy upset economic interests and gave rise to the de-
liberate construction of an alternative to Cárdenas’s approach, con-
sisting of the reconstitution of the liberal movement that had domi-
nated the country’s economy from the end of the nineteenth century 
to the end of the nineteen-thirties. Throughout the time that 
‘developmentalist’ thought was being formed and evolving, orthodox
economic thinking was also present, and it laid down tenets at the 
same time that it was establishing institutions within the country. 
This eventually created the conditions for neo-liberalism to come to
the fore in the nineteen-eighties. This paper will attempt to answer 
the following questions: How did orthodox economic thinking come 
. The approach was most closely identi-
fied, at that time, with Eduardo Suárez, the Finance Minister under 
Presidents Lázaro Cárdenas and Manuel Ávila Camacho, and this
school of thought, with varying interpretations, dominated and per-
meated Mexican economic policy for much of the twentieth century 
until the beginning of the nineteen-eighties.
                                                          
4 “From 1934, he undertook considerable structural reforms. Beginning dur-
ing his campaign, he adopted a model of economic planning, expressed in 
the First Six-Year Plan, that was inspired by Soviet planning. President 
Cárdenas also created institutions and a legal framework to sustain his eco-
nomic policy: in 1935, he established the Department of Hunting and Fish-
ing, the Forestry Department and the Department of Indigenous Affairs, fol-
lowed by the National Deposit Stores in 1936; in 1937, the National Bank 
of Foreign Trade and the National Workers’ Industrial Development Bank 
were founded, and the New Insurance Law was passed. In 1939, the Na-
tional Housing Commission was created, among other institutions.” Loyola 
& Martínez, “Guerra”, 2010, p. 23. 
5 For a full description of Mexican “developmentalism” (desarrolismo), see 
Suárez, “Dos visiones”, 2005, p. 229. For an overview of the economic the-
ories of Lázaro Cárdenas, see Guerrero, “Pensamiento”, 2005, p. 189. 
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about in Mexico? And how was orthodox thinking able to develop in 
Mexico, with Cardenist-Keynesian philosophy so dominant on the 
economic political scene?
Orthodox liberal thinking, in the opinion of Francisco Suárez, 
began to develop in the decades of the nineteen-twenties and thir-
ties6. My personal view is that this school of thought is a continua-
tion of the liberalism that prevailed during the reign of Porfirio Díaz
at the end of the nineteenth century, updated with new developments 
from the liberal school of the nineteen-twenties, in particular the 
Austrian School, put forward by Friedrich von Hayek and Ludwig 
von Mises. This approach was adopted and promoted in Mexico by 
Luís Montes de Oca7
                                                          
6 For a description of Mexican orthodox thinking, see Suárez, “Dos 
visiones”, 2005, pp. 228-229.
and Miguel Palacios Macedo, who believed 
that price stability should be the foremost objective of economic pol-
icy. The intellectual talents of these two figures were complemented 
by the pragmatic approach of businessmen such as Raúl Baillères 
7 Luís Montes de Oca was Minister of Finance and Public Credit from the 
16th of February 1927 to the 20th of January 1932. He occupied the post 
during the administrations of three Presidents: for a year and two months 
under Plutarco Elías Calles; for a year and two months under Emilio Portes 
Gil; and for eleven months under Pascual Ortiz Rubio. Eduardo Villaseñor 
describes him as a classical liberal and staunch opponent of any official in-
tervention to influence the national economy. He also had strong links to 
two of the representatives of the liberal orthodox current of the moment, 
with whom he maintained a correspondence: Ludwig Von Mises and Frie-
drich Von Hayek. Aníbal de Iturbide describes him as “an extraordinarily 
cultured man, and one with good relations with other talented men”. He was 
a natural leader and his opinions held a great deal of influence in intellectual 
and business circles in the country. He created and developed an ideology 
for these groups. He was Minister of Finance in the midst of the depression 
in the nineteen-thirties, in response to which he defended a balanced budget 
and “healthy finances”. He was also Director General of the Bank of Mexi-
co, and in this position he refused to provide support for the financial defi-
cits required by Minister of Finance Eduardo Suárez to expand the economy 
during the administration of Lázaro Cárdenas. Ibid., p. 227.
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and Aníbal de Iturbide. These figures are fundamental to an under-
standing of the roots of orthodox thinking in Mexico, as well as its 
development and the consolidation of its power during the last centu-
ry.
Together, they began the task of establishing institutions that 
would counteract Cardenist principles in the economy and in politics. 
In academia, they founded higher-education institutes that provided
an alternative to the leftist ideology in state universities, specifically 
the ideology of the School of Economics of the UNAM, founded in 
1929 by a group of nationalist intellectuals.
During this process of the formation of the school of orthodox 
economic thought in Mexico, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von 
Hayek had considerable intellectual influence. Both belonged to the 
socalled Austrian School, and the two professors were firmly op-
posed to any kind of planned economy, associating freedom with the 
market. They gained their position of influence in Mexico as a result 
of the fact that they helped to reinforce the approach and the rhetoric 
of the groups of business leaders and intellectuals who rejected the 
trend of economic nationalism. The question that arises is: How did
the Austrian School and the resistance against Cardenism work to-
gether? Within the group of Mexican intellectuals, the leading role 
was played by Luís Montes de Oca. He studied the work of Mises 
and Friedrich von Hayek, established a relationship with them, and 
they encouraged his ideas from an intellectual standpoint. Raúl 
Baillères, one of the group of pragmatic business leaders, provided 
financial support for the project. Together, these individuals con-
structed and breathed political life into the school of liberalism in 
this country.
2. An Alternative to Cardenism: Von Mises and Von Hayek
The rallying point in the intellectual debate between Luís 
Montes de Oca and the two professors from the Austrian School was 
the criticism of a planned economy that entailed very active interven-
tion on the part of the State in the country’s economic affairs. This 
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was condemned by all parties from the standpoints of both theory 
and policy. In Mexico, with the economics of Cárdenas, the notion 
had been established of planning with State intervention (the Six-
Year Plan), and this gained currency in many so-called Third-World 
countries in the period following the Second World War. The opin-
ions of Montes de Oca and his familiarity with the two representa-
tives of the Austrian School are made clear in an article, “State Inter-
vention in Economic Activity”, published in the year 19438
Montes de Oca and Von Mises met in New York in the winter 
of 1941. The former then invited Mises to visit Mexico for a series of 
conferences at the Universidad de México, and offered him excellent
.
conditions if he were to extend his sojourn. In her memoires, Margit 
von Mises, wife of Ludwig, recounts:
He offered Lu a lifetime position, a house with garden, a car 
and chauffeur, and tremendously high salary if Lu would accept his 
proposition. But Lu refused. He was happy to come as a guest, but he 
remained firm in his decision to make his home in the United States9
Despite such an attractive offer, Mises declined the proposal 
of the former Finance Minister. A year later, at an encounter in Man-
hattan, Montes de Oca again invited him for a period of two months 
and they discussed the possibility of having his book Socialism trans-
lated into Spanish. This would eventually be published in Mexico in 
1961, two years after Montes de Oca’s death.
.
While war raged on the international stage, on the 11th of Jan-
uary 1942, Von Mises arrived in Mexico in the company of his wife 
Margit and remained in the country until the 25th of February of that 
year.
The couple was received by a group of university professors 
and lodged at the Ritz Hotel in Mexico City. Mrs. Mises gives a de-
scription of the reception they received at the hotel and her impres-
sions of the following weeks:
                                                          
8 Montes de Oca, 1943, pp. 225-264.
9 Von Mises, 1976, p. 75. Margit referred to her husband Ludwig Von 
Mises as “Lu”.
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Our suit… was so full of roses, gardenias, and white callas I 
thought I was back on the stage.
The subsequent seven weeks… were perhaps the greatest 
surprise of my life. Not only because Lu, for the first time 
since we had left Europe, got the recognition he deserved, but 
because the high intellectual standard of Mexican elite, 
whom we had the privilege of meeting during our stay, was 
absolutely overwhelming to me10.
A group within the Mexican élite much admired the contribu-
tions that Von Mises had made to economic theory. In Mexico the 
Viennese professor seemed to have achieved a level of recognition
that he did not yet enjoy in the United States. Mises’s wife comments 
that Montes de Oca was already familiar with Mises’s work when 
they met, as we have already mentioned. It is possible that Montes de 
Oca introduced other members of the Mexican élite to the theories of 
the Austrian School.
Mises began his series of conferences on the 14th of January, 
at the school of economics of the UNAM and at the Escuela Libre de 
Derecho. Between 8 and 14 students attended the lectures, which 
were given in English. Montes de Oca himself acted as translator.
During his stay in Mexico City, Mises would meet Montes de 
Oca at the latter’s house at night. During these gatherings, Mises ex-
pressed again and again his pessimism about the future of society. 
Montes de Oca, on the other hand, insisted on his optimism. He be-
lieved that it was not too late to fight for freedom and was firmly 
convinced that Mexico was the ideal place to start.
The Association of Mexican Bankers, which was presided 
over by Raúl Baillères, also convened two conferences that were 
given by Von Mises. The first of them was on the topic of “Banking 
and Economic Policy in Our Time”; the second was “Planning and 
                                                          
10 Ibid.
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Banking”. These conferences were held in the auditorium of the 
Confederation of Chambers of Commerce in Mexico City11
Two of the most prominent associations of Mexican business 
leaders, the Association of Mexican Bankers and the Mining Industry 
Confederation, asked Von Mises to extend his stay and offered him
employment as an economic adviser. He asked for more information 
about the duties he would be expected to perform. Six months later, 
Montes de Oca made him the following proposal:
.
According to his proposition, Mises would become the head of 
the economics departments of the two business associations, with 
sufficient personnel to assist him and at a comfortable monthly salary 
of 1,000 Mexican pesos (a lunch for one person at the Ritz costs 
three or four pesos). He would also be teaching courses and seminars 
at any department he wished at the National University of Mexico 
and at the Colegio de Mexico, and he would be free to take up other 
(paid) teaching assignments. The offer was for three years and could 
become effective any time – Mises would not even have to return to 
the United States after his upcoming visit12
Once this offer had been received, Mises became interested in 
knowing more about the situation of the Mexican economy. In a let-
ter to his friend Hayek, he describes the opinion of Mexico that he
.
formed during his trip:
Mexico is a country without industry and very short of capital. 
The soil is in the greater part of the country very poor. The re-
sult... is that they have to import wheat and mais [Mises meant 
what Americans call “corn”], but the rulers – generals, trade 
union leaders and pink intellectuals – intend to start industrial-
ization by ruthless confiscation of capital. Neither this attitude 
nor its effects differ from conditions in other countries. But re-
ally amazing is the fact that there are some people – of course 
                                                          
11 El Nacional, 16th, 20th, 21st of February 1942. The Association of 
Mexican Bankers was founded in 1928.
12 Hülsmann, 2007, pp. 813-814.
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a small elite only – who have a very keen insight into the prob-
lems involved and try to educate the intellectuals13.
Two things are immediately notable in this letter to his friend: 
first, the description that Mises makes of the Mexican economy 
(poor and without industry), combined with infertile farmland and 
the existence of an industrialisation scheme sponsored by trade-union 
leaders and intellectuals based on what he refers to as the “confisca-
tion of capital”. Secondly, Mises is intrigued and surprised to note
that there is an élite in Mexico that is opposed to the Mexican gov-
ernment’s policy and that is attempting to create an intellectual 
movement in favour of its own arguments. In this latter aspect, both 
Mises and Hayek went on to play a fundamental role.
Following this first visit, Mises and Montes de Oca maintained 
an intense and fruitful correspondence.
In the month of June 1942, Montes de Oca proposed to Mises 
the establishment of the Instituto Internacional de Ciencias Sociales, 
which would be under his direction, and in 1943 he informed Mises
that considerable progress had been made on the project. In the same 
letter, he also asked for suggestions as to what teachers might be 
willing to work for the institute, and the salaries that they would 
command:
Mises replied that Walter Sulzbach, Alfred Schütz, Louis 
Rougier, Jacques Rueff and he himself – all European expatriates liv-
ing in New York without American citizenship – would be available 
for permanent employment in Mexico City for an annual compensa-
tion of some $ 6,000 per head. This was a fairly generous salary, and 
proved to be a major stumbling block for the establishment of the In-
stitute. But in early 1943 everything seemed possible: a group of
first-rate intellectuals with classical-liberal pedigree was at least po-
tentially available and another group of men was interested in financ-
ing the venture. Moreover, there was a plan: Louis Rougier would be 
invited to the University of Mexico City for a series of lectures; 
Mises was to prepare a study on Mexican politico-economic condi-
                                                          
13 Ibid., pp. 814-815.
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tions (which Montes de Oca had commissioned for his Banco 
Internacional); and Montes de Oca continued to work on a translation 
of Socialism14
The subjects they would teach were: economics; history and 
critical analysis of the economic doctrines of the last two centuries; 
constitutional history since 1776; economic and social history since 
1750; and modern public finance.
.
Mises began to take on a role as intellectual adviser to the 
Mexican élite with Montes de Oca as his intermediary, which he 
makes reference to in his letter to Hayek. He was consulted in con-
nection with the formation and development of what was later to be-
come the movement’s most important educational project: the 
Instituto Tecnológico de México.
3. An Economic Policy for the Post-War Period: Von Mises
At the end of the month of February 1942, Mises left Mexico 
with a promise to write an article for the magazine Cuadernos Amer-
icanos15
The war did not put a stop to intellectual endeavour; on the 
contrary, many intellectuals poured their energies into reflections on 
what the respective virtues and defects were of the different political 
regimes at large in the world, and which had clashed in the Second 
World War: socialism, fascism, communism, liberalism. Among the-
se thinkers were Joseph Schumpeter, Karl Mannheim, and Karl Pop-
. He was true to his word, and “Ideas on Post-War Policy” 
was published in the July-August edition (number 4) of the magazine 
in that same year. In the article, Mises reflects on the economic poli-
cy guidelines that in his opinion different nations should follow to
rebuild their economies in the post-War period.
                                                          
14 Ibid., p. 827.
15 A magazine of social sciences and philosophy, founded and edited by 
Jesús Silva Herzog.
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per; Friedrich von Hayek and Mises also took part in this collective 
meditation16
In his article, Von Mises maintains that to rebuild their econ-
omies, nations should follow a policy that was radically different 
from the one used before the start of the war. He was specifically re-
ferring to economic nationalism, which he believed detrimental to 
economic development. He describes it as:
.
…An economic policy based on the belief that it is possible to 
promote the wellbeing of all the subjects of a nation, or at least 
a specific group, by putting into practice measures that are dis-
advantageous to foreigners. It was believed that a service was 
being rendered to one’s country by obstructing or completely 
prohibiting imports of foreign products, restricting foreign 
immigration or expropriating, in part or in full, the capital be-
longing to foreigners. This is not the place to undertake an in-
vestigation of whether measures such as these were in fact ide-
al for the purposes of achieving the desired outcome. Classical 
free-trade theory has now provided irrefutable proof that the 
end result of restrictions on foreign commerce is none other 
than a generalised decrease in the productivity of labour and, 
therefore, of the standard of living. Thus, production ceases in 
places where it could create large yields, and is transposed to 
other locations where, with a minimum of effort on the part of 
both capital and labour, far lower returns are obtained. The 
classical theory of free trade espoused by Hume, Smith and 
Ricardo has never been refuted. Every postulation made 
against it has subsequently proved to be unfounded17.
Mises maintained that the elimination of economic nationalism 
was a precondition for nations to achieve peace and wellbeing in the 
post-War period. He believed that the essential problem of the post-
War economy was a shortage of capital, and for him the only way to 
alleviate this ill was:
                                                          
16 Watson, 2003, pp. 405-406
17 Von Mises, 1942, p. 88.
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…to produce more than is consumed, that is, to save and 
thereby to create new capital. The more is produced, and the 
more of what is produced is invested and the less consumed, 
the faster will the difficult times of lack of capital pass. Any-
one who advises a different solution to the one that we have 
just explained is deluding himself, or is trying to delude oth-
ers18.
He goes on:
There are no magical financial procedures to ease the lack of 
capital. The expansion of credit cannot alleviate it, much less 
eliminate it. On the contrary, a boom artificially created by an 
expansion of credit may lead to a lack of focus, and therefore a 
squandering of capital, by immediately favouring overconsump-
tion, that is, the consumption of capital. Inflationary experi-
ments will do nothing but worsen the crisis. What is needed in 
this case is, precisely, a monetary and credit policy that ensures 
the stability of monetary value19.
Mises was of the opinion that governments should abandon 
their confiscatory policies and radically change their taxation poli-
cies. He proposes that:
…the part of revenue that is not consumed, but is saved and in-
vested, should be free from all taxes, since it is in the public in-
terest that as much new capital be formed as possible20.
To conclude, Von Mises’s proposal for the policy for recon-
struction following the Second World War was to bring to an end the 
economic nationalism that had entailed a policy of protectionism, as 
well as a taxation policy that, in his opinion, did not allow an in-
crease in savings and the formation of capital. Economic reconstruc-
                                                          
18 Ibid., p. 93.
19 Ibid., p. 93.
20 Ibid., p. 94.
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tion, in his opinion, had to be lit by the glow of the free-trade para-
digm.
4. Von Mises and the Economic Problems of Mexico
Also resulting from his trip to Mexico was the essay Economic 
Problems in Mexico, written in 1943, in which Von Mises put for-
ward a critique of Mexican State economic policy since the Revolu-
tion of 1910. The essay was published by the Instituto Cultural Lud-
wig Von Mises in 1998, with an introduction by Carolina R. de Bolí-
var. In the year of publication, she was the Academic Director of the
Instituto Josefina Vázquez Mota and a notable member of the Partido 
Acción Nacional political party.
Bettina Bien Greaves, a distinguished student of Von Mises, 
presented the institute with the text of this publication as a gift, after 
inheriting from Ludwig and Margit von Mises all the documents that
they left behind in their New York apartment when they died. Margit 
von Mises describes the role that Greaves played in their lives as fol-
lows:
…She first came to the seminar in 1951 and attended it to the 
last session, not missing a single meeting. She is one of those 
rare individuals who combine intelligence and mental curiosity 
with warmth and understanding of human nature. With the 
passing of the years, she became a household ward with Lu 
and me. If there was any information Lu needed, any refresh-
ing of his memory, he would say, “Call Bettina” and surely 
enough she had the answer21.
After four or five years in the seminar, Bettina took her seat 
next to Lu, taking notes in shorthand – and no one would have 
dared to contest for that seat. I spoke first to Bettina in 1952 
during a seminar in California. At the time she was still rather 
quiet, hardly asking any questions, but later, working with 
                                                          
21 Von Mises, 1976, p. 140.
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tremendous zeal, studying Lu’s books from beginning to end, 
reading them again and again, her inner security grew in rela-
tion to her knowledge. She wrote an excellent bibliography of 
Lu’s work, and for his ninetieth birthday she catalogued – with 
my permission and without Lu’s knowledge – his whole li-
brary of about 6,000 volumes, to Lu’s greatest surprise and de-
light22.
Bettina Bien Greaves was very familiar with the Mises library, 
which she also inherited when the couple passed away. This explains 
her finding the documents where Mises analysed the Mexican econ-
omy, and which make up the content of Mises’s previously un-
published article on Mexico.
In “Economic Problems in Mexico”, Ludwig von Mises chal-
lenges the economic policy measures implemented by President 
Lázaro Cárdenas during his administration. His criticism centres on: 
State intervention, inflation, protectionism and economic national-
ism23
Before turning to an analysis of Mises’s arguments, it is im-
portant to note that when Mises visited Mexico, the country was un-
der the administration of President Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-
1946) and the Second World War was being played out international-
ly. The war created favourable conditions for the industrialisation of 
the country, by increasing demand for Mexican manufactured goods 
on the international market. The most salient features of the industri-
alisation project then under way were: a very active role for the State 
in the economy, protectionism, the granting of tax incentives and the 
creation of infrastructures.
.
In his essay, the author takes as his starting point the argument 
that Mexico is a backward country and that industrialisation is the 
key to solving the problems of economic underdevelopment, alt-
hough he states his opposition to the industrialisation policies of the 
Mexican State, which are based on considerable State intervention 
                                                          
22 Ibidem.
23 Von Mises, 1998.
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and protectionism. With reference to the period of nationalization 
under Lázaro Cárdenas, he comments that Mexico needed capital for 
development and that these nationalisations scared it away:
What Mexico needs more than anything else is capital, either of 
its own or from overseas. The default on the national debt and 
the expropriation of foreign investments discourage the external 
capitalist, and the methods of taxation obstruct the accumulation 
of internal capital. Complete renunciation of these practices is 
the first requirement for the economic regeneration of the coun-
try.
There is no hope of building prosperous industry in a country 
that considers every businessman as exploitative and tries at 
every turn to punish his success. The policy of shortening the 
working day and driving up costs, by forcing the entrepreneur to 
provide housing for his workers and establishing minimum 
wages, either due to the direct interference of the government or 
by failing to reign in the demands of the unions, is foolhardy in 
a country whose industrial base has yet to be created.
It is an unfortunate reality that a country that has less favourable 
natural conditions for production than others, and that suffers 
from a comparative lack of capital, has just one way in which to 
compete with countries that have been more blessed by nature 
and are richer in capital: a cheaper workforce. In a world with 
no barriers to immigration, there is a tendency to put salaries in 
different countries on a par with one another. If there is no free-
dom of movement for workers, however, salaries must neces-
sarily be lower where natural resources are scarcer and capital 
less abundant. There is no way to change this fact. If the gov-
ernment or the trade unions are unwilling to accept this reality, 
not only will they fail to improve conditions for the masses, but 
they will make them worse. They will hinder the development 
of manufacturing industries, condemning workers to persist as 
agricultural labourers in extreme poverty, when they could have 
better-paid employment in factories.
The only way to improve the economic situation of Mexico is 
through economic liberalism: that is, a policy of laissez-faire...
to envy the success of one’s more fortunate countryman is a 
common weakness among men. But an honourable patriot 
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should not look upon the fortunes of efficient entrepreneurs 
with distaste. He must understand that, in a capitalist society, 
the only way to accumulate wealth is by supplying consumers 
with the goods that they demand, at the lowest possible cost. He 
who serves the public best, is best rewarded. What Mexico 
needs is economic freedom24.
In general, then, the developmental policy of the Mexican 
State was disparaged by Mises: the specific targets of his criticism 
were the protection of the internal market, wage and union policies, 
and the intervention of the State in the economy.
5. The Institutions: the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura
A group of businessmen, headed by Raúl Baillères, was inter-
ested in providing an alternative to the economic policy that had pre-
vailed in Mexico since the administration of Cárdenas25
                                                          
24 Von Mises, 1998, pp. 12-13.
. In 1946, the
institution that would become the standard-bearer for this alternative 
project was founded: the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura. Formally, 
it was created with the aim of: initiating, promoting, stimulating, 
sponsoring, or directly administering and directing educational and 
25 At a later date, both the old-guard industrialists and bankers would play a 
role in the establishment of higher-education institutions that provided an 
alternative to what they perceived as the leftist ideology prevalent in State-
regulated universities. The Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores 
de Monterrey (ITESM), founded by local industrialists in 1943, placed em-
phasis on technical fields of study, such as engineering and business admin-
istration. Inspired by the institutes of technology of Massachusetts and Cali-
fornia, the “Tec de Monterrey” would not have an economics department 
until 1954. Another private university, the Universidad Iberoamericana, was 
also founded in the nineteenforties with a conservative, Catholic ethos, and 
did not open an economy department until the nineteen-sixties. Babb, 
Proyecto, 2003, pp. 98-99. 
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cultural activities of all kinds26. Its founding statement explains that, 
in order to comply with its fundamental purpose of promoting educa-
tion in Mexico, the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura undertook to:
…establish a system of higher-education campuses that are free 
to exist with no obligations other than to the laws of learning, 
and with complete academic liberty; with no purpose other than 
the discovery of the truth and the education of young people; 
removed from any dependence on militancy or group politics;
free from the vicissitudes of financial hardship; capable of 
providing, within a strict framework of order and discipline, 
new opportunities for the youth of Mexico in efficient cultural 
education, scientific instruction, technical training and research; 
that guarantees for its faculty members an honourable life and 
their enthusiastic and exclusive dedication to teaching; and 
which encourages equally the complete education of the young 
person in aspects cultural, scientific, technical, sporting and, es-
sentially, moral and patriotic27.
Among the founders of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura 
we find seven of the country’s largest banks and several businesses 
based in Monterrey, including the brewery Compañía Cervecera
Moctezuma and the iron and steel producer Compañía Fundidora de 
Fierro y Acero de Monterrey28
The prominent individuals that took part in the formation of 
the Association include: Mario Domínguez, Luís Montes de Oca, 
Ernesto Amescua, Aarón Sáenz, Evaristo Araiza, Federico T. de
Lachica, Julio Lacaud, Manuel Senderos, Pedro Maus, José de la 
Mora, Emilio Souberville, Hipólito Signoret, Guillermo Barroso, 
Carlos Gómez y Gómez, Manuel Ulloa, Carlos Trouyet, Rogelio 
Azcárraga, Aníbal de Iturbide, Enrique González Rubio, Carlos 
Novoa, Antonio Díaz Lombardo, Salvador Ugarte, Noé Graham 
Gurría, Fernando A. González, Bernabé A. del Valle, Manuel Sand-
.
                                                          
26 Negrete, 1988, pp. 9-11.
27 El Universal, 26th May 1946, p. 10.
28 Ibid.
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oval Vallarta, Eduardo García Máynez, Antonio Martínez Báez, Fer-
nando Orozco, Gustavo R. Velasco, Mariano Alcocer and Virgilio 
Domínguez. The Association’s first board of directors was com-
prised of businessmen, bankers and individuals who had pursued ca-
reers in both the public and private sectors29
The Association’s founders considered that their most pressing 
task was to cultivate institutions that would promote technical train-
ing with a human touch among young people wishing to go into pro-
fessions in the banking, industrial and commercial sectors
.
30
a) The School of Industrial Engineering, which offered courses in 
mechanical, electrical, chemical and administrative engineering.
. For this 
reason, they chose to establish:
b) The Mexican Institute of Economics, where students could study 
bachelor’s and doctorate degrees in economics, or to become stat-
isticians or actuaries.
c) The School of Administration, which trained students to become 
accountants and business administrators in the banking, industrial 
and commercial sectors.
The Association also offered short specialisation courses for 
executives and employees in banking, industry and commerce, with 
the aim of promoting technical innovation and cultural develop-
ment31
The educational institutions that were created on the basis of 
this platform would be administered by a Technical Advisory Com-
mission made up of university academics, including: Dr. Manuel 
Sandoval Vallarta, Dr. Fernando Orozco, Virgilio Domínguez, Anto-
nio García Báez, Gustavo R. Velasco and Mariano Alcocer. Eduardo 
García Máynez was appointed Director General
.
32
The creation of the different schools was seen as, or was por-
trayed as, “...the first major step by private enterprise in favour of 
.
                                                          
29 Ibid.
30 Universal, 12th January 1947, p. 11.
31 Opción, 1988, p. 5.
32 “La Asociación Mexicana de Cultura va en auxilio de la Universidad”, El 
Nacional, 24th June 1946, p. 6.
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cultural refinement, in a spirit of cooperation with the National Uni-
versity of Mexico and with the aim of solving problems of over-
crowding in classrooms”33. This account was contested by Gilberto 
Loyo, then the Dean of the National School of Economics at the
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, who claimed that his 
school in fact had a shortage of students34.
6. Creation of the Instituto Tecnológico de México
 
The Asociación Mexicana de Cultura eventually achieved its 
objective and created the Instituto Tecnológico de México (ITM), 
later known as ITAM, whose core programme was the study of eco-
nomics and which was organised as an alternative to the programme 
of studies at the UNAM’s School of Economics. In 1946, the 
Asociación Mexicana de Cultura opened its rival School of Econom-
ics, which followed the study plans and programmes that were in use 
at the National University with some minor adjustments in the order 
of the various subjects, but without eliminating any of them35
It might be considered curious that the School of Economics at 
the ITM chose to follow the curriculum and programmes of the 
School of Economics at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México, if it had been created as an alternative to the latter. When 
the news broke, some people espresse doubts about the new educa-
tional institution: Why would the country’s bankers want to create
another school of economics? Would it not be better for them to pro-
vide financial support for economic culture through the institutions 
that already existed
.
36
would later on be provided by the founders themselves of the institu-
tion in question.
? The answers to these questions
                                                          
33 Ibid..
34 “Economistas”, El Tiempo, 15th March 1946, pp. 29-30.
35 El Universal, 6th January 1948, p. 7.
36 Revista de Economía Continental, vol. 1, no. 1, 15th August 1946.
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Dr. Josué Sáenz, a lecturer at the School of Economics and the 
Director of Statistics at the Ministry of the Economy, was the first 
person that the bankers asked to be Director of the Mexican Institute 
of Economics. He turned down the position. The appointment was 
then conferred on Daniel Kuri Breña, a close collaborator with the
Partido Acción Nacional and someone, therefore, perhaps much 
more ideologically aligned with the founders’ plans37
In an interview in 1988, one of the founding partners, the 
banker Aníbal de Iturbide, gave some insight on the set of circum-
stances that persuaded the group to create the Asociación Mexicana 
de Cultura and the Instituto Tecnológico de México. In his words:
.
[In 1946] at the end of the presidency of Manuel Ávila 
Camacho… there was a Cardenist ideology that was still very 
much in vogue, which was, in our opinion, misguided. The no-
tions of governance of General Cárdenas were still exerting a 
great deal of influence on the ideological development of poli-
tics and the Mexican way of life, which we believed was not 
the best way to go about seeking the balanced development of 
the nation.
So a group of us, those of us that organised the Asociación 
Mexicana de Cultura, were of the opinion that if we were to 
promote industrial development in Mexico, we would have to 
try to change the mentality of the people, because with a mind-
set that was predominantly socialist and left-leaning in nature, 
which was the most dominant ideology in politics, we did not 
believe that industrial development was possible. It was not 
possible for the existing climate to be conducive to capital in-
vestment, either Mexican or foreign, to allow Mexico to begin 
a new predominantly industrial stage in its development.
That was essentially the reason why we decided to found the 
Instituto Tecnológico de México, with the aim of creating a 
school of economics to educate the men who would in the fu-
ture administer the private and public finances of Mexico...38
                                                          
37 “Economistas”, El Tiempo, 15th March 1946, pp. 29-30.
38 Negrete, 1988, p. 9.
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According to de Iturbide’s account, the idea began to form 
during the administration of General Lázaro Cárdenas, when the 
group of businessmen in question began to realise that Cardenist pol-
icy was at odds with their way of thinking. He says:
We believed that with Cardenist ideology in full force, there 
was insufficient incentive for the large-scale capital invest-
ments that were needed to begin the process of transforming 
the country from one that relied on agriculture, fisheries and 
mining to one that was
industrialised.
We decided not to go ahead with the School of Engineering 
because we came to the conclusion that we would not be effec-
tive if we tried to include too many branches. Instead we chose 
to focus on three or four schools, with preference always for 
the School of Economics, because it was our belief that this 
would be the base on which the future of Mexico would be 
built39.
The chief proponents of the ideology of State intervention es-
poused by Cardenism, which was so criticised by Iturbide and his 
partners at the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura, were the National
School of Economics at the UNAM and its academics. Many of the 
latter belonged to the economic nationalist movement, and had the 
objective of implementing the programme that was fought for during 
the Mexican Revolution, which would later evolve into a policy for 
economic development. Some of them were: Jesús Silva Herzog, one 
of the founders of the National School of Economics; Enrique Gon-
zález Aparicio, Ricardo Torres Gaytán, Horacio Flores de la Peña 
and Emilio Mugica. They were all deans of the School, held high-
level positions in the public sector, and played important roles in the 
public sphere. At the National School of Economics, these professors 
recruited students for the public sector, while simultaneously creat-
ing the professionals that the ‘developmentalist’ State needed for 
                                                          
39 Ibid. p. 10.
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administrative purposes40. According to research carried out by 
Roderic Camp:
Graduates of the National School of Economics have tended to 
concentrate heavily in two government agencies: The Secretari-
at of Industry and Commerce, and the Secretariat of the Treas-
ury. There are several reasons for this concentration. As is evi-
dent … leadership of those agencies has been dominated by pro-
fessors or graduates of the National School of Economics from 
1929 to 195141.
An interesting case is that of Gilberto Loyo:
…who became dean of the School of Economics in 1944, 
gave a great impetus to the career of being an economist by 
encouraging the employment of economists in the Secretariat 
of Industry and Commerce, which he headed in 1952 after 
leaving the deanship. Control of this agency by National 
School of Economics graduates has continued until 1974. The 
establishment of a federal Income Tax Department in the sec-
retary of the treasury, which almost exclusively employed 
economists… was soon directed consecutively by National 
Economic School graduates. Lastly, when costudents and pro-
fessors recruited students, it was often into their own agen-
cies42.
It was in opposition to this school of thought that the liberal 
project headed by the group of businessmen in question began to 
create alternative institutions. In an article published in the magazine 
Tiempo on the 15th March 1946, a quote was printed from one of the 
founders of the ITM – who was not identified, but who was part of 
the so-called BUDA group (the cabal formed by bankers Raúl 
Baillères, Salvador Ugarte, Mario Domínguez and Ernesto J. 
Amezcua) – which said: “We need liberal economists uncontaminat-
                                                          
40 Camp, 1975.
41 Ibid., p. 147.
42 Ibid.
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ed by interventionism, who defend our interests in opposition to the 
State”43
The unnamed source went on to criticise the National School 
of Economics:
.
...the National University and its School of Economics [are] in 
a permanent state of disorder, and as for the latter, which is pos-
sessed by statist ideology, it is incapable of guaranteeing the 
creation of well-educated, technical economists that may be en-
trusted with positions in banking and private enterprise without 
raising concerns44.
Gilberto Loyo, Dean of the National School of Economics at 
that time and a professor of statistics and demographics at the same 
institution, responded to this statement from a purely academic
viewpoint:
It is false to claim that at this institution we provide an ideologi-
cally doctrinaire professional education. The academic freedom 
enjoyed by teaching staff at the UNAM allows for the National 
School of Economics to be exposed to all schools of thought, 
and this is in fact the case. However, what we do aspire to is for 
graduates of our institution to be capable of serving the nation 
and not just a specific social class. We have also made sure that 
our
study plans are standardised, so that students can apply their 
know-how effectively, independently of whether or not they nu-
ance them with their own purely personal opinions45.
The statement issued by the businessmen could not be clearer 
in relation to their motives for establishing the ITM: in their opinion, 
only a liberal economic policy was capable of representing the inter-
ests of private enterprise. Despite their criticism of the administration 
                                                          
43 El Tiempo, 9th August 1946, pp. 33-34.
44 “Economistas”, El Tiempo, 15th March 1946, pp. 29-30.
45 Ibid.
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of Manuel Ávila Camacho for being under the sway of Cardenist 
ideology, they recognise that the government – and de Iturbide him-
self mentions this in the interview referred to above – never put up 
the slightest resistance to their development of the educational pro-
ject of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura.
7. Some of the Leaders of the Project
The president of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura, from its 
establishment and up until his death in 1967, was Raúl Baillères, a 
banker who in 1934 founded Crédito Minero, S.A. (later Banca 
Cremi), the first Mexican bank specialising in the financing of min-
ing concerns. He later founded the financial institutions Crédito 
Hipotecario, S.A., and Crédito Afianzador, S.A.; and from 1941 to 
1942 he was the president of the Association of Mexican Bankers. In 
1941, Baillères was also the leader of a group of investors with con-
trolling stakes in the brewery Compañía Cervecera Moctezuma based 
in Monterrey, and in the chain of department stores El Palacio de 
Hierro46
Baillères pursued many of these business interests in the nine-
teen-thirties as part of the BUDA financial group, made up of him-
self, Salvador Ugarte, Mario Domínguez and Ernesto J. Amezcua; 
the four were also founders of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura 
and together they established and expanded several large business 
ventures
.
47
                                                          
46 Baillères, 1988, p. 6.
.
47 In 1932, on the initiative of Salvador Ugarte, the financial institution 
Banco de Comercio was formed (later Bancomer and now BBVA). Raúl 
Baillèr esplayed a leading role in this project, and the bank’s institutional 
organisation was entrusted to Aníbal de Iturbide. Collaborators on this pro-
ject included Mario Domínguez, Ernesto Amezcua and Liberto Senderos. A 
short time later, they would go on to establish Crédito Hipotecario, S.A. and 
Crédito Afianzador, S.A. together. They would also play a part in the crea-
tion of Banco General de Capitalización, founded in 1934. In 1956, disa-
greements over the control of Banco de Comercio caused the departure of 
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Raúl Baillères, the project leader, was opposed to the govern-
ment’s statist strategy, which in his opinion had seized control of a 
large number of companies and had thereby limited the scope of ac-
tion for private enterprise:
He was intuitively convinced that the system could not work 
and that Mexico needed a free society with private enterprise as 
its engine of economic development48
 
. 
Aníbal de Iturbide introduced Raúl Baillères to Luís Montes 
de Oca, and of this encounter he says:
I was the one who brought them together. Luís was the ideas 
man, and Raúl the one who provided financial support49.
De Iturbide goes on: “the two of them and a group of distin-
guished friends, now all departed, created the Asociación Mexicana 
de Cultura and the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México 
(ITAM).”50
Baillères declared at the time:
We are going to educate young men so that, in 30 or 40 years, 
they can carry out the transformation from a statist country to a 
liberal capitalist country51.
Luís Montes de Oca was a certified public accountant. He 
played an important role in directing the country’s finances during 
the period of economic reconstruction: President Plutarco Elías 
                                                                                                                           
Raúl Baillères and several board members from the bank. Later on, de Itur-
bide (who had resigned from the bank in 1955) and Baillères were invited to 
work for Banco Comercial Mexicano (Comermex) as CEO and board mem-
ber, respectively. 
48 Baillères, 1994, p. 36.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
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Calles appointed him as Auditor General of the Nation in 1924, and 
he remained in the post until 1927, when he was named Minister of 
Public Finance (1927—1932). During the administration of Lázaro
Cárdenas, between 1935 and 1940, he was Director of the Bank of 
Mexico, and he subsequently retired from politics to make a career 
for himself as a private banker. In 1941, he brought together a group 
of businessmen to form Banco Internacional. Montes de Oca was the 
founding partner of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura who had the 
strongest links with Mexican intellectuals, and it was through him 
that the ITM was able to recruit Miguel Palacios Macedo, a lecturer 
at the National School of Economics, to teach History of Economic 
Thought and Economic Theory at the newly founded Institute52. In 
interview, de Iturbide stated:
Within the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura, we had the for-
tune to have a man of exceptional intellectual capabilities: don 
Luís Montes de Oca, who had been the Minister of Finance 
and Director of the Bank of Mexico. At the time he was retired 
from politics. He was an extraordinarily cultured man, and one 
with good relations with other talented men. He was the vehi-
cle that allowed us to contact and attract to the ITM people... 
who were very influential, such as Miguel Palacios Macedo, 
the most important person in the development of the School of 
Economics53.
Carlos Novoa was a private banker who also held a series of 
top-level positions: President of the National Banking Commission, 
1933; President of the Association of Mexican Bankers, 1945—
1946; and Director of the Bank of Mexico from 1946 to 1952. Carlos 
Novoa was the son of Eduardo Novoa, who was Porfirio Díaz’s 
Deputy Justice Minister. His career, like that of Montes de Oca, was 
in public and private finance. At the same time that he held a promi-
                                                          
52 Negrete, 1988, p. 10.
53 Ibid.
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nent government position, he was providing support for a project that 
was at cross purposes with the prevailing economic policy54
Scholar Nora Hamilton maintains that the post-revolutionary 
government, as well as creating the conditions for the accumulation 
of capital, forged a new political class. Once the armed struggle was
.
over, revolutionary generals continued to control several regions 
within the country. The government appeased and controlled these 
military men by providing them with financial dispensations and
channelling their political ambitions into business activities. Hamil-
ton asserts that a classic example of this process was Aarón Sáenz55.
At 26 he was the head of General Álvaro Obregón’s presidential 
guard, the Estado Mayor Presidencial, and he maintained a close 
friendship with the President; in 1924, Obregón appointed him Min-
ister for Foreign Relations; from 1927 to 1930, he was governor of
his home state, Nuevo León56
Comercio
; and he was Minister for Industry and 
Trade from 1930 to 1931. Aarón Sáenz then went from his role in the 
military and in the government to being a businessman. He became a 
sugar magnate, who made a fortune on the strength of the political 
connections he had acquired during the Revolution and then in the 
public offices he held. Sáenz had close links to conservative business 
groups in Monterrey, and he was also president of Banco Azucarero, 
a bank that specialised in investments in the sugar industry, which 
would later become Banco de Industria y
57. He was one of the main founding partners of Banco 
Internacional, together with Montes de Oca:
Sáenz’s wealth apparently originated during his government ca-
reer with the establishment of a construction firm (in association 
with President Calles) which benefited from government con-
tracts. He and Calles,...were also associated in the construction 
of a major
                                                          
54 Camp, 1992, pp. 410-411.
55 Hamilton, 1982, pp. 40-41.
56 See also: Tapia Fabián, ÁaronSaénz. http://www.sre.gob.mx/acervo
/can2_3.pdf.
57 Hamilton, 1982, pp. 40-41.
Globalization and Economic Crisis
146
 
sugar refinery at El Mante, in the state of Tamaulipas. Sáenz, 
Calles and other government officials obtained the lands after a 
dam and irrigation system had been constructed at government 
expense, and a modern sugar refinery was built with the assis-
tance of a substantial loan from the Banco de México58.
Another important member of the Association was Aníbal de 
Iturbide, Director of Banco Nacional de México in 1945 and of 
Banco Comercial Mexicano in 1955. For two terms, he was president 
of the Association of Mexican Bankers. He was a key figure in the 
creation of the liberal school of thought, and was one of the most 
prominent bankers of the twentieth century in Mexico. He was pro-
fessional, efficient and competent, and he did not just have a tech-
nical interest in banking; he was also knowledgeable about the mone-
tary and banking theory of the time, and played an active role in
building up the country’s banking and credit institutions. He stood 
out as a leader and intellectual guide in the sector. He participated in 
economic debate, and tried to influence the government’s
‘developmentalist’ economic policy by insisting on stability as a pre-
requisite for development59
Aníbal de Iturbide was a man that expressed and made public 
his ideas and opinions in a range of different documents. Several of 
his works are anthologised in the book Visión científica y 
retrospectiva
. He was particularly active in debates on 
credit and currency.
del crédito en México. In April of 1954, at the XX Bankers’ Conven-
tion held in Acapulco, Guerrero, he gave a talk entitled “The Real 
Importance of Public Spending for the Economy”60
                                                          
58 Ibid., p, 41.
. One work in 
59 See: Visión Crítica Retrospectiva del Crédito en México published in 
1963, volume 11 of the SELA Collection (Selección de Estudios 
Latinoamericanos), which contains several works by Aníbal de Iturbide 
from the period between 1947 and 1960. 
60 “La importancia real del gasto público en la economía”, talk given by 
Aníbal de Iturbide, General Manager of Banco de Comercio S.A. at the XX 
Bankers’ Convention held in Acapulco, Guerrero, on 26th April 1954. 
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particular that summarises his thoughts on currency and credit was 
the conference “Monetary and Credit Policy”, which he presented in 
his capacity as Director of the Bank of Mexico at the Instituto
Tecnológico de México in April of 195961
At this conference, he maintains that the country’s fundamen-
tal problems are dependent on monetary stability, and he goes on to 
add:
.
Thus the need to re-examine our monetary policy and practice 
is a task that must be carried out without delay. The lack of 
stability in the value of our peso is today the most urgent prob-
lem, and the one with the most wide-ranging consequences, for 
the wellbeing of our nation; for this reason, I firmly believe 
that all other aims of economic policy should immediately be 
subordinated to the fundamental objective of keeping our cur-
rency stable62.
In his speech, de Iturbide also took the Mexican monetary and 
banking authorities to task over the role of the Bank of Mexico, as a 
central bank whose job it was to promote economic development in
the country, and railed against the use of the public deficit as an in-
strument for development63
                                                          
61 The conference was held on Wednesday 15th April 1959 in the auditori-
um of the Instituto Tecnológico de México, with Ernesto Fernández 
Hurtado, Deputy Director of the Bank of Mexico, Josué Sáenz and Víctor L. 
Urquidi as speakers. See: Iturbide, Política, 1959. 
.
62 Iturbide, 1959, p. 2.
63 Aníbal de Iturbide held a wide range of positions throughout his career: 
General Manager of Banco de Comercio, S.A.; Chief Executive Officer of 
Banco Comercial Mexicano S.A. (1956); board member of the Asociación 
de Banqueros de México; board member of Tubos de Acero de México;
board member of the Confederation of National Chambers of Commerce; 
board member of 24 separate banks affiliated to Banco de Comercio, S.A.; 
board member of La Comercial, Compañía de Seguros, S.A.; board member 
of La Almacenadora, S.A.; board member of Nacional de Drogas, S.A.; 
board member of Manantial Peñafiel; and alternate board member of 
Crédito Hipotecario S.A. He was also the Mexican delegate at the Interna-
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8. The Austrian School in Mexico: Von Mises and Von Hayek
 
In the same year of 1946, a few months after the creation of 
the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura, this Association and the Bank-
ers’ Association extended an invitation to Mexico to two of the 
foremost representatives of the Austrian School: the teacher and his 
pupil, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek. They were both 
tireless fighters for economic and political freedom, who opposed 
fascism as much as they did socialism or F. D. Roosevelt’s New 
Deal. Luis Montes de Oca once again assumed the role of their pro-
moter and presenter at conferences.
9. No Economic Freedom Without Political Liberty
On the 22nd of July 1946, Professor Friedrich von Hayek of 
the London School of Economics arrived in Mexico City, at the invi-
tation of the Association of Mexican Bankers and the Asociación 
Mexicana de Cultura. Hayek was an eminent disciple of Ludwig von 
Mises and author of the famous book published in 1944 The Road to 
Serfdom, in which he argued in favour of the free market and upheld 
the notion that a planned economy can never have enough infor-
mation about individual preferences to allow the consumer to make 
an appropriate choice.
He gave three conferences at the Mexican Institute of Eco-
nomics and the Confederation of Chambers of Commerce on the 
24th, 25th and 29th of July64
                                                                                                                           
tional Credit Conference in Rome; a member of the Commission for Re-
view of the Credit Institutions Law; a member of the Economic and Fiscal 
Policy Council; and a member of the National Commission on the Economy 
organized by President Ávila Camacho during his final year of government. 
See: Romero, Aníbal de Iturbide, 2010, p. 157-162. 
. The first two, on the 24th and 25th, 
64 Doctor Hayek was born in Vienna on the 8th of May 1899 and studied at 
the university in that city, where he obtained a doctorate in law in 1922 and 
another in political science in 1923. He worked in the Austrian civil service 
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centred on the topic of “Employment and Public Expenditure”; the 
subject of the conference of the 29th was “The Meaning of Competi-
tion”. In the conference at the Chambers of Commerce, Professor 
Hayek also spoke on the subject of “The Political Consequences of 
Economic Planning”. President of Banco Internacional Luís Montes 
de Oca – a self-declared enemy of economic planning and, like Pro-
fessor Hayek65, a supporter of neo-liberalism – presented the 
speaker to the audience. At the time, the president of the Bankers’ 
Association was Carlos Novoa66. The magazine El Tiempo reported 
that the mere mention of Hayek’s arrival in Mexico aroused the in-
terest and stirred the passions of Mexican economic scholars. The 
most notable thing about the article, however, was the first appear-
ance in the press of the term “neoliberal”; previously, visiting profes-
sors had been labelled as members of the Austrian School or the 
School of Vienna. In his final conference, Hayek expounded on one 
of his principal theses:
…that political freedom is not possible without economic 
freedom, and that any planning or guidance of the economic 
activities of a country implies the guidance of the political ac-
tivities of its citizens. He declared himself a supporter of a sys-
                                                                                                                           
from 1921 to 1926, and between 1927 and 1931 he was the Director of the 
Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research. From 1929 to 1931 he was 
also a professor in political economics at the University of Vienna. In 1931
he was appointed professor of economic sciences and statistics at London 
University. He was a member of the British Academy and of the Royal 
Economic Society Council. Professor Hayek published the following works: 
Prices and Production, 1931; Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, 1933; 
Collectivist Economic Planning, 1935; Monetary Nationalism and Interna-
tional Stability, 1937; Profits, Interest, and Investment, 1939; The Pure 
Theory of Capital, 1941; The Road to Serfdom, 1944. See: El Universal,
17th July 1946. 
65 El Tiempo, 26th July 1946, pp. 45-46.
66 El Universal, 17th July 1946.
Globalization and Economic Crisis
150
 
tem of private enterprise that would only allow a certain de-
gree of planning in exceptional cases…67
Like Ludwig von Mises, von Hayek does not stop at an appre-
ciation of the individual as merely an economically rational being, 
the maximising individual; instead, he sees the individual as a politi-
cal being perhaps over and above a subject whose behaviour opti-
mises the economy. This is an essential point that differentiates this 
school of thought from the old liberalism.
In his conferences, addressed to a public made up of bankers, 
he challenged the policy of public works in a period of high inflation 
as, in his opinion, this would accentuate the imbalance between in-
vestments and savings. He stressed that the regulating mechanism in 
the economy was competition, not the State.
Hayek’s views were echoed in the Mexican business world. At 
a conference he gave on Industrial Planning at the National School of 
Economics before Hayek’s arrival in the country, José R. Colín,
President of the Mexican Chamber of Manufacturing Industry, said 
in reference to the Austrian scholar that
…This writer’s thesis has been found time and again in the the-
ses put forward by different employers’ organisations in our
own country, where the Austrian economist’s arguments have 
been repeated68.
Colín’s comment begs the question: Did Montes de Oca intro-
duce Mexico’s business leaders to Hayek’s theories, or were they 
simply theories that were well received by the country’s business
community?
Hayek’s presence in Mexico received a great deal of attention 
from the press. Nonetheless, it would appear that only the professor 
of economic theory at the UNAM’s National School of Economics,
                                                          
67 El Nacional, 1st July 1946
68 Revista de Economía Continental, vol. 1, no. 1, 15th August 1946.
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Francisco Zamora, was prepared to debate his theories and to chal-
lenge the members of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura. In a 
lengthy article published in the newspaper El Universal, Professor 
Zamora says:
It is at once revealing and ironic that the first foreign academic 
invited to visit by the opulent association of bankers and indus-
trialists, to whom is owed the youthful existence of the Instituto 
Mexicano de Economía and who almost plays the role of ideo-
logical
godfather to the latter, is Professor Friedrich von Hayek. Re-
vealing, because the distinguished economist is the most well-
known and crowd-pulling star that economic liberalism has in 
these increasingly trying times; and ironic because among the 
prominent persons who invited him are many, perhaps the ma-
jority, who owe their relatively recently achieved fortunes and 
social standing to the anti-liberal intervention of the Mexican 
State in the economic activity of the nation, thanks to which 
monopolies have been created that have made them rich.
Thus we find ourselves faced with an amusing paradox: Profes-
sor Hayek has come to Mexico to nurture the seed of the liberal 
economy, after having undertaken a similar mission with great 
success among the North American mesocracy, on the initiative 
and at the cost of a group of moneyed individuals whose wealth, 
in a great number of cases – it could be said in most cases – has 
its origins in government policy that is the polar opposite of the 
principles of liberalism. The patrons of this crusade against 
State intervention in the orientation and development of private 
enterprise without doubt have a wide range of backgrounds; but 
the fact that at least some of them have arrived at this point 
from the sectors of government finance, the sugar industry and 
the road haulage industry gives one justification to doubt the 
sincerity with which they are sponsoring this more or less scien-
tific, liberal-economic propaganda exercise69.
                                                          
69 Zamora, 1946.
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Professor Zamora was referring specifically to the business-
man Aarón Sáenz, who, as we have already mentioned, was a found-
ing partner of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura, a sugar-industry 
mogul and a person who had made his fortune under the protection 
of the ‘developmentalist’ State that he so harshly criticised.
10. Von Mises Returns
In August of 1946, Mises visited Mexico for a second time 
and joined Hayek. They travelled together to Lake Chapala in the 
state of Jalisco. In Guadalajara, Mises presented a conference and, 
once again, Montes de Oca was his translator. During his stay in 
Mexico City, Mises gave a series of talks that had been convened by 
Raúl Baillères, the president of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura, 
and by the president of the Bankers’ Association, Carlos Novoa. The 
subject of the first conference, held in the auditorium of the Instituto 
Mexicano de Economía, was “Interventionism; Ideological Founda-
tions and Economic Consequences”70. The second conference, “The 
Crisis of Interventionism”, was held at the same venue on the 14th of 
August71
Hours before giving the last of these talks, Von Mises met 
with members of the Mexico City Rotary Club at an elegant restau-
rant. He told the select group of financiers that he had been a mem-
ber of the Vienna Rotary Club from 1929 to 1938, until Hitler dis-
banded Rotary Clubs in Austria, then in Germany the following year 
and subsequently in all the countries invaded by the Reich. On this
occasion his speech was on price control
.
72
                                                          
70 The Instituto Mexicano de Economía was located at Palma Norte 518, on 
the 6th floor. The conferences were held on the7th and 14th of August 
1946, at 7 p.m. El Universal, 7th August 1946. 
. The essential ideas that 
he put forward in both conferences referred to the obstacles or incen-
71 El Universal, 8th August 1946.
72 El Universal, 14th August 1946.
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tives for the accumulation of capital in developing countries like 
Mexico:
What these countries need, he said, is industrialisation, and for 
this it is necessary to have foreign capital. Exchange-rate con-
trols (which do not exist in Mexico) and the policy of expro-
priation have prevented this capital from coming from abroad. 
Another method is State investment; but this, commented 
Ludwig Von Mises, is politically dubious... There is no other 
alternative, then, to the formation of capital internally. This 
could be achieved by creating the conditions for a quantitative 
and qualitative increase in production, as well as for an in-
crease in the marginal product of labour.
However the obstacles that hinder the accumulation of capital 
must be removed. Any action taken by the State to encourage 
[the accumulation of capital] is good; any action that deters it 
or makes it impossible is bad. Price controls and wage increas-
es through the trade unions go against this goal...
Price-control policy contains a structural contradiction: gov-
ernments want on the one hand high prices for manufacturers, 
and on the other hand low prices for consumers. These oppos-
ing goals are simply impossible to reconcile. By removing bar-
riers to foreign trade and food imports, lower prices would be 
achieved…73
Mises’s recommendation for the process of accumulating capi-
tal in Mexico was free trade, which implied the mobility of capital 
and goods and the influx of foreign investment.
11. In the Company of Monterrey Businessmen
 
The Centro Bancario de Monterrey invited Von Mises, 
through the Asociación de Banqueros de México, to the city of Mon-
terrey to give some of his talks on economics. This led to a confer-
ence that was held on Tuesday, the 20th of August 194674
                                                          
73 Ibid.
. Mises’s 
74 El Porvenir, Monterrey, 19th August 1946.
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reflections once again centred on government interference and the 
development of private enterprise. He also spoke about the successes 
and failures of the Austrian School in the United States:
The Austrian school of economic thought, explained Professor 
Von Mises, was studied and adapted by many of the econo-
mists in the United States who are advisors to the government. 
However, the start of the war threw the economic structure of 
that great nation into turmoil. In the opinion of Professor Von 
Mises, the country will soon recover from its current economic 
problems75.
In Von Mises’s opinion, economic recovery in the United 
States would have a favourable effect for Mexico, as inflation in 
Mexico was dependent on the neighbouring country to the north. As 
he said to a reporter from the newspaper El Porvenir:
As soon as that great nation improves its economic situation, in-
flation in Mexico will stop.
Mexico did not have the choice to go or not to go down the 
dangerous path of inflation. Price controls in the United States, 
which have now been regulated differently to how they were be-
fore, will soon make American industry surpass itself. This, I 
assure you, is colossal. It is not just the vision of a European 
scientist with regard to the potential of this great American con-
tinent76.
Von Mises takes note of the interrelation that existed between 
the two economies. However, he does not consider Mexico’s eco-
nomic dependence on the United States as something harmful; rather, 
it is an essential part of Mexico’s condition as a backward country.
The following day, the 21st of August, Von Mises continued 
with his talks with groups of business leaders from Monterrey. The 
central topics of this conference were: State interventionism and the
                                                          
75 El Porvenir, Monterrey, 20th August 1946.
76 Ibid.
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price-control system. Nazi Germany and Socialist Russia were the 
historical examples that Von Mises made constant reference to. In 
his opinion, State interventionism had direct effects on the political
system. He says: “It is clear that interventionism on the part of the 
State is self-destructive, because it restricts parliamentarianism, lim-
its the freedom of the press, overlaps with labour interests, and de-
stroys private enterprise and political freedom of thought”77
He went on to talk about the price-control system as one of the 
most detrimental forms of State interventionism:
.
The price-control system, said Von Mises, is one of the most 
flagrant forms of interventionism. The system results from the 
inflation created by governments. Governments should not be 
said to combat inflation, but rather its effects...
Of course what the price-control system results in, once the 
government has failed in its intervention to dictate the eco-
nomic index of a given product, is the farmer or the industrial-
ist that produces the product whose price has been capped by 
the government simply abandoning his crop or his production, 
because the benefit created by the activity decreases. When 
supply goes down but demand remains the same, the value of 
the article increases outside the regulated market, creating one 
fictional price and one black-market price; this leads to infla-
tion because the government is incapable of controlling the 
rise in the price of the article due to demand. The government 
eventually is forced to abandon its price interference and to 
accept the inflation, and must then try to combat inflation after 
the fact78.
Mises also held meetings with several business concerns from 
the region: accompanied by Virgilio Garza Jr., president of Crédito 
Industrial; Ignacio Martínez Jr., manager of Banco de Nuevo León;
Francisco Maldonado, manager of Compañía General de 
Aceptaciones; and Jesús Velasco, manager of Banco de Monterrey, 
he visited several local factories, gave a conference at Banco de 
                                                          
77 El Porvenir, Monterrey, 21st August 1946.
78 Ibid.
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Crédito Industrial, and dined with a group of bankers at the Casino 
de Monterrey. As we can see, Mises and Hayek had a very busy 
schedule on the visit they paid to Mexico’s business community.
12. Mont Pelerin Society in Mexico
On the 10th of April 1947, the Mont Pelerin Society was cre-
ated by a group of mainly economists, historians and philosophers 
from the academic world, under the leadership of Friedrich August 
von Hayek and Albert Hunold79. Among other notables who formed 
the society were Ludwig von Mises, Milton Friedman and the phi-
losopher Karl Popper80
proposed of the State and the fate of classical liberalism. The group 
stated that:
. At its inaugural meeting, a discussion was
Its sole objective was to facilitate an exchange of ideas between 
like-minded scholars in the hope of strengthening the principles 
and practice of a free society and to study the workings, virtues, 
and defects of market-oriented economic systems81.
The society’s members described themselves as liberals, and 
they were opposed to theories that defended State interventionism 
such as those of John Maynard Keynes, which gained currency after
the Second World War.
In the post-War period, those responsible for economic policy 
in various countries took inspiration from Keynesian theory to pur-
sue the development of their respective economies. At the same time,
                                                          
79 The society’s name is taken from the Swiss resort where the group’s first 
meeting was held. See: Harvey, “Breve”, 2007, p. 26. 
80 For the society’s articles of incorporation, see web site: 
http:www.montpelerin.org/aboutmps.html, and Harvey, “Breve”, 2007, p. 
27. 
81 http://www.montpelerin.org/montpelerin/mpsAbout.html.
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neoliberals opposed the systems of centralised State planning. They 
argued that:
Decisions made by States... were condemned to be politically 
biased on the basis of the interest groups that would be affected 
on each occasion (such as trade unions, environmental organisa-
tions or business lobbying interests). Any decisions made by 
States on investment and the accumulation of capital would al-
ways be erroneous, because the information available to the 
State could not compete with the information contained in the 
market82.
The group held annual meetings in different cities around the 
world, and in September 1958, Mont Pelerin came to Mexico. The 
society’s meeting was sponsored by the Instituto de Investigaciones
Sociales y Económicas, A.C. The attending professors who were 
members of the society were: Bruno Leoni, Ernst Bieri, Bernard 
Pfister, Friedrich von Hayek, Albert Hunold, W. H. Hutt, John Van 
Sickle, Arthur A. Shenfield, Ludwig von Mises and Daniel Villey.
As well as conferences that were given by some of the mem-
bers, a round table discussion was organised on the problems of the 
world economy. The two fundamental topics of the debate were in-
flation and official controls. There were also reflections on:
                                                          
82 The members of the group described themselves as “liberals” (in the tra-
ditional European sense of the word) because of their fundamental com-
mitment to the ideals of individual freedoms. The label “neoliberal” indicat-
ed that they were adherents of the free-market principles established by ne-
oclassical economics, the movement that emerged in the second half of the 
19th century (as a result of the work of Alfred Marshall, William Stanley 
Jevons and Leon Walras) and replaced the classical theories of Adam 
Smith, David Ricardo and Carlos Marx. Nonetheless, they stood by Adam
Smith’s conclusion that the invisible hand of the market was the best mech-
anism to mobilise even the basest of human instincts, such as gluttony, 
greed and the desire for wealth and power, for the common good. Harvey, 
“Breve”, 2007, p. 27. 
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…inflationist financial policy... and they warned that controls 
on prices, imports and exports would counteract the efforts of 
private enterprise and necessarily create negative effects on ag-
ricultural and industrial production and on the different business 
sectors; in the long term the economy would be brought down
by a contraction in productive activity. We can only hope that 
these authoritative voices are heard in the spheres of govern-
ment in Mexico, where the controlled economy has powerful 
sympathisers who stubbornly follow an inept policy of making 
the State the master of the land83.
The Mont Pelerin intellectuals failed to achieve broad appeal 
in Mexico because at that time, the socalled “Mexican miracle” was 
at its peak and the Mexican State had adopted a model of develop-
ment that ensured stability, with an economic policy in which State 
intervention played a fundamental role. Nonetheless, there were 
those among the country’s élite who were determined to strengthen 
the liberal programme promoted by the organisation.
13. Epilogue
 
The economic programme of President Cárdenas, based on 
economic growth with the distribution of wealth, was seen in a nega-
tive light by some of Mexico’s business leaders. Bankers and indus-
trialists sought to create institutions that would counteract the 
movement, which was the cornerstone of Mexican 
‘developmentalism’. Within this context, it is easy to grasp the sig-
nificance of the trips made to Mexico by the two most important 
members of the Austrian School – Von Mises and Von Hayek –
whose aim was to provide ideological and theoretical support for the 
debate being waged by the Mexican élite against the nationalist Mex-
ican State. They fulfilled their role of helping to articulate the dis-
                                                          
83 Excélsior, 2nd October 1958.
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course of the group of Mexican businesses most closely linked to the 
international financial sector.
The élite took on the task of creating the conditions for the 
construction of an alternative project to Cardenism, and therefore to 
economic nationalism. The establishment of higher education institu-
tions was the most significant means employed to help realise this 
ideal. An example is the Instituto Tecnológico de México; from the 
time it was founded, both the Institute’s administrators and the mem-
bers of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura began submitting the 
necessary applications to the corresponding authorities to achieve 
full academic independence for the institution. On the 10th of April 
1962, President Adolfo López Mateos signed a decree granting the 
institution its independence84
Things did not stop there. The group of business leaders would 
continue to create institutions throughout the second half of the twen-
tieth century. On the 13th of September 1962, on the initiative of the 
businessman Bruno Bagliani, the Mexican Council of Businessmen 
(CMHN) was founded. The organisation ostensibly had the objective 
of creating a mechanism for arbitration between business, the State 
and civil society
. This gave the institute complete free-
dom to design study plans, programmes and methods of teaching, 
and it became the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México 
(ITAM). The institute became an important source of young people 
with technical expertise as economists and a different way of think-
ing about economics to that which was prevalent in the so-called
‘developmentalist’ stage, who then went on to implement the politi-
cal project conceived by their educators.
85
                                                          
84 The decree was published in the Official Federal Gazette on the 19th of 
January 1963, at a time when the Minister for Public Education was Jaime 
Torres Bodet. Miguel González Avelarand and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo partic-
ipated in drafting the decree. See: Opción, April 1988, p. 44. 
, although banker Aníbal de Iturbide suggests that 
the business group was established with the aim of creating a direct 
channel of communication with the top levels of political power and 
of representing the country’s most important business leaders.
85 Brito, 2002, p. 81.
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Over time, and for the rest of the twentieth century, the de-
mands of the group of business leaders who set about building insti-
tutions to promote liberalism and oppose economic nationalism re-
mained: limitation of participation of the State in the economy, elim-
ination of protectionism, and promotion of free trade and foreign in-
vestment.
To conclude, it is very important to emphasise that although 
the group with liberalist leanings was economically strong, not eve-
ryone in the Mexican business community was opposed to the ideol-
ogy of economic nationalism. In fact, a group of business leaders 
emerged and became strong due to economic protection and the sup-
port of government policies. A detailed study has yet to be carried
out as to what kinds of business interests, and from which sectors, 
were the ones who sought to create a project linked to liberalism dur-
ing the twentieth century in Mexico.
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Chapter 7
The Change of Economic Institutions in Mexico: 
the NAFTA Era from 1983 to 2011
Juan Pablo Arroyo Ortiz
_______________________________________
1. Changing institutions after 1982. The hypothesis
?
From 1936 to 1982 Mexico was ruled by a model of mixed 
economy, based on government economic intervention, which sup-
ported development. But in the early 1980's there was a change. A 
new model was introduced. In a long process of two decades (1982 
to 2002). Another economic policy prevailed. It was based on the 
idea that the free market is the best way for allocating resources. 
Since 2002 to 2011 the new institutions of the neoliberal economic 
model were implemented.
Up to now it has been said that the fundamental reason for this 
change was the exhaustion of the import substitution model, previ-
ously applied. It is difficult to find the elements of such exhaustion 
(Moreno y Ross 2010), because it has never been explained in detail. 
The hypothesis of this paper is that, although we think that there was 
depletion, it was more influential the political defeat of those intel-
lectuals and politicians who had supported the policy of economic 
intervention. They were overwhelmed by those who had long sought 
a model of an open economy and free market. 
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In the previous approach, those whom we call "developers”1
were always concerned with the employment rate and a better in-
come distribution. Their policy was based on the guidelines of multi-
lateral organizations (IMF, IBRD, WB, IDB, USAID and ECLAC)2
These suggestions were the consequence of the changes in the 
international financial system. Since the early 1970s, among the na-
tions with the largest amount of foreign reserves, a new ideological 
attitude started (Eichengreen 1996). The Group of the most powerful 
seven nations in the world (G7), those who had the biggest monetary 
reserves, redefined financial economic relations.  At the same 
time, we had great technological changes in computing, nanotech-
nology, the exploitation of new sources of oil and its petrochemical 
derivatives, and in the influence of information technology in the or-
ganizational theories. All these changes occurred so fast and deeply 
that they altered the way of production and circulation of goods and 
capitals. This new conditions led the world to the globalization of 
production and of the financial market. Such tendencies pressed for a 
change in economic policy. They provided political support to politi-
cians, academics and intellectuals, in order to build up the model of a 
new economy, government and society. 
,
and on their financial support, with low interest and long-term rates. 
They managed to have a long period of growth. The other path, pre-
ferred by liberal economists, achieved the globalization in the 
movements of goods, capital and securities, and reduced to a mini-
mum the state interference in the economy. Finally the second group 
prevailed and was supported, in some reforms, by the measures that 
international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank suggested 
or imposed to debtor countries. 
                                                          
1 In Spanish, “desarrollistas”. This concept can be applied to all Latin-
American countries.
2 IMF, International Monetary Fund. IBRD, International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. WB, World Bank. IDB, Interamerican 
Development Bank. USAID, US Agency for International Development. 
ECLAC, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carribean
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The purpose was to replace the previous mindset of develop-
ment, based on industrialization and public employers, with the free 
market, where private enterprise is fundamental and central govern-
ment is reduced to a minimum. The instrument that caused the 
change was the financial system, which encouraged borrowing and 
created conditional bailouts and derivatives. Some banks were pri-
vatized and organized cartels for the granting of debts. 
In the more advanced nations, the economic change gradually 
also led to institutional changes, thanks to the weakening of the gov-
ernment’s role in the economy. Keynes’ theory and its applications 
for development and welfare were defeated by the liberal groups, 
who were linked to the financial sector. But the countries where oil 
extraction was dominant, as revenue source, and industrial produc-
tion was not supported, lagged behind. The change began with the 
strong political influence of the financial system.  Interest rates 
changed and prices of goods in international trade went down.
That was how, after adjustments of the economy and debt re-
structuring, the goal emerged of opening economies as a condition 
for growth. After the basic settings, the new government program 
was the Free Trade Agreement of North America (NAFTA). In it the 
main lines are embodied for the transformation of economic policy. 
Thus the NAFTA era began.
2. Features of the change
The new economic model led to the implementation of new 
institutions, which were seen as essential for achieving the function-
ality of liberal ideas. The new institutions are dominated by the ide-
ology of free market. Their basic idea is to have a small and econom-
ically weak government, because they give prominence to the enter-
prise, the entrepreneur and supposedly to the consumer. This new 
approach puts at risk the integration and security of society, by as-
serting individual freedom as the basis of society. It eliminates any 
notion of collective social representation. 
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The main changes relate to the very role of the state. Public 
administration undergoes a reorganization, and the allocation of pub-
lic spending is transformed. Production and market organization 
change. There is a wide opening of the market; a growing deregula-
tion in both domestic and foreign trade; the international corporate 
capital and the national private capital replace public investments; 
private enterprise plays as the main engine of economic growth.
The main argument for such a sharp turn was the inefficiency 
and low productivity of state capital. In this process, monetary poli-
cy, the financial system and the payment system are modified to sup-
port the implementation of the stock market as a means of financing 
the economy. The new open economy adapts itself to the globaliza-
tion of financial investments and to the subordination of production 
to foreign markets. Production for the domestic market is depressed; 
its investments are limited by the inequality in income distribution.
3. Historical perspective
Theoretically the welfare state derived from the analysis of 
J.M. Keynes, who invoked state intervention when the economy was 
unable to ensure its proper functioning because of market failures. 
Then in the areas with a monopoly concentration, with no proper in-
formation among operators, or with great inequality among buyers 
and sellers in the market game, the state should intervene through 
rules and regulations. 
As a policy the welfare state derived directly from the post-
war period, when Europe and Japan, helped by the US, implemented 
a policy of welfare, of nationalism, and economic strength in order to 
start reconstruction.
The Latin American countries, which were subordinated to the 
production for the war, also participated in this dynamic recovery. 
The Bretton Woods agreement (1944) inspired the making of the 
multinational institutions. So it was that international financial regu-
latory institutions and the trading system were established: the IMF, 
the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
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(GATT). From this agreement many things derived: the prices’ con-
trol of state enterprises; support for basic industries such as energy 
and transports; support for the basic consumer goods. 
The instruments that promoted economic growth in the era of 
state intervention, with relative stability and wealth distribution, 
were: a) pricing and economic regulation in certain areas of produc-
tion; b) public intervention in some production and services, espe-
cially in the supply of strategic raw materials and energy, that led to 
better conditions of accumulation and investment; c) credit supported 
by public and private investments under the leadership of the central 
bank, in the expectation of growth; d) funding and price support of 
exports; e) proper management of the money supply and of the ex-
change rate to preserve price stability.
The State intervened in the strategic economic areas, which 
were necessary for development but in which private capital had not 
been able to succeed. The concept was framed of mixed economy, 
government and business. One important aspect was monetary ex-
pansion with a fixed exchange rate, and the provision of credit with 
relatively low rates. This helped also private accumulation of capital, 
since a series of enterprises, funded with public capitals, provided 
key services or basic row materials. The growth of production and 
the monetary control were always sufficient to prevent the unbridled 
increase in prices.
But meanwhile liberal ideas were moving around the world 
against the welfare state. In the Seventies these ideas won and man-
aged to remove any public influence in the economic governance 
(Harvey 2005). They also caused the ideological shift in the Schools 
of Economics of the major universities. This occurred throughout the 
Western world in a span of just twelve years, between 1978 and 
1990. In Mexico the beginning of this process is the appointment of 
Miguel de la Madrid as a candidate for the presidency in October 
1981.
According to the ideologists of liberalism, the state interven-
tion in economy leads to authoritarianism and disturbs the proper al-
location of resources (see Frederick Hayek, 2008, Ludwig Von 
Mises 1978, David Harvey, 2012).  Their objective is to defeat the 
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state apparatus (which represents a large part of the economy, with 
more than 2000 companies owned by the state or with a strong state 
involvement). The idea is to close up the institutions that promote a 
mixed economy and provide public subsidies and support. The ulti-
mate aim is to give power to the class which holds the largest con-
centration of social income (Romero Sotelo 2012a, 2012b).
4. The theoretical debate in the world
In the international context, we must consider that in the post-
war period socialism advanced and became a decisive factor in poli-
tics. While a sort of protected development prevailed in the West, 
mainly in American Continent and in Europe, other nations, like 
Russia, Eastern Europe, China and other parts of Asia opted for the 
socialist scheme with state ownership, political prices and govern-
ment decisions about production. The central planning authorities ar-
ranged the size and quality of production, and set the relative wages 
and prices. In both projects, welfare state and socialist regime, the 
state's role was crucial. 
The difference was about the nature of property: individual 
and private in one case, collective in the other. In the first case there 
was a sort of joint venture between private property and unequal dis-
tribution. In it the state always assumed its existence as limited, but 
substantial. Anyway in both cases the existence of a strong state was 
essential. Neo-liberal ideology, by supporting the elimination of the 
state from economy, criticized both the mixed economy and the so-
cialist state.
The Mexican development took place in the context of this bi-
polar world. Mexico was led by political and geographical reasons 
close to the economics and politics of the United States. While the 
U.S. built their expansion policy in the world, after the end of World 
War II, with the Marshall Plan and the United States Agency for In-
ternational Development from 1948 to 1955, a liberal stream 
emerged which radically criticized government intervention, and saw 
it as the "road to serfdom" of state authoritarianism against individu-
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al freedom. In the long run, both alternatives based on the state fin-
ished in a deadlock. J.M. Keynes and his followers had built up their 
theoretical framework on public investment. This approach produced 
the welfare state, but eventually arrived to a shortage of public fi-
nancing. This led to stagflation and the concentration of financial 
capital in private hands. On the other hand, in the USSR the bureau-
cratic central planning authority ultimately failed, because its rigid 
procedure generated lack of technological adaptation, very low 
productivity and a distribution of goods strongly unbalanced.
Frederick Hayek and Ludwig Von Mises started the ideologi-
cal opposition to state intervention as early as in 1944. Their thought 
formed businessmen and academics in the neoclassical economics 
and neo-liberal values. Their ideas became a political and philosoph-
ical banner. The Mont Pelerin Society, inspired by these two think-
ers, held annual meetings and organized centers of cultural develop-
ment and research. Such a society organized activities for many 
years and in many countries, mainly in universities, research insti-
tutes and government agencies. Particularly important were two of 
them, the economics program at the University of Chicago, and the 
Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico: ITAM (Mirowski 
and Plehwe 2009, Arroyo 2012). 
In Mexico there was never a theoretical discussion among pol-
iticians and academics. There was simply a battle for positions of 
power in the government, which implemented the new policies.
5. The international context in which the change occurred
The struggle around the welfare state policy and the regulation 
of the economic cycle through public spending gradually passed 
from an ideological confrontation to an "economic war" for the con-
trol of strategic materials - such as grains, industrial minerals, oil-
and for the private control of the international financial system. The 
internationalization in the production of various corporate enterpris-
es, gave the pace to technological changes in the fields of communi-
cations, electronics and organization of the production process. 
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The last attempt to strengthen the role of IMF as an institution 
promoting a strong state was the approval of the amendment of 1969 
which created the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). It allowed gov-
ernments to support the fixed exchange rate. The reaction of the fi-
nancial sector in the United States was radical. In 1971, when the 
French government claimed to change its foreign reserves into gold, 
the U.S. suspended the purchase and sale of gold for international 
transactions. The gold-dollar crisis began and opened the path to 
change (Eichengreen 1996). By then the Middle East crisis was at its 
peak. Oil price rose to record levels thanks to an agreement between 
the majority of producers, organized in OPEC.
A contextual aspect which had a strong impact, especially in 
oil prices, was the Six Day War in 1967 in the Middle East. Israel 
took the Sinai Peninsula and a large area of the Middle East. Five 
years after that, in October 1973, the Yom Kippur War made this 
context more complicated. That is the origin of the oil embargo and 
the reason for the rise in oil prices. That also functions as a counter-
weight to the claims against inflation in the United States that moves 
toward the rest of the world.
Economic negotiations to redefine the rules of the financial 
system within the G7 (the countries which together controlled most 
of the world's international reserves) were influenced by pressures 
due to the war and the oil crisis (Eichengreen1996). Another front 
was opened by the diplomatic negotiations in 1973 that signed the 
peace of Vietnam in Paris, France. The alliances in the Middle East 
between Egypt, Israel and the United States were consolidated, while 
on the other hand it raised tensions between Iran and Iraq. This led to 
the stagflation crisis in the United States. It occurred from the 
late1973 until 1978, with prices increase and deficit in the balance of 
payments. In the same period, France and West Germany were reluc-
tant to limit the welfare state and held a covenant with social organi-
zations. 
But high oil prices and globalization of the oil problem, to-
gether with the reduction in prices of raw materials and food short-
ages, led to the beginning of the discussion on financial market re-
forms. This negotiation, that lasted more than eight years, was in the 
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context of the Middle East war and the price changes in international 
market. At the same time there was a strong progress in information 
technology, organization and internationalization of production in 
various products and regions. But also at this time the situation 
opened space for political confrontation between socialists, social 
democrats and conservative liberals in the G7 countries. 
When those long negotiations finished, a consolidation of 
agreements took place in 1978 in Kingston, Jamaica. The members 
of the Assembly agreed on a proposal of the most developed coun-
tries. This agreement established financial support to countries which 
had problems in their finances and currency. It also established the 
mandatory application of certain rules in the framework of economic 
liberalism, such as: reduction of government intervention, floating 
exchange rate, control of inflation through monetary tightening 
measures, stabilization of the deficit, control of internal and external 
credit. The IMF became supervisor for the implementation of 
measures for the private financial system, in order to grant loans ac-
cording to free market rates. The reform was driven by the agreement 
between the G7 countries. It was a triumph of the neoliberal trend. It 
opened room to the triumph of Conservatives in England and Repub-
licans in the United States. This agreement was also an explicit ac-
ceptance of the IMF interference in the internal politics of the signa-
tory countries. 
6. Facing the change. Mexico goes against
During the period 1971-79 in Mexico the state intervention 
was strengthened. The government spoke of a "shared development" 
strategy. This occurred in spite of investment restrictions, capital 
flight, and pressures by entrepreneurs, who insisted to reduce the size 
of government intervention and to have lower taxes. Paradoxically 
the boom in the oil market and the strategic geographical location 
encouraged Mexican government to implement a development pro-
ject which would be supported by a state-controlled sector and  
would limit any intervention of international financial capital. Hav-
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ing disposal of oil and capital loans at low interest rates, the govern-
ment had sufficient guarantees of foreign loans. At that time Western 
commercial banks were lending to all developing countries without 
limit and without adequate warrant.  Mexico was no exception. The 
government increased public debt and offered to warrant the debt of 
large Mexican companies.
The decline in commodity prices and the increase in the prices 
of technology and capital goods led to the crisis that President Luis 
Echeverría faced in 1976.  The deficit in the balance of payments and 
the pressure of capital flight forced the devaluation of the currency
for the first time since 1954. However exports declined temporarily. 
A loan was negotiated with IMF and the government accepted to use 
oil resources in support of public finances as security for the debt 
that contracted (Memo Mexico-IMF 1976). The signing of this un-
derstanding caused the flight of capitals of the main investors, in 
1976, and the forestalling of goods that caused shortages of various 
commodities. Business groups were the promoters of this pressure. 
They influenced the appointment of the presidential candidate and 
negotiated with him. The successor of Luis Echeverría, José López 
Portillo, would agree to lead the economy by means of reforms, and 
accepted in fact the dependency on foreign resources.
Some recommendations by the IMF were ratified by López 
Portillo in January 1977. They included the balance of the budget 
and the proposal that public finances could have but a small deficit. 
There was also the first reference to a floating exchange rate in many 
years. However the most relevant statement was this: the earnings of 
oil exports could be used to support the public finances because of 
the deterioration in commodity prices and in the terms of trade in
general. When this agreement was negotiated, the information about 
the disposal of oil resources was not published yet; this would have 
been after the first act of the new government of López Portillo in 
December 1976. Because of the exploitation and export of crude oil, 
the debt with the IMF was redeemed soon (Arroyo 2005). 
Moreover, in those years, with the assurance of high oil prices, 
international banks lent to private companies and commercial banks; 
while the government signed as guarantor. During the 1983 crisis, 
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corporate debt was recognized as public debt. In this package the 
bank debt, acquired because of the expropriation, was also included. 
There were two ways to make the private debt public. One was the 
nationalization of the FICORCA3
If one reads the terms of the engagements that Mexico signed 
in the agreement with the IMF in 1976,  he can visualize the first 
signs of what would later be the adjustment program (which was 
conditioned by the loans contracted during the crisis of 1982). The 
terms of this program were the same mentioned above: financing 
public expenditure through the revenues coming from natural re-
sources (oil); beginning of trade liberalization; reducing government 
spending; deregulation, cancellation of subsidies and privatization of 
public enterprises. Such principles were foreign to the policy and 
rhetoric of the State-Party (PRI)
and of the other banks. The other 
was to pay with public money the debts of the banks. This, together 
with the government's own debt, formed the total amount of public 
debt, which determined the government's financial difficulties in the 
next 10 years. The foreign debt grew up from 22,000 US million dol-
lars to 86,000 millions. 
4
After 1979 oil prices were falling. In 1981-82 there was an in-
flation in the US economy and an extraordinary rise in interest rates. 
The US Federal Reserve forced Mexico to apply the new interest 
rates from 1979 to 1985. Then they rose from 4.5% to 24%.
, but now they were supported by 
the power itself.
Thus Mexico was in trouble for both the increased liability and 
the reduced earnings in foreign exchange. In this context capital 
flight occurred, the peso was devaluated. Then the cancellation of 
payment obligation was announced. The group that was elected in 
July 1982, led by Miguel de la Madrid, in complete agreement with 
the reforms suggested, led to a clearer willingness to implement the 
                                                          
3 Fideicomiso de cobertura contra el riesgo cambiario”. There were public 
resources that the government used to buy the private debt signed in dollars, 
and to put it in Mexican pesos.  
4 “Partido Revolucionario Institucional”.
 
Globalization and Economic Crisis
176
 
recommendations of the IMF, that were already part of the standard 
body. 
It's in December 1982 that the implementation of a market 
model and the requirements of the adjustment program began. That 
program was already applied in other countries, and consisted in 
structural reforms. In that critical situation Mexico, being in a virtual 
absence of foreign exchange, could not import some essential goods. 
Then the Secretary Jesus Silva Herzog obtained a letter of intent for a 
Credit Agreement Extended by 4500 million dollars for the period 
January 1983 to December 1985. In these negotiations, unlike those 
of 1976, the first letter of Intent between the government and the 
IMF was signed. It established the conditional loan of IMF to com-
mercial banks of 5000 million dollars.
The conditions imposed by the IMF and accepted by the gov-
ernment were: trade liberalization and deregulation of domestic 
trade, reducing the size of government through the sale of public en-
terprises, reduction of the deficit to the point of zero, reform of fi-
nancing system, with the transformation of commercial banks. Both 
the memorandum of 1976 and the agreement of 1983, between the 
Mexican government and the IMF, are the main antecedent of ac-
ceptance to join the GATT and then the negotiation on NAFTA. 
Thus, the IMF set the conditions for recovery and gave the re-
sources to overcome the crisis stemming from international banks, 
through loans where several banks were associated. The engagement 
was to apply the adjustment program. Throughout the decade, Mexi-
co’s negotiations (which later paved the way for other developing 
countries) had a clearly evolutionary character. Each step was done 
in the beginning with great difficulty. The debt negotiation and insti-
tutional transformation, which went together, followed these steps: 
August to December 1982, the beginning; January 1983 to Septem-
ber 1985, first phase; 1986 to 1987, second phase; 1988 to 1993, 
third phase; finally 1994 to 2002. 
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7. Neoliberal’s political success is in 1982
The negotiation of 1982 was the result of several years of con-
frontation between two groups in power, the technocrats (orthodox) 
and the nationalists (heterodox). The political triumph of the first 
group came with the appointment of Miguel de la Madrid as a candi-
date for the presidency of the Republic. Until that time, it was the 
President who defined the person who would be his successor. He 
used to do this after consulting the most influential political groups, 
which were at the basis of the decision. Elections were the formaliza-
tion and legalization of a decision taken by the dominant political 
and business groups, in which also labor unions were involved, to-
gether with peasant representatives, financial capital and powers 
from abroad. 
These arrangements operated since the constitution, in 1929, 
of the National Revolutionary Party (PNR), afterwards called Institu-
tional Revolutionary Party (PRI). This was the first time in 60 years 
of PRI’s governments that the decision was taken only by one politi-
cal group, which wanted the transformation of the country inspired 
by a radical ideological conception, the neoliberal orthodoxy. This 
was the time of the political triumph of the technocrats over the na-
tionalists. Since then we may say that the neoliberal group is in pow-
er.
The consequence of this institutional change was, since 1982, 
the acceptance and implementation of adjustment and stability pro-
grams, with the provisions included in the letters of intent signed 
with the IMF. The other element of institutional change was the deci-
sion to nationalize the banks and the beginning of the transformation 
of the financial system, with the rapid development of the stock mar-
ket. The agreement assumed the features of "political pacts", which 
involved the most important forces in the decisions of government: 
employers, unions and some civil organizations that accepted the 
plan of adjustment. 
After this agreement, a stabilization plan was implemented and 
the change of institutions started. The IMF recommendations were 
applied between 1983 and 1988. Later, after 1990, these changes 
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were the building blocks of the conditions agreed in the Washington 
Consensus. The form taken by the first program is the Immediate 
Economic Reconstruction Program (PIRE) in 1983, which aims to 
restructure the economy in the short term. President de la Madrid 
made the announcement since the beginning and put it into practice 
immediately.
After several visits for monitoring and surveillance by the IMF 
missions, with successive updating of the letters of intent, there was 
progress on several issues such as budget setting, the search for a re-
duced fiscal deficit, trade liberalization and the gradual construction 
of the stock market. However the acceptance of excessive financial 
obligations, payment of debt service without the possibility of post-
poning it, the inability to sustain an appropriate price level, but also 
the effects of the earthquake in 1985, all this left the adjustment pro-
gram with scarce results. The highest levels of inflation ever seen, 
mismatch of public finances, but also political instability because of 
internal ruptures in the political party, put seriously in doubt the gov-
ernment's intention to achieve price stability and to make further 
progress in the structural reforms. These years of low increase in 
production, hyperinflation and declining purchasing power of the 
population, are known as the "lost decade".
Stagnation and instability led to seek a solution to the crisis, 
which involved several countries. A controversy arose with the fi-
nancial creditors: the United States, the representatives of banks and 
multinational agencies. The Secretary Silva Herzog stated the need 
for resources to grow. It was impossible to pay debts without an in-
crease in economic activity and investments. He called for a debt re-
structuring that would include extension of time, low interest rates 
and a reduction of the total amount. The Mexican officials promoted 
a meeting of creditors in Cartagena in Colombia, and organized a 
debtors' club.
The denial by the creditors about debt restructuring led to the 
resignation of the Secretary Silva Herzog, just a few weeks before 
the meeting of IMF and World Bank in 1986 in Seoul, Korea. The 
meeting was attended by the new Secretary of Finance, Gustavo 
Petriccioli, who would accept without restrictions the conditions dic-
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tated by the creditors to all debtors in what became known as the 
Baker Plan. Reductions in debt obligations were allowed at the con-
dition of a more profound and explicit reform in the institutional 
structure of Mexico. 
The application of the Baker Plan was not sufficient to solve 
the problem of growth while still paying the debt. Then the Brady 
Plan was proposed and implemented in 1989/1990, for a new renego-
tiation with creditors. The implementation of reforms would be ex-
tended, but would be accepted by the US political forces and the G7 
nations, later joined by Russia. This made, in November 1989, the 
Washington Consensus start. In Mexico there was the experiment of 
this agreement. In this country already many aspects of this agree-
ment had been advanced.
This change of figures in the presidential cabinet of Miguel de 
la Madrid, gave strength and dominance to the group of technocrats 
headed by Carlos Salinas de Gortari. The latter in 1988 would remain 
in power as president. In the debates on the appointment of the presi-
dential candidate, there were political differences. The electoral pro-
cess altered the tradition of legitimizing the presidential designation. 
The electoral result that gave the victory to Salinas will always re-
main in doubt. It was in fact questioned, and the differences in the 
outcome of the vote was never clear. That dubious election raised the 
need to implement an electoral institution independent of the gov-
ernment to legitimize the elections. This fact closed the period of the 
State-Party, but left in power the group that would implement more 
forcefully the economic and political structural reforms inspired by 
the neoliberal model. 
Thus the Washington Consensus approach was first imple-
mented and experimented in Mexico since 1983. Then it was the ba-
sis for the acceptance of a more binding and strong rule, that is the 
international treaties that would be signed later in 1994. This opened 
the treaty era, with the American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
Such a project had been prepared for years, but till then it had not 
found the conditions required for its full implementation. After the 
reforms introduced from 1983 to 1993, the NAFTA agreement al-
lowed the final access to the GATT, the free movement of capital, 
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the constitution of the stock market, privatization of public enterpris-
es (including banks that would have been nationalized in 1982) and 
the autonomy of the central bank.
The institutional framework had changed.  In 1994 there was a 
presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, who could have put in 
doubt the above mentioned reforms. Because of this, he was assassi-
nated through a derangement. Then Ernesto Zedillo went into power. 
He was a strong follower of liberal reforms, and strengthened all of 
them. 
NAFTA became effective in January 1994. It had the year 
2009 as the deadline for its full implementation. Since the beginning 
there were the conditions for a new economy based on open market 
and backed by the force of law and by international conventions. 
Mexico agreed, once and for all, on an economic program which has 
at its basis a deregulated economy, with limited government interfer-
ence, a reduced deficit, floating exchange rate. This economic and 
social model was completely different from that which had been 
supported by the state-party, which followed the ideology of the 
Mexican Revolution. The NAFTA is more than a free trade agree-
ment. It is the legal frame of the new relationships between Mexico, 
Canada and USA; that involves also governmental decisions of eco-
nomic policy, and other binding engagements in various fields.    
The international context is essential in order to understand the 
evolution of economic policy that Mexico underwent. The negotia-
tions about the financial crisis, which changed the Bretton Woods 
agreement, occurred at the time of the privatization of the banking 
system and the reform in the financial system. The financial support 
did not come anymore from the most important countries through 
multilateral organizations. The financial powers, that now included 
also Germany and Japan, decided to establish private international 
financial markets, stocks and securities firms, the bonds of govern-
ment debt. Agreements about consumer goods and capital goods, 
project investments and development of new technologies will be 
negotiated in a global market. All this would be established, in a 
network with perfect and secure lines of communication, from the 
financial centers of Wall Street in New York to the City of London 
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and other stock exchange centers, like Paris, Frankfurt and Tokyo. 
Around these, other stock exchange centers are connected in real 
time. This is the basis of what is understood as globalization in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The global stock mar-
ket is one of the main institutions built for the working of economy 
in the XXI century. 
This financial structure calls for open economies in the trade 
of goods, but the most important thing is the flow of capitals. The 
open market is supported by the idea of full freedom for the individ-
ual. The basic principle is that there must be no obstacles to prevent 
consumer decisions. The government has to reduce its scope of ac-
tion in society, apart from public safety, education and health care. In 
some cases room is left to public infrastructures.
This approach replaces the idea of protecting production with 
subsidies and other support, with the aim of growth. The new logic is 
based on productivity, competition and free trade, to the benefit of 
consumers. It is assumed that citizens as consumers are adults and 
are able to decide for themselves without the guidance of govern-
ment.
8. Conclusion
Thirty years after the start of liberal reforms that changed the 
social system, we can find that they are not yet fully implemented, 
and have not yielded the expected results. In fact economic stagna-
tion prevails, with low growth rates and increasing poverty. The 
middle class has not emerged, human conditions of the majority of 
population are not improved, dependence and subordination to the 
US economy is growing. Mexico remains the provider of cheap labor 
and raw materials with very low costs, and is increasingly linked to 
the US cycle of industrial production and consumption.
The radical orthodox groups maintain that the measures im-
plemented have fundamental flaws; they have not been applied as 
they should; there have been populist concessions. Gradualists main-
tain that the present policy should keep following the same path; be-
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cause we have to wait for processes to mature. But eventually there 
emerges, although with little force, the search for alternatives. It is 
based on the critique of structural failures, of the excessive concen-
tration of wealth and the impoverishment of the population. 
The main features of the institutional changes in Mexico, re-
sulting from the structural adjustment program, implemented in dif-
ferent phases, and the subsequent acceptance of the rules of NAFTA, 
are the following.
1) ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND FISCAL POLICY.
a) In this area we have a fundamental change in the state. It 
passes from a strong government intervention in the economy to an 
attitude that waives any interference. Now it confines itself to the po-
litical and social task of the modern state: health care, education, and 
poverty relief.
In the new framework, the government renounces to control 
certain products considered strategic, such as fertilizers, petroleum 
and chemical industry. The main purpose of this reform was to make 
the companies responsible for their activity and to reduce radically 
the government activity. 
b) A most debated argument, since the beginning of the re-
forms, is why tax collection gives so low revenues. It has been at-
tributed to the bad efficiency of the institutions in charge of taxation. 
But it has also been found that there is preferential treatment on tax 
exemptions and special regimes that have not changed after the re-
forms. When tax officials showed the intention to charge more taxes, 
tensions arose between the government and the business world. Since 
at present power is in favor of business, the government does not 
want to charge it by changing its fiscal policy. It looks for support by 
different income sources such as the exploitation and export of oil. 
The real problem is not the low efficiency of tax collection, it is ra-
ther the privileged treatment of investors and big business, who find 
many ways to avoid or evade taxes.
For the neoliberal approach, fiscal policy should not inhibit 
investments, and should strengthen indirect taxes on consumption.
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c) Control of current expenditure. Decrease in the number of 
public employees. Transfer of public workers to the private sector, 
because public employees often enjoy better conditions than the pri-
vate ones.
d) Restructuring Public Administration: reorganizing the sys-
tem to make it more efficient. The reform has suppressed the Minis-
try of Public Property (Patrimonio Nacional). It also puts strong lim-
its to the Economic Ministry: sections dealing with price control and 
control of public companies are redefined or suppressed; subsidies 
are eliminated. 
The sale of assets of the public sector provides additional in-
come which allows a deficit reduction.   
e) Privatization of public enterprises. "The fundamental belief 
is that private enterprise is more efficient and more dynamic than the 
public company" (Alba Vega 1996). It involves the purpose to sell 
profitable public enterprises and to suppress the unprofitable; and to 
eliminate trusts in order to promote production.
2) PRODUCTION IN THE REAL ECONOMY: DEREGU-
LATION
a) Elimination of price controls.
b) Withdrawal of the state from the market. Closure or privati-
zation of state economic agencies.
c) Elimination of investment control and indiscriminate open-
ing to foreign investment market.
d) Deregulation of the financial system, which means rising 
interest rates in order to increase savings. Financial support will be 
awarded to the most profitable projects.
3) INTEGRATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET 
ECONOMY
a) Support to a competitive exchange rate, to encourage ex-
ports.
b) Reduction of import duties in order to have cheaper goods. 
Local industries have to be more competitive or to close up.
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c) Export incentives for agricultural products, previously pro-
duced only for the domestic market. Financial subsidies to the pri-
vate sector.
d) Avoiding an unsettled trade balance, especially with the 
United States, the country's most important trading partner.
4) MONETARY AND FINANCIAL SECTOR. 
a) Ways of financing production. In the new policy, resources 
for production are made available through the sale of securities in the 
market. In fact bank credit is expensive and difficult to be obtained. 
This new market condition, started in 1982,  marginalizes banks and 
the government itself. It also stimulates the integration of the stock 
market and money market with the brokerage business. 
b) Giving autonomy to the Bank of Mexico. Since 1993 the law 
grants the Central Bank only these tasks: achieving economic stabil-
ity, checking the monetary supply and controlling the currency mar-
ket against speculation. These functions promote a monetary policy 
to attract more investments. 
The Central Bank also guarantees for the payments to the in-
vestors; it holds currency reserves equivalent to, or greater than the 
amounts invested in the market. It is also engaged to pay debt service 
and the principal, even in case the debt is restructured. 
5) SOCIAL SECURITY
In the area of social services government spending provides 
for the population in poverty, basic education for poor children, 
health system, etc. These measures want decentralization, by delegat-
ing responsibilities to the municipal or regional level. It's remarkable 
how much public expenditure is devoted to these fields, although so-
cial security institutions of the former regime are still prevailing, 
such as the IMSS (Mexican Institute of Social Security) and the 
ISSSTE (Social Security Institute for State Workers). The most im-
portant reform is the one which has to do with the financial sector 
directly, that is the retirement pension system. In this area there is a 
new system that will be fulfilled in about 15 years.
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In the present discussion there is a tendency to replace the two 
large institutions that are currently engaged with the unemployed 
(Chávez Presa et al. 2012).
6) THE LABOUR SPHERE
a) Implementation of a wage policy that limits the annual in-
creases to the level of expected inflation. This allows wages to be a 
price benchmark that hinders price raising, and reflects a shrinking 
market for the gradual reduction of the consumption capacity.
b) Promoting the weakening of unions and their ability to exert 
political pressure, in order to reduce  the presence of organized labor 
in politics.
c) The labor reform was passed in the final days of govern-
ment, which ended in December 1, 2012. It contains greater facilities 
for entrepreneurs in their relationships with unions and workers. The 
new labor law allows more flexibility in hiring workers, in the set-
tlement of contracts, in hiring outsourcing companies. This increases 
pressure on workers and the unions. 
The declared purpose is to create more jobs. But in fact this re-
form does not create more jobs. For this purpose more investments 
should be promoted, and better wages should be allowed to enlarge 
the domestic market.  
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